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Abstract 
 
The overall aim of this study was to investigate the extent to which and ways 
in which Irish relief and development nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) were 
linked with the concepts of legitimacy and accountability in Irish Times newspaper 
coverage between 1994 and 2009.  This research was based on a quantitative content 
analysis of 215 Irish Times articles and the results were analysed using statistical 
methods.  Key findings of the research included that NGO accountability received 
significantly more coverage than NGO legitimacy, “principal-agent” approaches to 
NGO accountability received significantly more coverage than “stakeholder” 
approaches to NGO accountability, and questioning of NGOs based on either their 
accountability or legitimacy was very limited.   It is suggested that these findings 
may indicate both a failure by Irish NGOs to promote “development literacy” and 
global solidarity among the Irish public, and a limited degree of “development 
literacy” and global solidarity among the Irish public. 
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1.1 Introduction 
The 1994 Rwandan genocide, which resulted in the deaths of between 
500,000 and 800,000 Rwandese, the internal displacement of at least 850,000 and the 
movement of over 1.5 million into neighbouring countries (Buchanan-Smith, 2003, 
p. 10) is widely recognised as a crucial moment in the recent history of relief and 
development nongovernmental organisations (NGOs).  The humanitarian response 
that followed the genocide was both extensive and high profile: over 200 NGOs and 
an estimated 500 media personnel worked in the affected areas during 1994 alone 
(Relief and Rehabilitation Network, 1996).  Despite the scale of the response, 
however, 80,000 people are believed to have died in the aftermath of the crisis, 
largely from preventable diseases, in mainly NGO-run refugee camps (Relief and 
Rehabilitation Network, 1996).  More damningly, NGOs were accused of having 
prolonged the conflict by providing aid to perpetrators of the genocide (Polman, 
2010).  Perhaps unsurprisingly given this accusation, the scale of human suffering 
and the intense media focus on Rwanda, an unprecedented level of scrutiny of 
NGOs, and in particular international NGOs, both within and outside the sector 
ensued.   
Analyses of NGO performance in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide 
differed greatly in terms of their scale and conclusions.  Some commentators 
suggested that NGOs had performed as well as they could have in a particularly 
difficult situation (Khan, 2001).  Others argued that the real failings in Rwanda were 
political, diplomatic and military rather than humanitarian (Storey, 1997).  Others 
still argued that the problems identified with NGO work had also been features of 
previous humanitarian responses (Deloffre, 2010 ).  A comprehensive “official” 
evaluation of NGO performance was undertaken by a committee that included 
representatives from bilateral donor agencies, the European Union, multilateral and 
United Nations units, and NGOs (Relief and Rehabilitation Network, 1996).   This  
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda concluded that “whilst many 
NGOs performed impressively, providing a high quality of care and services, a 
number performed in an unprofessional and irresponsible manner that resulted not 
only in duplication and wasted resources but may also have contributed to an 
unnecessary loss of life” (Relief and Rehabilitation Network, 1996, p. 23).   
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Whereas there have always been individual NGO practitioners and outside 
observers who analysed NGO performance (e.g. Korten, 1990, Edwards and Hulme, 
1992), in the years prior to the Rwandan genocide NGOs were routinely portrayed as 
a “magic bullet” for the problems of development that could be fired off in any 
direction and would still find their target (Vivian, 1994, Edwards and Hulme, 
1996b).  The Rwandan experience marked a watershed for NGOs as it appeared to 
finally dispel the notion of NGOs as an automatic and uniform force for good. In the 
years that followed, commentators discussed a range of concepts oriented towards 
improving NGO performance and restoring their public image.  These included 
transparency (Fox, 2007), responsibility (Fry, 1995), legitimacy (Lister, 2003) and 
accountability (Najam, 1996).  Of these it was accountability, which had been 
specifically identified as a point of NGO weakness in the Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, which gained most traction inside and outside the 
sector.   Whereas before 1994 NGOs had been portrayed as a magic bullet for the 
problems of development, in the years that followed accountability was portrayed as 
a magic bullet for the problems of NGOs.  Indeed, some commentators proposed that 
accountability be considered the “central goal of development” (Litovsky and 
Gillivray, 2007, p. 4).  This emphasis on accountability, sometimes accompanied by 
references to other concepts such as legitimacy, was in keeping with the zeitgeist, 
which was marked by a global accountability culture that remains influential today.  
For example, whereas the starting year of the time period under consideration in this 
study (1994)  is marked by the Rwandan genocide and the subsequent emphasis on 
NGO accountability, the concluding year of the study (2009) witnessed the 
introduction in Ireland of charity legislation, which aims to “ensure the 
accountability of charitable organisations” (Government of Ireland, 2009, p. 16). 
The self-reflection that occurred in the NGO sector in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide manifested itself not only in questions surrounding NGO 
accountability, but also in deeper reflections on appropriate NGO roles.   Although 
the charge had long been made that relief and development NGOs attended primarily 
to the symptoms of global inequality to the neglect of its underlying causes, this 
view appeared to gain momentum towards the end of the 1990s.  In 2002, for 
example, Fowler (p. 22) memorably described most NGOs as acting as “ladles in the 
global soup kitchen” and went on to argue that NGOs should focus their energies on 
achieving structural reform in how states, markets, civil society and governing 
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institutions function.  Seemingly heading the charge on a mission to re-orient NGO 
activities during this period was Michael Edwards, a long-time NGO practitioner and 
analyst, whose work has considerably influenced this thesis.  Edwards  (1998, p. 3) 
cautioned NGOs to avoid “slipping out of ‘service innovation’ designed to lever 
change on a broader level into ‘service substitution’ or large-scale service delivery 
where the stress is on replacement of public functions and the consequent erosion of 
the duty of states to provide and care for all their citizens”. In a dichotomy that came 
to be widely-cited, Edwards (1998) characterised these two potential NGO 
orientations as “development as delivery” and “development as leverage” and 
strongly recommended that the latter be pursued.   One practical measure 
prominently advocated by Edwards (Edwards et al., 1999, p. 125, Edwards, 2004) as 
a means for NGOs to operationalise “development as leverage” was “building 
constituencies for international cooperation”.  By this he intended that NGOs should 
focus on activating a citizenry in the developed world that could work for changes in 
larger structures such as markets, politics and the media with a view to advancing 
international co-operation and global equality.   
 This thesis is concerned with relief and development NGOs with 
headquarters in the Republic of Ireland during the period 1994-2009.  Changes of 
particular relevance to Irish NGOs that occurred during this period include the rapid 
rise and subsequent fall in the budget of the official Irish aid programme, Irish Aid.  
In 1994, the total Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) provided by Irish Aid 
was €95 million; by 2008 this had increased to €920 million, and in 2009 a series of 
recessionary cuts dramatically reduced Irish ODA to €718 million (O'Neill, 2010).  
Along with increases in Irish Aid funding during this period came rapid increases in 
the numbers of Irish-based relief and development NGOs.  Indicative of these 
increases was the growth in membership of Dóchas, the umbrella body for Irish 
relief and development NGOs, from 17 in 1993 to 44 in 2009 (Dóchas, 2004, 
Dochas, 2009a).  The growth in both Irish Aid and numbers of Irish-based NGOs 
was symptomatic of wider changes in Ireland’s economic fortunes during the period 
of this study.  To simply state that Ireland went from growth to boom to bust or from 
being one of Europe’s poorest countries to one of its richest during this period fails 
to convey the extremes in economic fortunes experienced by the country.  At the 
time of writing, stress tests conducted on Irish banks, which suffered major losses 
resulting from the global financial crisis and a property bubble, suggested that the 
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final figure needed for an Irish bank bailout would be €70 billion (Press Association, 
2011).  Juxtaposing this figure against the €920 million given by Ireland in ODA at 
its highest point in 2008, or the US$120 billion in total ODA given in 2009 by the 
top 23 donors who form the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
(Development Co-operation Directorate, 2010), helps emphasise the extent of the 
Irish economic crash.  So too does the reflection that while Irish public discussions 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1994 were generally initiated by 
campaigners intent on highlighting apparently negative effects of IMF policies in the 
developing world (e.g. Good, 1994), in 2010 Ireland itself became a recipient of IMF 
funding.  
1.2 Background Argument  
 Influenced by the arguments of Edwards and others who have called for a 
radical reorientation of NGO roles, arguments that I review in Chapter 2, I argue that 
Irish NGOs should primarily focus their attention on the promotion of development 
literacy and global solidarity among the Irish population.  By the promotion of 
development literacy I mean the promotion of an awareness of development thinking 
and practice, and in particular the contested nature of development, to enable people 
to understand and critically assess proposals made in the name of development or 
likely to impact on development.  By global solidarity I intend a “global 
consciousness that constructs the grievances of physically, socially and culturally 
distant people as deeply intertwined” (Oleson, 2004). Considering the promotion of 
development literacy and global solidarity together I intend that Irish NGOs should 
primarily concern themselves with educating the Irish public about development 
issues, which given the implicitly value-laden nature of development literacy would 
inevitably encourage people to reach particular conclusions; and, by means of an 
emphasis on the explicitly value-laden concept of global solidarity, motivating them 
to either directly challenge global structural inequalities or support the efforts of 
others in this regard.  I argue that not only is such a reorientation of roles advisable 
for Irish NGOs given a myriad of international factors, but that Ireland in its current 
state of economic collapse represents an ideal time and place for such a 
transformation. 
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 As already described, critiques of NGO performance in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide seem dominated by the strikingly malleable concept of 
accountability.  While a substantial literature originating within the NGO sector 
suggests that conceptualizations of accountability that apply in other sectors are 
inappropriate for NGOs, the standard conclusion from this literature has been to 
propose alternative, NGO-specific conceptualizations of accountability rather than to 
reject the validity or usefulness of the concept outright (Brown, 2001, Ebrahim, 
2003, Wenar, 2006).   In particular, a prominent distinction has emerged within 
NGO accountability literature between principal-agent and stakeholder approaches 
to accountability.  Broadly speaking, principal-agent approaches in this context 
centre on the idea that NGOs have formal obligations to account to power-holders 
such as donors, and stakeholder approaches suggest that NGOs should account to all 
those likely to be affected by their actions whether or not they are formally obliged 
to do so.  Research to date has suggested that accountability as practised by NGOs 
generally corresponds with principal-agent approaches and has had a negative 
influence on the capacity of NGOs to fulfil their missions (Wallace et al., 2006, 
Mawdsley et al., 2005, Taylor and Soal, 2003).   
In this thesis I argue, firstly, that an emphasis on accountability by NGOs 
may be incompatible with the NGO role I have advocated based on the promotion of 
development literacy and global solidarity; and, secondly, that an emphasis on NGO 
accountability by others may indicate an absence of development literacy and global 
solidarity.  As I will describe in more detail in Chapter 3, these arguments are based 
on my convictions, firstly, that a questioning of NGO accountability generally 
amounts to a superficial critique in contrast to the deeper critical engagement that 
development literacy demands; and, secondly, that a focus on accountability rarely 
coincides with the prioritisation of those in whose name development initiatives are 
pursued, which I suggest is essential for global solidarity.  In this context, therefore, 
a questioning of NGO accountability amounts to asking the wrong question.  
 Having suggested that an emphasis on accountability may be antithetical to 
the role I recommend, I argue that the concept of legitimacy, which has received 
considerably less attention in NGO literature than accountability, has the potential to 
advance this role.  In contrast to NGO accountability I suggest that a focus on NGO 
legitimacy can promote an interrogation of underlying assumptions regarding work 
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undertaken in the name of development and may as a result enhance development 
literacy and global solidarity. 
 The final prong of the argument underpinning this study asserts that 
newspaper coverage in which NGOs are linked with the concepts of legitimacy and 
accountability may indicate both the extent to which NGOs are already promoting 
development literacy and global solidarity (i.e. fulfilling the role I recommend) and 
the extent to which the public already exhibit development literacy and global 
solidarity.  As outlined in Chapter 4, the mass communication theories of agenda 
setting and priming, which assert that the media is highly influential in influencing 
both the public agenda and how certain issues are perceived, are employed to justify 
the reliance on media coverage in the study. 
 The background argument to this study can, therefore, be broken into three 
parts as summarised below. 
1. Irish relief and development NGOs should reorient their activities towards 
the promotion of development literacy and global solidarity among the Irish 
public and now is a particularly opportune time for this reorientation.  This 
argument is described in more detail in Chapter 2. 
2. The ways in which NGOs refer to the concepts of legitimacy and 
accountability may indicate the extent to which NGOs are promoting 
development literacy and global solidarity and the ways in which the public 
refer to legitimacy and accountability in relation to NGOs may indicate the 
extent to which the public already exhibit development literacy and global 
solidarity.  This argument is described in more detail in Chapter 3. 
3. Irish Times newspaper coverage may serve as a reflection of NGO and public 
views in relation to legitimacy and accountability and hence may serve as an 
indicator both of the extent to which NGOs are already promoting 
development literacy and global solidarity and the extent to which the Irish 
public already exhibits development literacy and global solidarity.  This 
argument is described in more detail in Chapter 4. 
1.3 Empirical Research 
In light of the argument just described, the overall aim of this study is to 
empirically investigate the extent to which and ways in which Irish relief and 
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development NGOs are linked with the concepts of legitimacy, accountability and 
administration costs, which I identify as a particular accountability mechanism, in 
Irish Times coverage between 1994 and 2009.  Guided by this overall aim, a 
quantitative content analysis of 215 Irish Times articles published between 1994 and 
2009 in which NGOs are linked with the concepts of legitimacy, accountability and 
administration costs, forms the empirical investigation at the core of this study.  
Specifically, four research questions guide my empirical research. 
1. Is the quantity of coverage of NGO accountability greater than the quantity of 
coverage of NGO legitimacy? 
2. Is the quantity of coverage of principal-agent approaches to NGO 
accountability greater than the quantity of coverage of stakeholder 
approaches to NGO accountability? 
3. Is the quantity of coverage in which low NGO administration costs are 
presented as desirable greater than the quantity of coverage in which the use 
of low NGO administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality is 
questioned or disputed? 
4. How critical is Irish newspaper coverage of relief and development NGOs? 
1.4 Synopsis of Main Conclusions 
This study found that NGO accountability received far more Irish Times 
coverage during the period 1994-2009 than NGO legitimacy and that principal-agent 
approaches to NGO accountability received far more Irish Times coverage than 
stakeholder approaches to NGO accountability.   It also showed that during this 
period there were significantly more Irish Times articles in which low administration 
costs were presented as desirable than articles in which the validity of low 
administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality were questioned or disputed.   
Measured in terms of Irish Times coverage of questioning of NGO legitimacy and 
accountability, this study also showed a very uncritical approach to NGOs across the 
period of the study.  If one accepts the background arguments of this study as to the 
relevance of legitimacy and accountability for development literacy and global 
solidarity and the appropriateness of using Irish Times coverage as a possible 
reflection of NGO and public views, then one can conclude that these findings may 
indicate both a failure by Irish NGOs to promote development literacy and global 
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solidarity among the Irish public, and a limited degree of development literacy and 
global solidarity among the Irish public. 
 
1.5 Terminology 
As with most academic endeavours this thesis is replete with terminology 
that meets W. B. Gallie’s (1956) definition of “essentially contested concepts”, the 
meanings of which are explicitly disputed.  While the language of development, 
upon which much of this thesis relies, merits, and has already been, the subject of 
detailed scrutiny in its own right (e.g. Cornwall, 2007), this section confines itself to 
mentioning certain concepts that will be defined in detail later in this thesis and 
briefly defining some additional terms.  
As I discuss in Chapter 2, the term development is, of course, itself contested.  
While my perspective on development is broadly aligned with a Human 
Development Approach (Klugman, 2010), in most instances my use of the term 
development refers simply to its use by others who may take this or other 
approaches.  In addition, while the argument has been convincingly made that in a 
globalised world with geographically spread patterns of inequality and poverty, a 
sharp division between rich and poor countries or developed and developing 
countries is no longer possible (Edwards, 1999a), there are instances when it remains 
useful to distinguish between different parts of the world on the basis of their 
perceived levels of development, however that is defined.  Hence the language of 
this thesis continues to cautiously invoke this division with the dichotomies between 
Developed and Developing World and North and South being used interchangeably. 
The terms legitimacy, accountability and nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) are central to this thesis and are interrogated in Chapters 2 and 3.  The focus 
of attention in this study is international relief and development NGOs that have 
originated in, and retain physical bases in, developed countries.  While, traditionally, 
the activities undertaken in support of relief or humanitarian operations were seen as 
very different to those undertaken in the name of development, it has more recently 
been argued that across the board NGOs now seek to achieve long term impacts from 
their work making most of them developmental (Dichter, 1999).  Because of this, 
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and because of a widespread tendency for NGOs to describe their activities in terms 
of both relief and development, both are considered together in this thesis.    
In common with much NGO accountability literature, the term stakeholders 
is widely used in this thesis.  While this term has assumed managerialist 
connotations in recent years, for the purpose of this study stakeholders refers simply 
to those with perceived interests or stakes in something.  The term critical is also 
frequently referred to in this thesis, including in the fourth research question which 
asks how critical is newspaper coverage of Irish relief and development NGOs.   In 
this thesis the term critical is used to convey serious and careful evaluation or 
critique. 
Finally, an important dichotomy invoked throughout this study is between 
NGOs and “the public” – e.g. newspaper coverage is analysed in terms of what 
NGOs are reported to say (i.e. mediated communications from NGOs) and what “the 
public” (also referred to as “others” or “other actors”) are reported to say (i.e. 
mediated communications from others).  While I acknowledge from the outset that 
there is neither a single public with a uniform perspective nor that NGOs are uniform 
in their views I suggest that this division is helpful in distinguishing between 
reported NGO perspectives and the reported perspectives of others who NGOs might 
reasonably hope to influence.  These “others” are all categorised together under the 
broad heading of “the public”. 
1.6 Rationale and Motivation for Research 
My interest in NGO roles, legitimacy and accountability stems largely from 
my professional experience, particularly my work with GOAL, one of the NGOs 
under consideration in this study.  Between 1999 and 2009 I was employed in 
GOAL’s Irish head office as a logistician.  During this period I was in ongoing 
contact with colleagues throughout the developing world and also spent time both as 
an independent traveller and on work assignments in various developing countries.  
While employed by GOAL I was responsible for conducting high value international 
procurement and developing and codifying logistics systems for GOAL overseas 
programmes.  Specifically, I developed policies relating to procurement, supply and 
distribution, warehousing, vehicle management, and communications and focused in 
particular on ensuring that these policies and GOAL logistics practices in general 
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were compliant with the requirements of its donors.  Much of my work with GOAL 
was explicitly oriented towards ensuring accountability for funds, which ultimately 
led me to question the usefulness of accountability as practiced by GOAL, its donors 
and the many other NGOs with which I had regular contact.  For example, I 
frequently wondered whether requiring “beneficiaries” to formally confirm 
acceptance even of very low value items might both undermine relationships 
between NGOs and beneficiaries and reduce the number of beneficiaries willing to 
participate in individual programmes thereby undermining their potential for success.  
Similarly, my international procurement experience made me very sceptical as to the 
value of reporting on administration costs, which I concluded could potentially 
conceal a host of inefficient practices – for example, an organisation that allowed an 
inexperienced volunteer to conduct its procurement could report 0% procurement 
administration costs and appear very efficient even if the person in question bought 
completely inadequate humanitarian supplies in inappropriate locations and at a cost 
far in excess of what which an experienced staff member could have obtained.   
Just as my logistics work led me to reflect on the issue of accountability, my 
exposure to GOAL (and other NGO) fundraising and development education 
initiatives led me to reflect on NGO roles and how day-to-day NGO activities might 
undermine their professed long term goals.  While my professional experience 
stimulated my interest in these subjects, this thesis ultimately owes its direction to 
the reading and reflection that followed my early thoughts.  As already noted, I have 
been particularly influenced by the work of Michael Edwards in this regard. 
While I acknowledge the overall scale and contribution of my research to be 
modest, I suggest that there is an onus on all researchers, however modest their 
work, to outline why it was worth conducting and why it is worth reading.  In 
general, I suggest that research on NGO roles is worthwhile because of the 
magnitude of global inequality in opposition to which NGOs profess to work and 
because of the immense funding and support invested in NGOs worldwide.  I 
suggest that newspaper coverage of NGO legitimacy and accountability is a worthy 
subject for research because of my belief, which as I will discuss in Chapter 4 
appears to be shared by many Irish NGOs,  that what NGOs say or are reported as 
saying may influence public opinion.  More specifically, I believe that analysis of 
this coverage is important as it may give an insight into the extent to which NGOs 
through their use of the concepts legitimacy and accountability are promoting 
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development literacy and global solidarity and the extent to which the public exhibit 
development literacy and global solidarity.  This research is innovative in that it 
focuses not on the practice of NGO legitimacy or accountability, but on how the 
concepts are reportedly talked about both by NGOs and in relation to NGOs and 
possible implications of this.  This research is also innovative in that it focuses on 
Ireland, which has a well-established and relatively well-funded NGO sector, but a 
relatively limited research base in relation to relief and development NGO activities.   
Having highlighted the potential merits of my work, I feel it also appropriate 
to acknowledge its limitations.  Firstly, the overall conclusions of this study pivot on 
a background argument, which I acknowledge from the outset may not be deemed 
convincing by all readers.  Secondly, there are a series of limitations inherent to 
quantitative content analysis, the method applied in this research, which I discuss in 
more detail in Chapter 5.  Thirdly, as I discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, there are 
limitations that stem from my application of content analysis, most obviously in my 
exclusive reliance on coverage from the Irish Times. 
1.7 Structure of Thesis  
The structure of this thesis follows a traditional pattern.  Chapter 1 (this 
chapter) provides an introduction.  Following overviews of development theory and 
practice, civil society trends, and theorizing on NGO roles, Chapter 2 develops the 
argument that Irish NGOs should primarily focus their attention on promoting 
development literacy and global solidarity among the Irish public.  After presenting 
overviews of theorizing on NGO legitimacy and accountability, Chapter 3 develops 
an ancillary argument as to why the ways in which NGOs are linked with legitimacy 
and accountability may serve to indicate both the extent to which NGOs are 
promoting development literacy and global solidarity and the extent to which the 
Irish public already exhibit development literacy and global solidarity.  Chapter 4, 
which discusses the media effects theories of agenda-setting and priming, provides 
the theoretical justification for the use of newspaper coverage as a possible reflection 
of NGO and public views.  Chapter 5 describes the philosophical perspective 
underpinning the research and the methods employed.  Chapter 6 describes the 
findings of the content analysis.  Chapter 7 brings together the literature review and 
results in a discussion of the study’s overall findings.   
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Chapter 2 
Irish Relief and Development NGOs: Why Now is the Time 
to Adopt New Roles 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter has a dual function.  Firstly, it aims to contextualise the 
discussion of relief and development NGOs by providing an overview of evolving 
development theory and practice and the changing roles of civil society 
organisations.  Secondly, it develops an argument that Irish relief and development 
NGOs should primarily focus on the promotion of development literacy and global 
solidarity among the Irish public.  While recognising that NGO activity in Ireland is 
both influenced by and to a lesser degree itself influences international trends, for the 
sake of clarity this chapter deals separately with the international and Irish contexts.  
As such, sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 provide overviews of development theory and 
practice internationally, changing civil society trends internationally, and theorizing 
on appropriate NGO roles.  Attention is then turned to the Irish context specifically 
where in sections 2.5 and 2.6 similar headings are used to explore the particularities 
of the Irish case.  Finally, the concluding discussion argues that not alone should 
Irish relief and development NGOs adopt new roles, but now is a particularly 
opportune time for them to do so. 
  
2.2 International Development and Aid: An Overview 
2.2.1 Changing Approaches to Development 
 The modern history of development can be understood as a prolonged 
engagement with the theory that economic growth equals development.  While this 
perspective has dominated traditional development discourse and practice, other 
approaches have been suggested by proponents of so-called “alternative 
development”.  In order to provide a basic overview of the terrain of development 
this section will identify some of the main shifts in both traditional and alternative 
development thinking and comment briefly on the ideas of post-development. 
The first major proclamation of the dream of development is routinely 
identified as Harry Truman’s inaugural address as president of the United States in 
1949.  In this he urged bold measures by Western countries to help less developed 
countries and argued that “greater production is the key to prosperity and peace” 
(cited in Kiely, 1999, p. 32).  Truman’s articulation of development was underpinned 
by modernization theory, which envisaged a linear path to development through 
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stable economic growth.  While this perspective has been harshly criticised for 
reasons including its paternalistic assumption that developing countries would 
uniformly aspire to develop along the lines of Western societies, it soon achieved 
mainstream status and development came to be measured through economic growth 
as indicated by GNP per capita.   
 Following neo-Marxist critiques of development theory in the 1960s and 
1970s (e.g. Gunder Frank, 1966), alternative development, associated initially with 
Robert Chambers (1997) and participatory development, emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s.  The parameters of alternative development are unclear.  As discussed by 
Pieterse (1998), alternative development can be defined in terms of specific features 
such as development from below with below implying both NGOs and communities, 
or it can be viewed in broader terms as a roving critique of mainstream development, 
shifting along with the latter.  While alternative development is diffuse, its varying 
strands appear to hold in common a view that economic indices alone are insufficient 
measures of development.  Specific problems identified with a reliance on such 
indices include their failure to consider inequality within countries, non-market 
transactions and the social costs of transactions (Storey, 2009).  Arguably the most 
prominent champion of the notion that development must extend beyond economic 
considerations is Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen (1999) whose work defined 
development in terms of the expansion of human freedom.   Alternative development 
can be criticised for overstating the homogeneity of mainstream development and for 
being co-opted into mainstream development thinking. 
By the 1970s, although economic growth was still central in mainstream 
development thinking, international recession and rising food prices led to poverty 
emerging as an important additional focus.  By the 1980s, rising developing country 
indebtedness and continuing poverty contributed to a widespread disquiet about the 
apparent failures of development and the suggestion that development theory had 
reached an impasse (Schuurman, 1994).  The view emerged in mainstream policy 
circles that many of the problems of development could be attributed to excessive 
developing country government involvement in economic markets.  This perspective 
prompted the emergence of neoliberal thinking in development (known as the 
Washington Consensus), which argued that governments should liberalize their 
economies in favour of the laissez faire economic paradigm.  Economic stabilization 
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and structural adjustment emerged as key specific policy prescriptions during the 
decade and were supported by controversial IMF and World Bank interventions.   
Despite the apparently high price paid by poor people in developing countries 
during the 1980s for the blanket imposition of neoliberal economic policies, 
including health sector reforms (Peabody, 1996), by the end of the 1980s 
development as originally conceived of seemed further away than ever for many 
developing countries.   Although in some cases growth had occurred, this had 
frequently been accompanied by increasing poverty.  Yet again mainstream Western 
development thinkers suggested reasons for the apparent failures of development.  
This time good governance and the need for developing country democracy were 
seized upon as essential conditions for development and soon began to appear in 
official development discourse and policies (Aubut, 2004, World Bank, 1994).    
From the 1990s onwards the influence of alternative approaches to 
development within mainstream thinking became increasingly obvious with a shift in 
emphasis away from growth and towards pro-poor policies.  A focus on greater 
country ownership and a renewed belief in the importance of the state also began to 
emerge.  These manifested themselves in initiatives including Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Aid Effectiveness Agenda.  Additional issues that 
had previously been the preserve of alternative development but penetrated official 
discourse and practice during this period included a focus on the link between 
poverty and developing country indebtedness, a focus on participation and 
empowerment, a concern with building local organizations and promoting civil 
society, a concern with gender issues, a concern with sustainability, and a rights 
agenda.   The emergence in 1990 of the UN Human Development Index (HDI), 
which ranked countries based on data including life expectancies, education and per 
capita GNI, represented one particularly strong indication of the widespread 
acceptance that measurements of development must encompass social indicators. 
While the picture painted so far suggests that the boundaries between 
alternative and mainstream development have become increasingly blurred, post-
development thinking, which emerged during the 1990s, remains resolutely 
independent of both.   Broadly speaking, post-development claims that all ideas of 
development imply the exercise of power by the West over others and that 
development, understood as interventions designed to engineer specific changes, 
should be rejected outright.  In arguing that universal Western middle class lifestyles 
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(which post-development theorists see as the goal of development) are neither 
sustainable or desirable, one of post-development’s key advocates, Wolfgang Sachs 
(1992, p.3), famously wrote that “it is not the failure of development which has to be 
feared, but its success”. 
Whereas alternative development is concerned with different ways of doing 
development, post-development is concerned with alternatives to development.  
Critics argue, however, that post-development has, in fact, failed to provide 
alternatives and that it offers “critique but no construction” (Pieterse, 2000, p. 188).  
Other common criticisms of post-development include the charges that it conflates 
all theories of development with the outmoded theory of modernisation (Kiely, 
1999), fails to acknowledged that many people want Western-style development 
(Storey, 2000), and romanticises local traditions and social movements ignoring the 
reality that they may also be embedded in global power relations (Escobar, 2000).   
 The ongoing commitment to the idea of development indicated by a huge 
international development infrastructure suggests that the influence of post-
development thinking has thus far been limited.  While economic growth remains 
central in much development thinking, it is generally now seen as only one of many 
necessary elements.  The current mainstream approach to development is dominated 
by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  Although not without their critics 
(Rigg, 2008), these eight goals, which were formulated in 2000 and have since been 
agreed to by all 192 United Nations members states, arguably represent the greatest 
consensus in development thinking ever achieved.       
 
2.2.2 Aid  
It has been argued that “in a world of moral uncertainty one idea is sacred, 
one idea cannot be compromised: the rich should help the poor, and the form of this 
help should be aid” (Moyo, 2009, p. xviii).  Aid, which is variously defined in terms 
of humanitarian aid, aid for long-term development initiatives, bilateral aid, 
multilateral aid, aid from individuals, and concessional loans, has been at the centre 
of the project of development right from the 1940s when the US unveiled the 
Marshall Plan committing it to transfer roughly US$14 billion to  European countries 
ravaged by World War II.  Of particular interest in this study is voluntary aid, which 
18 
 
refers to aid given by individuals and organisations often through NGOs; and ODA
1
, 
which refers to official aid given by governments.  
Since the 1950s over US$2 trillion in development-related aid has been 
transferred from rich countries to poorer ones (Moyo, 2009).  Aid has been used at 
different periods to support particular development priorities – e.g. as a response to 
poverty in the 1970s, as a tool for stabilization and structural adjustment in the 1980s 
and as a buttress of democracy and governance in the 1990s.  The prioritization of 
different agents of development at different times has also been noteworthy with 
NGOs receiving vastly increased sums during the 1980s, which were later reduced in 
favour of increased aid to governments.  The shifts in thinking regarding the agents 
of development can be linked to issues including the apparent professionalization of 
development (e.g. Kothari, 2005) and the changing conceptions of state and civil 
society, which I discuss later in this chapter.  Although aid levels as a proportion of 
developed country spending have been far higher in recent decades than they were in 
the 1950s, aid levels have not increased in a stable linear fashion.  During the Cold 
War aid was often given strategically with the aim of buying political influence and 
increased in response to perceived donor needs to buttress support.   From 1992 to 
1997 when the pattern of ideological-based distributions of aid that had built up 
during the Cold War began to break down, aid from the 22  donor countries that then 
made up the DAC, declined sharply (Fan and Yuehua, 2008).  Arguably one set of 
strategic motivations for aid were replaced by another, however, as since the 
September 11 2001 attacks on New York aid levels have substantially increased 
again.   While claims that aid had a limited impact on growth and poverty reduction 
became prominent during the 1990s, more recent reports have contradicted these 
claims (e.g. the UN Millennium Project Report prepared by Jeffrey Sachs and the 
Report of the Africa Commission chaired by Tony Blair provide evidence for aid 
effectiveness).  One of the most comprehensive and widely-cited analyses of aid 
(Riddell, 2007) found evidence of impact in areas including skills development, 
improved services, improved infrastructure, and improved education and health 
levels.   
                                                          
1
 The exact parameters of ODA are defined by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), which is a forum for 23 major donor countries and the European Commission. DAC. 2008. Is it 
ODA? [Online]. OECD. Available: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf [Accessed 18 
March 2011]. 
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In 1969 the UN recommended that developed countries donate 0.7% of their 
national income to development assistance.  Although only a handful of countries 
have ever achieved this target, it has gained huge prominence and been the focus of 
specific NGO campaigns.  However the measure has also received criticism on the 
grounds that it was calculated using assumptions that are no longer true and justified 
by a model that is no longer considered credible (Clemens and Moss, 2005).  In 
addition, analysts have cast serious doubt on the wisdom of basing aid levels on 
supply rather than demand indicators.  Put simply, there appears to be little 
justification for basing one country’s aid allocation on the economic performance of 
a different country in another part of the world.  
Although mainstream support for aid appears high (as indicated by recent 
campaigns such as Make Poverty History and Live 8), and, as already noted, some 
recent analyses point to positive impacts of aid, other high level analysts with varied 
perspectives and professional backgrounds continue to level criticisms at aid (Moyo, 
2009, Glennie, 2008, Collier, 2007, Easterly, 2006).  Their prescriptions range from 
the common view that aid can be harmful but should be reformed and continued 
(Easterly, 2006) to the more radical view that aid should be phased out (Moyo, 
2009).   Moyo (2009), for example, has argued that aid fosters corruption which in 
turn hinders growth, it reduces developing country government accountability to 
citizens by orienting them towards foreign donors, it ferments conflict, and it causes 
economic problems including reductions in domestic savings and investment, 
diminishing exports and inflation. 
If one takes on board the arguments of the aid critics, an obvious question 
presents itself: why does aid in its current form remain so popular if it has indeed 
proved so damaging?  A likely reason for the popularity of aid among recipient 
countries is the frequent absence of alternative means of revenue collection, although 
it is noteworthy that recent years have seen some developing countries, including 
Brazil and Argentina, pledging to voluntarily refuse aid.  Suggestions offered by 
Glennie (2008) as to aid’s popularity among donors include the proposition that aid 
is easy and that initiatives that would have a much higher impact on poverty would 
also have a much higher cost to donors (e.g. trade liberalization).  In addition, aid 
can be strategically useful: it can buy friends and be a good investment for donor 
countries who may tie it to the purchase of supplies or services from their own 
countries or preferential treatment for particular companies.  
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 Of particular note both in the context of strategic motivations for aid and the 
changing face of aid in general is the arrival of China as a major international aid 
player (Brautigam, 2009).  The conventional wisdom is that China gives aid without 
any strings attached primarily in return for access to resources.  However, in-depth 
analyses of Chinese aid suggest that the picture is more complex and that in its 
relationship with aid recipients China, in common with many other donors, 
simultaneously reveals itself as a development partner, economic competitor and 
colonizer (Alden, 2007). 
The relationship between NGOs and aid is complex.  NGOs could oppose 
multilateral and bilateral aid while still arguing for the continuation of NGO-
delivered aid.    Alternatively, NGOs could highlight difficulties with how aid has 
worked in the past and seek to promote reform of the aid agenda.  The NGO-led 
Make Poverty History campaign of 2005 was initially concerned with three issues: 
aid, debt and trade.  The aid component of this agenda was based not only on 
increasing aid, but also on better aid.  However, by the time Live 8 took place, 
increasing aid overwhelming dominated not only the aid element of the agenda, but 
also overshadowed the original calls relating to debt relief and trade justice (Glennie, 
2008).  NGOs, in general, have been persistent in their calls for increased aid (in 
which they have a vested interest) and there is virtually no evidence of NGO 
willingness to question the aid paradigm as a whole.     
In summary, while radical critiques of aid have gained prominence, most 
current analyses suggest that aid has had positive impacts while also acknowledging 
that this impact is influenced by other factors and that aid systems are in need of 
reform. 
2.2.3. Structural Impediments to Development 
You don't have to be a latter-day disciple of Marx to realise that policy 
changes are more important than aid to help end poverty. But those who 
have wanted to see a more root-and-branch reform of international trade and 
financial architecture, appealing to justice not charity, have tended to be a 
minority, drowned out by celebrities celebrating big-heartedness and 
removing politics from the equation (Glennie, 2011, p. 1) 
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One Irish development education consortium has attempted to pithily convey 
the impact of structural impediments to development using the formula 5:50:500 
(DevelopmentEducation.ie, 2010).  Based on statistical data this argues that whereas 
at least $5 billion in voluntary aid and $50 billion in ODA are transferred from rich 
countries to poor ones annually, at least $500 billion worth of resources are 
transferred from poor countries to rich ones.   According to the 5:50:500 argument 
this transfer occurs because of debt repayments, barriers to trade, subsidies, capital 
flight, “brain drain” from developing countries, and international policy on 
intellectual property rights.  This section will briefly discuss trade and developing 
country indebtedness, which can be considered structural impediments to 
development and have already been the subject of detailed attention.  It will also 
briefly discuss climate change and its impact on development. 
Whereas trade has long been touted as a pathway to development, the actual 
impact of trade policies on development is both complex and contested (Glennie, 
2008, O'Hearn, 2009).  It appears, however, that depending on certain internal and 
external conditions trade can promote development.   It also seems clear that the 
current global trading rules are skewed in favour of rich countries by means of 
mechanisms including trade barriers and subsidies.  The existence of overt trade 
barriers such as import tariffs, and hidden costs to trade such as overly-stringent 
health and safety regulations, has resulted in a situation where trade has been forced 
open in the things that rich countries are good at (e.g. manufacturing, technology and 
services) and remains closed in the things that poorer countries are competitive at 
(e.g. agriculture and textiles) (DevelopmentEducation.ie, 2010).  The use of 
subsidies results in a similar imbalance.  Whereas the Washington Consensus 
required developing countries to eliminate subsidies in return for IMF loans, affluent 
states continued to protect their own economies by means of subsidies.  It is 
frequently pointed out, for example, that the Common Agricultural Policy has 
resulted in European cows receiving larger daily subsidies than the average sub-
Saharan African person has to live on (Hasset and Shapiro, 2003). 
Developing country indebtedness has been the focus of ongoing 
campaigning.  In calling for a cancellation of what have been termed “illegitimate” 
debts, it has been argued that these debts are counterproductive as they often exceed 
the value of aid received, they have already been paid, and they were irresponsibly 
extended (Ní Chasaide, 2009).  While a variety of debt cancellation initiatives have 
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occurred since the 1990s onwards, debt cancellation has frequently been 
accompanied by controversial conditions.  New examples of apparently irresponsible 
lending to developing countries have also been documented (Ní Chasaide, 2009). 
Scientific evidence now overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that human 
activity leading to the emission of greenhouse gases is responsible for climate 
change (IPCC, 2007), which the 2010 UN Human Development Report (Klugman, 
2010) identified as the single factor most likely to derail advances in human 
development.  There appears to be a scientific consensus that climate change not 
only represents a threat to basic elements of life, including water, food production, 
health, and the environment, but that the negative effects of climate change will be 
experienced (and have been experienced to date) most acutely in developing 
countries (Stern, 2006).  This is, obviously, despite the fact that most emissions have 
resulted from the unsustainable consumption patterns of developed countries (Starke 
and Mastny, 2010, Democracy Now, 2009).  Due to the threat that climate change is 
posing to development and developing countries and the very high costs associated 
with mitigation and adaptation a coalition of interests has emerged arguing for the 
payment of what is termed “climate debt” by developed countries to developing 
countries to enable them to deal with the implications of climate change.   
Structural impediments to development are often considered in the context of 
‘Policy Coherence for Development’ (PCD).  PCD refers to “synergies between 
policies other than development cooperation that have a strong impact on developing 
countries, for the benefit of overseas development” (European Commission, 2010, p. 
1).  While PCD forms part of official discourse - e.g. the EU has been considering 
PCD in relation to 12 policy areas since 2005 - there appear to be many areas in 
which domestic policies continue to undermine development initiatives.  In the Irish 
context, for example, a comprehensive scoping report on PCD commissioned by the 
Advisory Board for Irish Aid (Barry et al., 2009a) identified Irish domestic policies 
that were damaging to developing country interests in the areas of agriculture, trade, 
fisheries, migration and the environment. 
2.3 International Civil Society and NGOs: An Overview 
  While civil society has a centuries-long history, recent decades have 
witnessed a clear upsurge in civil society activity and interest in this most elusive of 
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concepts.   Indeed in 1994, the starting point for this study, one commentator 
(Salamon) famously declared that the upsurge in organized voluntary activity evident 
globally amounted to an “associational revolution”.  Defining civil society is 
problematic in part because of the myriad of institutions and movements that it is 
said to comprise, including: nonprofit organisations, nongovernmental organisations, 
voluntary organisations, community organisations, the third sector, the independent 
sector, social movements, religious movements, social networks and charities.   
Although frequently understood as a space outside of the confines of the state and 
the market, the degree to which different civil society organisations interact with or 
rely on the state and market also differ substantially.  Unsurprisingly given the 
diversity of usages of the term civil society, there is also a significant diversity in the 
roles performed by so-called civil society organisations.  Together with colleagues 
and based on findings from 17 countries, Salamon (2000) hypothesized that five 
roles were particularly likely and appropriate: service-provision, innovation, 
advocacy, expressive and leadership development, and community building and 
democratization. 
 NGOs form a prominent part of civil society as reflected by the awarding of 
the Nobel Peace Prize to a coalition of NGOs in 1997 and an individual NGO just 
two years later.  Although accurate data on the number of NGOs is difficult to 
obtain, a 2000 (Economist) estimate suggested that there were more than 30,000 
active international NGOs, and a 2005 study (Union of International Associations in 
Werker and Ahmed, 2008) put the number at over 20,000.  While, like civil society 
itself, the definition of NGOs is problematic (e.g. Martens, 2002), NGOs are 
frequently characterised as the subset of civil society that engages in international 
development activities (Werker and Ahmed, 2008).  The more specific definition 
offered by Vakil (1997, p. 2060) of NGOs as “self-governing, private, not-for-profit 
organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged 
people” is adopted here because it well describes the relief and development NGOs 
that are the subject of this research.      
 Based on a review of classification schemes Vakil (1997) identified and 
described six possible NGO orientations, which overlap substantially with the roles 
identified by Salamon, Helms et al. (2000).  Firstly, a welfare orientation refers to 
the provision of basic services based on a charity model.  Secondly, a development 
orientation refers to efforts to improve the capacity of a community to provide for its 
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own basic needs.  Thirdly, an advocacy orientation refers to efforts to influence 
policy or decision-making.  Fourthly, development education refers to educating 
citizens in the developed world about development issues.  Fifthly, a network 
orientation refers to efforts by NGOs to channel information and assistance to other 
NGOs and individuals.  Finally, and without need for additional explanation, comes 
a research orientation.  While Vakil’s overview reveals possible options for relief 
and development NGOs, and implicitly makes a case for the usefulness of NGOs in a 
variety of roles, it says little about the degree to which they actually practice 
different roles or the factors that lead them to adopt these roles. To understand this 
requires one to revisit the changing terrain of international development thinking and 
resultant patterns of aid distribution.   Note that from this point forward unless 
otherwise stated all references to NGOs should be understood to refer to relief and 
development NGOs. 
 As already described, current approaches to development thinking are 
peppered with ideas that were originally conceived of as alternative development.  
While NGOs were originally at the vanguard of alternative development, it has been 
suggested that they moved towards a broad accommodation with mainstream 
neoliberal approaches to development during the 1980s (Bristow, 2008).  A primary 
reason for this was the availability of funding.  During the 1980s the growth of 
official development aid to NGOs outstripped almost fivefold the growth in ODA 
itself (Fowler, 1992).   A major reason for this upsurge in NGOs’ financial fortunes 
was the emergence from the 1980s onwards of “new public management” (NPM).  
NPM is associated with the notion that governments should dedicate their energies to 
“steering not rowing” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and is broadly understood as a 
cluster of ideas and ensuing regulatory practices that apply private sector and 
business approaches in the public sector (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000).  
Commentators have, however, pointed out that there has been a considerable 
variation in the ways in which NPM has been adopted (Hood, 1995) and that 
different models of NPM exist (Ferlie et al., 1996).  Managerialism, which may be 
linked with NPM, has been described as entailing “advocacy of formal rational 
management, corporate strategic plans with specified objectives as well as internal 
and external accountability systems oriented towards the measurement of efficiency 
and effectiveness” (Parker and Lewis, 1995, p. 212) . While managerialism predates 
the emergence of NPM, it has come to be so strongly associated with it that 
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separating out the exact components of each of these contested concepts is 
problematic.  For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, the term managerialism will 
be used as an umbrella term for the series of ideological and regulatory changes 
oriented towards the reform of public administration that occurred from the 1980s 
onwards.   Of particular relevance to NGOs in this context was the view that private 
sector management was inherently more efficient than public administration as this 
led to a range of government activities being transferred to private and ‘third’ sector 
actors, such as NGOs.  The rapid expansion of the NGO sector is regularly 
associated with this “downsizing of the state” (Roberts et al., 2005, p. 26). 
A second reason for the greater popularity of NGOs as channels for official 
aid during this period related to the emerging emphasis on democracy as a necessary 
precursor to economic growth.  Liberal democratic theory envisages a strong civil 
society as strengthening the state’s capacity for good governance by ensuring 
legitimacy, accountability and transparency (Mercer, 2002). NGOs, according to 
much development thinking, were supposed to act as “a counterweight to state power 
by opening up channels of communication and participation, providing training 
grounds for activists promoting pluralism and by protecting human rights” (Hulme 
and Edwards, 1997, p. 6).  In a definition that brings together both the supposed 
efficiency and democratising character of NGOs, Dichter (1999, p. 43) has summed 
up their perceived comparative advantages during this period as follows:  
they [NGOs] are innovative, nimble, and flexible; adjust quickly to change 
and to  local differences; and operate close to those they wish to benefit (because 
they are able to listen and interested in listening).  Their services (when they provide 
them) are lower in cost and more cost-effective, their staffs and leaders are highly 
motivated and altruistic, and their independence of commercial and governmental 
interests puts them in position to pressure for change on those interests  
While the implications of managerialism for the emergence of specific types 
of NGOs accountability will be discussed in Chapter 3, for now it is sufficient to say 
that the dual imperatives of contracting out of service provision associated with 
managerialism, and democratisation theorizing were largely responsible for the 
exponential growth in available funding for NGOs that emerged during this period 
and for the vastly increased engagement of NGOs in large scale government-funded 
activities.    
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2.4 Evolving Relief and Development NGO Roles: An Overview 
2.4.1 The Identity Crisis of the 1990s 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, the critique of relief and development 
NGO activity in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide was one important factor 
that led to a period of self-reflection within the sector and, ultimately, helped prompt 
an apparent NGO identity crisis (Edwards and Fowler, 2002, Van Rooy, 2000).     
 A reduction in foreign aid prompted by the ending of the Cold War was 
another important catalyst for NGO angst.  While high levels of funding through 
NGOs persisted, the real value of aid from the North fell significantly during this 
period leading to fears about the sustainability of official funding for NGOs and 
speculations about how NGOs would fare in “beyond aid scenarios” (Fowler, 2002, 
Aldaba et al., 2000).   
  In addition to concerns about possible reductions in foreign aid, concerns 
about the appropriateness of high levels of official funding of NGOs stimulated 
much debate in the 1990s.  Some critics suggested that increases in official funding 
had resulted in the “professionalization” of NGOs and undermined their ability to 
foster participation and democratisation (Jad, 2007, Markowitz and Tice, 2002).  
Other concerns included whether NGOs dependant on official funding could develop 
effective independent advocacy roles (Commins, 1999), whether official funding 
diminished the space for independent NGO thought (Mowles, 2007), whether the 
conditions attached to official aid (e.g. managerialist requirements) would impede 
the wider goals of NGOs (Edwards and Hulme, 1996c), and whether NGOs would 
face reputational damage through association with official aid given its poor results 
in many cases (Fowler, 2002).  Fears about NGO dependence on official aid can be 
seen as a specific manifestation of a greater worry: that instead of providing 
alternatives to dominant ideas of development as had been the calling card of NGOs 
in the past, NGOs had by the 1990s been co-opted into the mainstream orthodoxy. 
 Increases in numbers and capacity of Southern NGOs during the 1990s 
presented an additional challenge for Northern NGOs.  Although the expressed aim 
of working oneself out of business may have been central to early NGO discourse, 
and the NGO mantra of participation could be said to have as a logical conclusion 
the devolution of activities to Southern counterparts, many Northern NGOs appeared 
ambivalent about the emergence in the 1990s of strong Southern NGOs who could 
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compete with Northern NGOs for official funding.  The increasing capacity of 
Southern NGOs inevitably led to questioning about whether Northern NGOs should 
continue in operational roles at all.  Lewis and Sobhan  (1999), for example, found 
that direct funding of Southern NGOs produced more relevant assistance and 
suggested that Northern NGOs may have a moral obligation to refocus their efforts 
on building stronger links between their own publics and development issues. 
 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the increased funding of NGOs from the 
1980s onwards was accompanied by greater NGO visibility, which in turn coincided 
with a significant increase in questioning of NGO legitimacy and accountability.  
The supposed comparative advantages of NGOs also came under close scrutiny with 
a host of studies suggesting that the privileged position afforded to NGOs during the 
1980s was, by and large, unjustified.  For example, research could find little 
evidence to back up assumptions about NGO closeness to the poor, cost-
effectiveness, high levels of innovation and flexibility, scale of impact and success at 
capacity-building (Edwards, 1999a, Smillie, 1997). 
 In addition to the challenges faced by NGOs in relation to development 
activities, there were specific contextual changes during the 1990s that impacted 
particularly on NGO humanitarian work.  The end of the Cold War acted as a 
catalyst for rising numbers of intrastate conflicts and increasing numbers of 
internally displaced people (ODI, 1998).  The emergence of so-called “complex 
political emergencies”, and the increased international unwillingness to commit to 
armed humanitarian interventions after failures in Somalia in 1992, saw NGOs 
placed in often untenable positions whereby they felt obliged to take on roles far 
beyond those envisaged in their original mission statements.  Inevitably this led to 
intense questioning as to what precisely the role of NGOs in humanitarian action 
should be. 
 The specific catalysts for NGO self-reflection that have been discussed here 
were accompanied by a backdrop of a rapidly changing global context and, in 
particular, the contested phenomenon of globalisation.  Globalisation, it has been 
claimed, has led to the disintegration of the traditional North-South divide (Edwards, 
1999a) and an increasing awareness that there are “Souths within the North”, just as 
there may be “Norths within the South” (Gaventa 1991 cited in Gaventa, 1999, p. 
22).  This breaking down of the traditional geographical divide invited questioning 
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about what roles NGOs, whose work often appeared to have relied on such a divide, 
should adopt in order to best advance their causes. 
2.4.2 Emerging Perspectives on Relief and Development NGO Roles  
Long before the Rwandan genocide Korten (1987) described how NGO 
strategies frequently evolve through a series of three generations that begin with 
relief and development activities and move towards seeking changes in specific 
policies and institutions.  Korten (1990) identified a fourth generation of NGO 
strategies based on mobilizing a people’s development movement that he advocated 
for NGOs.  The questions he asked when outlining his vision well summarise the 
discussion on NGO roles that continued for the remainder of the decade: 
 Will they continue to act primarily as humanitarian assistance agencies, or 
will they become agents of transformation – even at the risk of alienating funders?  
Will they function primarily as professional staff bureaucracies engaged in the 
funding and implementation of projects, or will they build their capacities to 
strengthen global citizenship among their domestic constituencies and to serve as a 
support system for a voluntary people’s development movement? (p. 202) 
 Most NGO analysts also appear to be NGO supporters. Although isolated 
voices during this period suggested that Northern NGOs had, by and large, outlived 
their usefulness and should close up shop (Van Rooy, 2000), the vast majority of 
commentators continued to assert that NGOs had valuable contributions to make.  A 
focus for some of the most prominent discussions was a series of conferences that 
took place in Manchester and Birmingham in 1992, 1994 and 1999.  These 
conferences brought together influential NGO thinkers and the slew of publications 
that ensued from each conference arguably set the agenda for the sector.  The 
conference themes also provide a useful means of tracking the key ideas of the 
period.  In 1992, for example, the conference focus was on how to scale up NGO 
impact on development by moving from improving local situations on a small scale 
to influencing the wider systems that create and reinforce poverty (Edwards and 
Hulme, 1992).  In 1994 the emphasis switched to questions about NGO performance, 
accountability and relationships with funding sources (Edwards and Hulme, 1996c).  
By 1999 explicit questions about NGO roles had come to the forewith the conclusion 
that NGOs must move from “development as delivery” to “development as 
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leverage”, meaning that they must focus on structural causes of poverty rather than 
its symptoms (Edwards et al., 1999). 
 By the end of the 1990s NGO commentators were generally in agreement 
that there was a pressing need for NGOs to engage with forces that could make a 
long-term difference or, as described by Korten (1990, p. 202), to becoming “agents 
of transformation” .  While some commentators appeared to suggest that NGOs 
could add value in certain activities without linking them to this wider goal -  e.g. 
humanitarian activity (Van Rooy, 2000) and capacity-building and institutional 
development of Southern NGOs (Edwards et al., 1999) - in general, the activities of 
Northern NGOs in the developing world were seen as useful only in so far as they 
contributed to or facilitated this broader goal.   
   Although there was widespread agreement on the perceived need for NGOs 
to focus on becoming change agents in this sense, there was less agreement about 
exactly what activities NGOs should undertake in pursuit of this objective.  Some 
authors suggested that NGO should act as watchdogs and hold others accountable for 
their performance in relation to issues including social and environmental  goals 
(Van Rooy, 2000, Fowler, 2002).  Edwards and Sen  (2000) suggested that NGOs 
should  act as value-driven agents of personal change.  Fowler (2002) suggested that 
NGOs should embrace roles as civil innovators through which they could find, test 
and demonstrate different ways in which states and markets can fulfil their 
obligations.  Although its meaning is contested, partnership, often understood as an 
agreed relationship in which participants have equal standing but different roles and 
responsibilities (Pickard, 2007), was also frequently invoked as a means for Northern 
and Southern partners to combine their comparative advantages (e.g. Northern 
NGOs’ closeness to the donor public with its advocacy and policy-influencing 
potential and Southern NGOs’ local knowledge and presence) to produce an 
outcome greater than the sum of its parts (Brehm, 2001).   
2.4.3 Current Relief and Development NGO Roles 
 The most recent “Manchester conference” took place in 2005.  In one of the 
ensuing publications Edwards (2008) discussed what changes had occurred since the 
previous conferences and, in particular, whether NGOs had moved from 
“development as delivery” to “development as leverage”.  His conclusion was that 
although there had been some NGO successes, including keeping the spotlight on the 
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need for reforms in international institutions and cementing an intellectual 
commitment to participation and human rights as basic principles of development, 
there had been no quantum leap in NGO impact.  Specifically, Edwards argued that 
most NGOs had failed to establish strong connections with social movements that 
could lead to sustained change; paid insufficient attention to downward 
accountability; prioritised organisational imperatives of growth and market share 
above the developmental imperatives of individual, organizational and social 
transformation; and failed to build constituencies for change in global consumption 
and production patterns.  Edwards attributed this limited progress in large part to the 
perseverance of the traditional aid paradigm.  Whereas earlier Manchester 
conferences had predicted the gradual decline of aid, in fact aid levels had increased 
providing, in Edwards’ (2008, p. 45) words, “a continued ‘security blanket’ for 
current practice”.   
 If Edwards is correct, it would appear that all the talk and reflection of the 
1990s resulted in little substantive change in NGO roles or orientation during the 
decade immediately following it.  However, this does not mean that the concerns 
identified regarding NGO roles were not relevant then and do not remain relevant 
now.  In fact, history may show that the increases in aid during the 2000s were short-
lived.    Certainly the global financial crisis and resultant recession that began in 
2008 led to reductions in GNI and aid commitments in some donor countries 
(O'Neill, 2010). In addition, strong Southern NGOs remain, questions about NGO 
legitimacy and accountability have not been resolved, scepticism about comparative 
advantages of NGOs remain, and the central question of how to transform NGOs 
from service providers to agents of global transformation continues to be asked.  
2.5 Development Thinking and Practice in Ireland: An Overview 
A review of the current international development sector in Ireland suggests 
diversity and vibrancy.  The number of aid agencies, options for development 
education, and research activities dedicated to development issues have all greatly 
increased in recent decades in tandem with increases in the size of the official Irish 
aid programme, Irish Aid.  As will be described, high levels of Irish public support 
for development assistance are also routinely reported and international research has 
tended to view Irish development initiatives favourably.  But there is more to this 
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story than these facts alone suggest.  Over a ten months period from 2008 to 2009 
Ireland’s aid budget was subject to cuts of 22% or €254 million, far greater than the 
cuts imposed on other areas of Irish government spending during the same period.  
More worrying from the perspective of aid advocates, these cuts met with little 
resistance outside of development circles suggesting that the apparently strong public 
support for development assistance may be shallower than previously thought.  In 
light of the rapid rise and even more rapid reduction in the levels of aid provided by 
Ireland, this section provides a brief overview of international development in an 
Irish context.  This begins with Irish Aid itself and then discusses what is known 
about public attitudes to development assistance.   
 Irish Aid, which was formerly called both Ireland Aid and Development 
Cooperation Ireland, was formed in 1974 one year after Ireland’s accession to the 
European Economic Community (EEC).  As described by the then foreign minister, 
the programme “was necessary to give Ireland moral credibility internationally” 
(Borg et al., 2010, p. 49).  Starting from small beginnings with an initial commitment 
of US$6 million, Irish Aid funding grew slowly but steadily towards the UN target 
of 0.7% of GNI until 1988 when  total budgeted ODA was suddenly reduced by 26% 
(Fitzpatrick and Storey, 1988). Despite this interruption to the upward trajectory, the 
1990s again witnessed significant growth in Irish ODA.   Between 1992 and 1998, 
for example, Irish ODA trebled, while performance in relation to a growing GNP 
almost doubled, rising from 0.16 per cent to 0.30 per cent  (Development Co-
operation Directorate, 1999).  The pinnacle of Irish rhetorical commitment was 
reached in 2000 at the Millennium Development Summit when the then Taoiseach, 
Bertie Ahern, committed Ireland to achieving the UN target of 0.7% of GNI by 
2007.  Although the “Celtic Tiger” years witnessed rapid growth in the overall sums 
of ODA allocated by Ireland (rising to €920 million in 2008), this target was 
deferred in 2006 to 2012 and in 2009 to 2015.   
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Table 2.1 Irish ODA, selected years 1974-2009 (€ million & %).   
 1974 1984 1994 2004 2008 2009 
Total ODA 1.9 42.2 95.5 488.9 920.8 718.1 
  Bilateral aid 0.3 16.9 50.2 329.7 650.2 496.8 
  Multilateral aid 1.6 25.3 45.3 159.2 270.6 221.3 
Bilateral as % of ODA 15.8 40.0 50.7 67.4 70.6 69.2 
ODA as % of GNI 0.05 0.22 0.24 0.40 0.59 0.54 
Reproduced from O’Neill (2010, p. 261) 
 
As outlined in Table 2.1, Irish Aid funding is divided between bilateral aid, 
which includes aid given directly to programme countries and that delivered through 
NGOs; and multilateral aid, which constitutes aid delivered through institutions such 
as the EU, the UN and the World Bank and IMF.  The key principles underpinning 
Irish aid are outlined in the 2006 White Paper on Irish Aid (Government of Ireland).  
Reflecting international trends, this lists partnership, public ownership and 
transparency, effectiveness and quality assurance, coherence, and long-term 
sustainability.  It also confirms Ireland’s commitment to using the MDGs as a 
roadmap for development. 
Recent international comparisons and reviews of Irish support for 
development have been generally positive.   Since 1993 the Centre for Global 
Development in Washington has produced an annual index called the Commitment to 
Development Index.  This index currently rates 22 donor countries on how they help 
promote development in developing countries.  Ireland’s score rose from 15 out of 
21 countries in 2003 to a high point of five out of 22 countries in 2008 (despite the 
cuts in 2009 the 2009 and 2010 scores remained high at six out of 22 countries).  
Ireland’s aid programme achieved particularly high scores as part of this exercise 
due to its absence of tied aid, large amounts of private charitable giving and a large 
share of its aid being issued to relatively poor countries with democratic 
governments (Centre for Global Education, 2010).  
The OECD’s DAC reviews conducted in 1999, 2003 and 2009 (Development 
Co-operation Directorate, 1999, Development Co-operation Directorate, 2003, 
Development Co-operation Directorate, 2009) also act as independent and broadly 
positive assessments of Irish Aid.  The 2009 review, for example, commends Irish 
Aid for being a generous and flexible donor and for having fully untied aid.  Also 
relevant from the perspective of this research is that the three reviews commented 
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that the total proportion of Ireland’s ODA allocated via NGOs was high relative to 
other DAC members.   
 Whilst the strength of Irish Aid may be interpreted as a sign of Irish political 
commitment to development assistance, its status does not necessarily imply a 
concomitant level of public commitment. Research on Irish public opinions 
regarding international development is patchy.  A review of surveys and analyses of 
Irish public opinions between 1985 and 1999 found consistently high levels of public 
support for development cooperation (approximately 90% of respondents were in 
favour in each study) (McDonnell, 2003).  In common with other DAC countries, 
however, the Irish public also demonstrated greater awareness of humanitarian crises 
than longer-term development issues (McDonnell, 2003).   
A comprehensive study of Irish public opinions towards development 
cooperation in Ireland was conducted on behalf of Irish Aid in 2002 (Weafer).  It 
was based on face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of 
approximately 1,000 adults and contained 30 questions relating to development 
issues. It too found high levels of public support for development cooperation with 
90% of respondents in favour of helping developing countries.  However it also 
found that most people did not have a clear image of what ODA comprised and had 
greater awareness of humanitarian emergencies than longer term development issues.  
It also found that the majority of respondents believed that development aid from 
Ireland was given via Third World charities compared to only 32% who stated that it 
was given via the Irish Government/Irish Aid. 
  Whilst no national attitudes survey on development assistance has been 
conducted since 2002 there are other recent relevant sources of information.  These 
include a 2005 Eurobarometer study on attitudes to development aid (Directorate-
General Development, 2005), which, among other findings, reported that that only 
14% of the 1,000 Irish people surveyed had heard of the MDGs.  While this is 
marginally higher than the EU average of 12%, it seems nonetheless very low given 
that the MDGs underpin the official Irish aid programme.  In an analysis  of this 
survey’s results Connolly et al. (2008) noted that although they show an ongoing 
emphasis on aid as the primary means by which Ireland should help developing 
countries, they also show some increased awareness of structural issues of trade 
access, debt cancellation and conflict resolution.  When the same authors conducted 
a replication of the 2002 survey among 900 university students in a range of 
34 
 
academic departments across all the universities in the Republic of Ireland during 
2006 and 2007, it too found “little evidence of any sophisticated understanding of 
development issues” (Connolly et al., 2008 p. 226). 
 As already noted, the Minister who originally established the official Irish aid 
programme declared it necessary to give Ireland “moral credibility”.  In other words, 
the programme was explicitly described in terms of its benefits or what it gave to 
Ireland.  While Irish Aid has been commended for not pursuing specific strategic 
interests through its aid allocations, it can be argued that Ireland’s aid programme 
and approach to development is still primarily identified as being more about “us” 
than “them”.  An explicit articulation of this view appeared in a 2009 Irish Times 
article by the prominent Irish journalist, Fintan O’Toole.  In this, O’Toole ( p. 1), 
while criticising cuts to the Irish Aid budget, wrote that Ireland needed to maintain 
its aid programme for reasons of national pride.  While acknowledging that aid was 
not primarily about national pride, he wrote that “there’s a reason why, in the dark 
days of the 1980s, we were the world’s largest per capita donors to aid agencies. We 
needed to know that there was more to us than failure and despair” and went on to 
say that embarking on aid cuts “does more damage to our international reputation”.  
Finally, it has also been suggested that the Irish aid narrative remains firmly 
embedded in notions of charity and welfare rather than justice or duty (80:20 et al., 
2010). 
 In summary, it is clear that the official Irish development assistance 
programme, Irish Aid, has undergone rapid expansion during the period of this study 
and that it has fared well in international assessments.  However, most research has 
suggested a very limited and unsophisticated understanding of development issues 
by most Irish people despite some increased awareness of structural causes of 
poverty.  It appears also that the Irish aid story remains to some degree at least 
focused on Ireland rather than developing countries, and that NGOs and charities are 
generally seen by the Irish public as the primary face of development assistance.  
Finally, and as stated at the outset, the very limited resistance by the general public 
to the slashing of the Irish Aid budget between 2008 and 2009 casts doubt on the 
depth of Irish public commitment to development assistance.   
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2.6 Civil Society in Ireland: An Overview 
As is the case internationally, attempting to gain an accurate picture of civil 
society activity in Ireland presents serious challenges as not alone is defining civil 
society problematic, but research in Ireland has also been struggling to keep pace 
with the rise of the sector.  Nonetheless, this section will attempt to provide an 
overview of civil society in Ireland by briefly considering its extent, relationship 
with the state including the evolving regulatory framework, and funding. 
Although the expansion of formal civil society activity during the twentieth 
century was slower in Ireland than in other countries (Harvey, 2009), by the 1990s 
when government funding to the sector began to rise significantly, there was already 
a substantial range of civil society activities in place.  The first comprehensive 
survey of the nonprofit sector in Ireland was conducted in 2006 (Donoghue et al., 
2006) and provided evidence of the significant breath of activities undertaken by 
nonprofit organisations and the extent of their economic contribution, estimated to 
amount to 3.84% of GNP.  
Since 1987 the process of social partnership, which effectively gave a formal 
role to civil society organisations in negotiating state development plans, has 
significantly shaped relations between the government and civil society in Ireland.   
An extensive literature exists on the impact of the social partnership process from the 
perspective of civil society organisations.  Ó Broin (2009) has summarised four key 
critiques of the process as follows: it was dominated by powerful interests and 
effectively sidelined the legislature; it advanced neoliberalism and undermined the 
ability of the community and voluntary sector to shape the agenda; it undermined the 
autonomy of organisations; and it devalued politics and promoted managerialism.  
The social partnership process broke down during December 2009 over failure to 
reach agreement regarding a €1 billion reduction in the public sector wage bill. 
As in the international context, from the 1980s onwards in Ireland 
managerialism manifested itself in the greater availability of service contracts for 
civil society organisations and the imposition of particular reporting and 
accountability requirements on those who accepted these contracts.  Although civil 
society organisations in Ireland, like elsewhere, have performed a wide variety of 
roles (Donnelly-Cox et al., 2001, Donoghue et al., 2006), commentators have 
suggested that from the 1980s onwards the state deliberately sought to move civil 
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society organisations away from advocating for social change and towards the 
provision of services (Geoghegan and Powell, 2009, Murray and Rogers, 2009).  
Harvey (2009), for example, has described how a clause was inserted into the 
standard service level agreement used by the state when contracting service 
provision activities to voluntary organisations stipulating that none of the funding 
could be used for campaigning purposes.  Perhaps unsurprisingly given the dynamics 
of managerialism and social partnership, the 2006 nonprofit mapping study 
(Donoghue et al.) found that two thirds of responding organisations were in receipt 
of state funding and that in total 60% of income came from the state compared to 
10.5% from the public.  Concerns about the capacity of nonprofit organisations to 
advocate effectively given their increasing state funding and a belief that advocacy 
was under deliberate threat led to the establishment of the Advocacy Initiative in 
2008.  Headed up by a steering group made up of representatives from a diverse 
range of civil society organisations its survey of 170 nonprofit organisations (The 
Advocacy Initiative, 2010) found that nearly half of these organisations either had a 
funding cut or were  threatened with a funding cut as a result of their advocacy 
activities.   
While state funding clearly increased in nominal terms and influenced the 
direction of civil society from the 1980s onwards, due to a broadening of funding 
sources the proportion of total income that non-profit organisations received from 
the state declined from 74.6% in 1995 to 59.8% in 2007 (Donoghue, 2008 cited in 
Donnelly-Cox and Cannon, 2010, p. 336).  The other major funding sources were 
individuals, foundations and corporations.   Dealing with individual giving first, a 
2009 review concluded that a large number of Irish people donated to charity and 
that the amount they donated had increased between the 1990s and 2000s although 
not in proportion to increases in income (Prizeman and O'Regan, 2009). A 2009 
assessment of philanthropic giving in Ireland (McKinsey & Company, 2009) reached 
a similar conclusion and noted that while 89% of Irish adults gave to charity, most 
donations were small and given spontaneously rather than in a planned way.  
Comparing central statistics office figures the authors of this report concluded that 
while private donations in Ireland came to €460 million in 2005 compared with €189 
million in 1995 this represented a decrease in the proportion of disposable income 
given to charity from 0.94% in 1995 to 0.79% in 2005 and placed Ireland well below 
the US and many European countries.   
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Considering foundation and corporate giving the same 2010 report found that 
along with the €460 million given in private donations in 2005, foundation giving 
was worth an estimated €85 million and corporate giving an estimated €25 million, 
both of which represented low figures compared to other countries (McKinsey & 
Company, 2009).  In sum, while there is a long tradition of giving in Ireland, this has 
been predominantly made up of spontaneous donations by individuals.  However 
there has been a recent surge of interest in the potential of philanthropy 
(incorporating individual, foundation and corporate giving) as evidenced by the 
establishment of Philanthropy Ireland in 2004 and a Government Forum on 
Philanthropy in 2006.   
While much attention was paid to concerns about the possible co-option and 
emasculation of civil society organisations as a result of dependence on state funding 
during the 1990s and most of the 2000s, in more recent years rapidly declining state 
and private sector funding has presented another set of challenges (Donnelly-Cox 
and Cannon, 2010). 
When fully implemented the 2009 Charities Act (Government of Ireland) will 
introduce for the first time in Ireland an integrated system of registration, reporting 
and regulation to be implemented by a new body, the independent Charities 
Regulatory Authority.  The Charities Act resulted from a commitment to reform 
charity law made as part of the programme for government in 2002 and followed 
independent reviews that had taken place in 1990 and 1996 (Donoghue et al., 2008).  
The provisions of the Charities Act have been commended internationally and within 
Ireland for facilitating significant improvements in transparency within the sector 
(European Centre for Not-for-profit Law, 2009, McKinsey & Company, 2009).  
Interestingly from the perspective of civil society organisation roles, the Charities 
Act allows for charities to promote a political cause, but only if it relates directly to 
their charitable purpose. 
2.7 Irish Relief and Development NGOs: An Overview 
Having briefly considered Irish civil society as a whole attention will now be  
turned to relief and development NGOs.  While the regulatory framework remains 
the same for these NGOs as for domestic nonprofit organisations, some differences 
exist regarding their relationship with the state and how they are funded.  These 
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issues will be discussed in this section after an overview of the emergence and extent 
of Irish relief and development NGOs.   
Ireland’s strong overseas missionary tradition incorporating development 
work as well as pastoral activities provides the backdrop for both the establishment 
of Irish Aid and Irish NGOs.   Although Ireland’s largest NGO, Concern Worldwide, 
was established in 1968, the majority of Irish NGOs began to emerge from the 1970s 
onwards (e.g. the next largest Irish NGOs, Trócaire and GOAL, were formed in 1973 
and 1977 respectively).  While GOAL has traditionally been more strongly 
associated with emergency relief than Trócaire or Concern (O'Dwyer, 2006), all 
three engage in both humanitarian and development work and focus explicitly on 
alleviating poverty.  As outlined in Table 2.2, the incomes of Concern, Trócaire and 
GOAL dwarf those of other Irish NGOs.  
 
Table 2.2 2009 Income of selected Irish NGOs in € (this includes valuations of 
donations in kind) 
Name of 
NGO 
Total 
income 
Irish Aid 
Funding 
Notes and sources 
Concern 120,507,000 26,807,000 2009 Annual Report (Concern Worldwide, 
2010) 
GOAL 65,849,881 16,097,330 2009 Financial Statement (GOAL, 2010)  
Trócaire  47,793,623 5,527,452 2010 Financial Statement (Trócaire, 2010). 
Figures relate to 1 March 2009 to 28 
February 2010. The Irish Aid funding figure 
is unrepresentatively low because Trócaire 
received most of its 2009 Irish Aid funding 
in February 2009 and its 2010 funding in 
March 2010 – both were therefore included 
in other year’s financial accounts.  
Oxfam 15,411,153 2,350,000 2009/2010 Annual Report  (Oxfam Ireland, 
2010). Figures relate to the 11 months from 1 
May 2009 to 31 March 2010.   
Christian 
Aid 
8,176,000 2,826,000 2010 Financial Statement (Christian Aid 
Ireland, 2010). Figures relate to 1 April 2009 
to 31 March 2010. 
Self 
Help 
Africa 
7,558,180 2,805,000 2010 Financial Statement (Self Help Africa, 
2010) 
Plan 
Ireland 
5,899,369 929,406 2010 Annual Report (Plan Ireland, 2010).  
Figures relate to 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010. 
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The relief and development NGO sector in Ireland is represented by an 
umbrella body called Dóchas.  According to its website, Dóchas (2009b) “provides a 
forum for consultation and co-operation between its members and helps them to 
speak with a single voice on development issues”.  At the time of its establishment in 
1993 Dóchas had 17 members (Dóchas, 2004).  This had risen to 44 in 2009 
(Dochas, 2009a).  The increase in membership corresponds with the general increase 
in Irish-based NGO numbers during this period, which resulted in large part from the 
establishment in Ireland of branches of international organisations (e.g. Christian 
Aid, World Vision, Tearfund, Plan, ChildFund, Action Aid and Sightsavers).   
Whereas the influence of social partnership on the Irish nonprofit sector in 
general has received extensive critical attention, there has been relatively little 
attention paid to the close engagement of relief and development NGOs with the 
Irish government.  The most prominent official articulation of this engagement 
appears in Irish Aid’s Civil Society Policy (2008a, p. 4), which proclaims its 
aspiration to serve as a “guide that enables Irish Aid to work in partnership with civil 
society organisations, North and South, towards poverty reduction and the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals”.  Two prior examples of this 
“partnership” approach are the initiation of a strategic relationship between Dóchas 
and Irish Aid in 2002, and the initiation of a long-term funding initiative (the Multi-
Annual Programme Scheme/MAPS) between Irish Aid and selected Irish NGOs in 
2003.  According to Dóchas (2004, p. 25), the purpose of its strategic agreement with 
the Irish government was “to enable Dóchas to become a more actively engaged and 
better resourced partner of Irish Aid, in order to reinforce our common overarching 
goal of reducing poverty throughout the developing world”.   Concern over resources 
was a clear motivation for Dóchas from the outset therefore.   An independent 
evaluation of the partnership between 2006 and 2008 (McEvoy, 2009, p. 4) reported 
that “although there is a natural tension between financial dependence on 
government and maintaining one’s integrity to advocate and critique, Dóchas is 
perceived to have rather skilfully struck a balance between the two”.   
MAPS was initiated between Irish Aid and Concern, Trócaire, GOAL, 
Christian Aid and Self Help Africa in 2003.  MAPS I ran from 2003-2005 and 
disbursed €117 million among the five agencies.  MAPS II runs from 2007-2011. 
The total projected allocation for MAPS II was €380 million although the actual 
allocation will fall short of this due to budget cuts (Gaynor, 2010).  The purpose of 
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MAPS was to provide flexible and programmatic funding to the NGOs involved 
based on the strategic objectives of those NGOs.  Although not defined, partnership, 
both between Irish Aid and the participating NGOs and between those NGOs and 
their Southern counterparts, was identified as a key element of the programme.  An 
independent evaluation of MAPS I (Development Cooperation Ireland, 2006, p. 7) 
found that  the spirit of partnership had advanced during MAPS I and that “no 
instance arose in which a MAPS NGO felt pressure from Development Co-operation 
Ireland [currently Irish Aid] to act outside its own visions and strategies”.  As part of 
the midterm review of MAPS II (Gaynor, 2010) all MAPS NGOs indicated that 
MAPS II had enabled them to engage in more strategic partnerships with Southern 
NGOs and they reported that they had stronger relationships with Irish Aid than 
NGOs not in the scheme.   
Reviews of both MAPS and the strategic partnership between Irish Aid and 
Dóchas suggest a desire for genuine partnership and openness on the part of Irish 
Aid.  Indeed Irish Aid seems to have been very cognisant of the risks of NGO 
independence being compromised by such arrangements and to have deliberately 
sought to minimise these risks.   Nonetheless there have been some hints that the 
relationship between the Irish government and NGOs has not always fulfilled its 
promise of partnership.  For example, despite the apparent openness of Irish Aid to 
innovation from the MAPS NGOs, the MAPS I review (Development Cooperation 
Ireland, 2006) reported that the NGOs were conservative in terms of the uses to 
which they put the MAPS funding and that this was partly due to their desire not to 
jeopardise it.  The midterm review of MAPS II (Gaynor, 2010) also indicated 
concerns that Irish Aid was seeking to foist an agenda onto NGOs in terms of 
increasing cooperation between agencies and joint learning.  On balance, however, 
there appears to be little evidence that Irish Aid funding has unduly influenced the 
operations of those it has funded.  Dóchas has remained a strong advocate for 
increased aid throughout the period.  GOAL, one of the MAPS partners, has 
remained a trenchant critic of the Irish government, for, among other things, its 
funding of undemocratic regimes (e.g. O'Shea, 2008). 
Due in part to overlaps between different NGO roles it is difficult to precisely 
classify the roles played by Irish NGOs.   A comprehensive 2006 Dóchas member 
survey (Donnat, 2007) identified strengthening social sectors (e.g. education and 
health), alleviating poverty and building sustainable livelihoods as key programme 
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foci for its members.  While capacity building of Southern NGOs and development 
education activities were shown to have increased since the previous Dóchas survey 
in 2001, direct implementation of programme activities remained very important. 
The MAPS II interim evaluation (Gaynor, 2010) noted that two of the five NGOs 
(GOAL and Self Help Africa) were still significantly focused on direct 
implementation activities.   In other words, not only do these (and many other) Irish 
NGOs support local NGOs in the implementation of programmes, but they actually 
conduct programmes directly themselves. Of course it should be pointed out that 
important differences exist between Irish NGOs, which manifest themselves in, 
among other things, different roles being adopted or prioritised.  For example, 
whereas GOAL (2011) continues to advocate for increased direct implementation 
due to concerns about developing country corruption, Trocaire (2011) has called for 
NGOs to engage more with their own societies.  AFRI also represents an excellent 
example of a small NGO that has radically transformed in a way similar to that I 
recommend.  Whereas from its foundation in 1975 until 1982 AFRI was involved in 
the funding of projects in the developing world, it then chose to radically reorient its 
activities in favour of linking issues in Ireland with issues in the developing world 
and focusing on structural obstacles to development (AFRI, 2004).  This 
transformation was exemplified by the name change of AFRI in 1982 from AFRI – 
Aid from the Republic of Ireland to AFRI – Action from Ireland.  Of the 77 NGOs 
being considered in this study (the identification of which will be described in detail 
in Chapter 5), it is noteworthy that 58 operate in developing countries in addition to 
having a base in Ireland.  This suggests that it is not the norm for Irish NGOs to 
engage exclusively in advocacy, development education or other activities that can 
be conducted without a physical presence in the developing world.  Even when these 
activities are conducted by Irish NGOs they often represent only a tiny proportion of 
those NGOs’ work.  For example, the home page of Concern Worldwide 
prominently features a pie chart indicating that 88% of its budget is spent on relief 
and development compared to just 2% on development education and advocacy.  A 
recent Dóchas discussion paper (2008, p. 5) also reported a belief among the Irish 
NGO community that “the public wants NGOs to engage in practical activities”.   
While MAPS is notable for making available large and predictable volumes 
of aid to a very small number of agencies, a variety of other Irish Aid schemes were 
open to other NGOs during the period of this study.  By 2009 Ireland was delivering 
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approximately one third of its development assistance funding through NGOs, one of 
the highest proportions of any international donor (Irish Aid, 2009).  It is noteworthy 
that MAPS II included a requirement that MAPS NGOs raise a minimum of 30% of 
their total income through voluntary funds (i.e. charitable donations) raised in 
Ireland.  Table 2.3 gives details of the actual percentages raised through voluntary 
funds in Ireland reported by the MAPS partners for 2007 to 2009.  Interestingly the 
2006 nonprofit mapping study found that international development organisations 
received 7.7% of total state funding compared with 25.1% of total private funding 
(Donoghue et al., 2006).  This suggests that the international development NGO 
sector is far less reliant on the state than domestic nonprofit organisations.  In 
addition to state funding and voluntary income it is noteworthy that many Irish relief 
and development NGOs have been very successful at attracting funding from 
international donors.  For example, in 2009 GOAL’s grant income of over €37 
million consisted of just over €16 million from the Irish government with the 
remainder coming from other institutional donors such as the US government and 
the UK government (GOAL, 2009b).  
 
Table 2.3 Percentage of total income raised as voluntary funds in Ireland by 
MAPS Partners.   
NGO   2007   2008   2009 
Christian Aid* 47%   38%   45% (estimate) 
Concern  not given  not given  50% 
GOAL   35%   32%   21% (estimate) 
Self Help Africa 49%   50%   40% (estimate) 
Trócaire  57%   53%   not given 
Table reproduced from the MAPS II Interim Evaluation (Gaynor, 2010) 
*Figures based on Christian Aid’s funding year which runs from April to March.   
 
Finally of note in the context of this study is the high level of trust invested in 
Irish NGOs by the Irish public.  The comprehensive 2002 study of Irish opinions to 
development cooperation (Weafer) found that 76% of Irish people found third world 
charities to be either a fairly reliable or very reliable source of information on 
developing countries.  A 2008 replication of the 2002 study (Connolly et al., 2008) 
found that 80% of Irish students found information given by NGOs on developing 
countries to be either reliable or very reliable.  Finally, the annual Edelman Trust 
Barometer studies have shown consistently high levels of trust in NGOs in Ireland.  
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The most recent study (2011), for example, reported that 61% of Irish respondents 
expressed trust in NGOs compared to 56% who trusted business, 52% who trusted 
government and 49% who trusted the media. 
2.8 Future Roles for Irish Relief and Development NGOs: A 
Discussion and an Argument 
2.8.1 Introduction 
As I have described, most commentators agree that removing or lessening 
structural impediments to development, such as those posed by trade rules, 
developing country indebtedness and climate change, offers far greater long term 
potential for development than increases in aid alone.  In this section I endorse this 
view and suggest that the task of tackling structural impediments to development 
requires support from large segments of developed county populations and that Irish 
relief and development NGOs should primarily focus their attention on building this 
support. 
Specifically, I argue that Irish NGOs should seek to educate the Irish 
population about development and global inequality and motivate them to either 
directly challenge the structural causes of poverty or to support the initiatives of 
others in this regard.  In other words, I argue that the focus of Irish NGOs should 
shift from developing country activities towards activities in Ireland.  In a role that I 
refer to as the promotion of development literacy and global solidarity I argue that 
Irish NGOs should endeavour to, firstly, convince the public to support (at least 
some) development initiatives that take their lead from developing country agendas 
even when these do not chime with Irish individuals’ short-term personal interests; 
and, secondly, ensure that  Irish people are sufficiently educated and motivated about 
development issues to enable them to critically regard all initiatives framed as 
developmental or likely to impact on development.    
An NGO role oriented towards the education and motivation of domestic 
populations has already been articulated internationally.  In addition, some Irish 
NGOs not alone already practice elements of this role, but have also expressed an 
interest in further emphasising them.  Trócaire, for example, published a report 
(2011) that recommended that NGOs engage in more and better advocacy, engage 
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more with power and politics, engage more with their own societies and build a 
global culture of solidarity.  However, the bulk of most Irish NGOs’ work continues 
to be conducted in the developing world itself.  In this section I will begin by 
describing the role that I recommend in more detail and then outline a rationale both 
for the rejection of programme activities as the primary activity of Irish NGOs and 
the adoption of the role I recommend.  Finally, I will argue that not only is a 
reorientation of Irish NGO activities in this way possible, but that that there are 
particular features of the current Irish environment that make it an ideal location and 
an ideal time for such a transformation.     
2.8.2 NGOs and the Promotion of Development Literacy and Global 
Solidarity: A Description of the Role Recommended 
 The role I recommend for Irish relief and development NGOs overlaps with 
various roles articulated by international observers.  For example, Edwards (Edwards 
et al., 1999, p. 125) has consistently advocated a role he refers to as ‘constituency-
building’, which he defines as “creating an agenda for concern using diffuse 
channels over the long term”.  Edwards’ recommended role is similar to that 
advocated by  Korten (1990, p. 202) who asked if NGOs would “build their 
capacities to strengthen global citizenship among their domestic constituencies and 
to serve as a support system for a voluntary people’s development movement”, and 
also similar to the notion of consciousness-raising, which is concerned with helping 
people become politically conscious and which Yankovich (1991 cited in Smillie, 
1995, p. 144) argued enabled society to come to at least partial grips with 
environmental issues within thirty years and AIDS within five.    
 The role I recommend also shares many features with development education 
and related ideas of global education, global citizenship and global learning.  
Development education has a long history and is generally seen as having evolved 
from the provision of basic information about the South and development assistance 
towards an emphasis on critical analysis, reflection and action (Smillie, 1997).  
Despite this it has been argued that for many governments development education 
continues to be seen as a means of obtaining public legitimation for aid programmes 
and that for many NGOs development education continues to be used as a means of 
fundraising and securing support for specific campaigns (Bourn, 2008).  Echoing 
ideas of Freire (1970), Bourn (2008, p. 18) has called for a reconceptualisation of 
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development education as “a pedagogy of making connections between the 
individual and personal, from the local to the global, and which its very nature, is 
transformative”.  This conceptualisation is similar to the suggestion of McCloskey 
(2009) that development education should act as an agent of social change and 
similar to the role I propose,  but quite different to many activities undertaken in the 
name of development education.    
NGO advocacy also overlaps to some extent with the role I suggest.  
Advocacy can be seen as a means through which organisations and individuals seek 
influence.  Advocacy work can take various forms including interpersonal (and often 
private) efforts to influence policy makers, the construction of large alliances and the 
mobilisation of the public (Lewis and Kanji, 2009).  Although the mobilisation of the 
public is similar to the promotion of development literacy and global solidarity in 
some ways, it differs in that it tends to seek public support on a single issue for a 
particular purpose rather than educating the public on global issues and motivating 
them to seek out opportunities to advance development through structural changes.  
That said, advocacy can serve to prompt individuals or constituencies to challenge 
institutions or ideas and as such can serve as an element of the approach I 
recommend.  Similarly, NGO monitoring of institutions whose actions impact on 
development prospects can stimulate a critical approach among the public and hence 
can form part of this role. 
Terms like media literacy, scientific literacy, health literacy and 
technological literacy have all entered common usage with the concept of literacy 
increasingly being used to indicate a deep or critical knowledge of a particular 
subject.   Scientific literacy, for example, has been defined as “the ability of the 
individual to read about, comprehend, and express an opinion on scientific matters” 
(Miller, 1983, p. 30).  Broadly speaking, I suggest that development literacy exists 
when the general public have sufficient knowledge of development thinking and 
practice, and in particular the contested nature of development, to enable them to 
understand and critically assess proposals made in the name of development or likely 
to impact on development.  In my view, therefore, development literacy precludes 
superficial engagement with development issues and actors.  I acknowledge that, 
given the contested nature of development, development literacy too will necessarily 
be contested and that the normative intent implied by individual articulations of 
development literacy may differ.  The “syllabus” that NGOs would apply in 
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encouraging development literacy would inevitably involve a configuration of ideas 
and examples likely to steer people towards particular conclusions.  While 
development literacy as espoused by NGOs may encourage people to reach 
particular conclusions, it does not preclude the possibility that people will reach 
different conclusions.  I suggest, therefore, that whereas development literacy is an 
essential prerequisite for mass challenges to structural impediments to development, 
alone it is not sufficient. Whereas I see development literacy as implicitly normative 
in character, global solidarity is explicitly normative.  Global solidarity has been 
described as a “recognition of the common needs of a differentiated humanity, in and 
against a world of variable freedom and wealth” (Waterman, 1993, p. 261).  In a 
view that well sums up my understanding of the concept, Oleson (2004, p. 258) 
suggests that global solidarity “blurs the distinction between providers and 
beneficiaries  [and] is an expression of a more extensive global consciousness that 
constructs the grievances of physically, socially and culturally distant people as 
deeply intertwined”.  While recognising that grievances are intertwined, however, I 
suggest that global solidarity also demands a recognition that different people may 
be affected to a greater or lesser degree by particular actions or forces and a 
commitment to prioritizing the needs and wishes of those affected to the greatest 
degree in relation to individual initiatives.  While I suggest that development literacy 
and global solidarity are distinct concepts as the former is both broader and merely 
nudges people towards particular conclusions in contrast to the latter which demands 
a particular conclusion, they also have the potential to be mutually reinforcing as 
global solidarity demands that people seek to understand the dynamics of inequality 
and to become developmentally literate, and development literacy may well lead to 
increased global solidarity. 
For the purposes of this study, therefore, the promotion of development 
literacy and global solidarity is understood to refer to activities undertaken by Irish 
NGOs educate the Irish public and to motivate them to either personally challenge 
structural impediments to development or support relevant initiatives of others.  In 
particular I argue that NGOs should seek to convince the public of the need to 
prioritise the wishes of poor people in development initiatives and should educate 
and motivate them to critically assess any initiatives proposed in the name of 
development or likely to affect development.    
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2.8.3 A Rationale for the Adoption by Irish NGOs of Roles Based on the 
Promotion of Development Literacy and Global Solidarity  
The main pragmatic reasons for Irish NGOs to move away from programme 
activities in the developing world, which are very costly, and adopt the role I suggest 
relate to funding.  As became abundantly clear from 2008 onwards in Ireland, NGO 
funding sources are prone to sharp contractions depending on political and economic 
circumstances.  Even when the overall availability of NGO funding remains 
consistent this does not mean that the NGOs that have received funding in the past 
will also receive it in the future.  As described in the international context, trends 
appear to suggest both increased funding for Southern NGOs (Lewis and Sobhan, 
1999) and non-traditional development actors such as private service contractors and 
consultancy firms (Hailey, 2000).   Irish Aid’s own Civil Society Policy (2008a) 
prioritises Southern civil society strengthening, which may indicate likely future 
increases in Irish Aid funding being routed directly to Southern NGOs.  While 
generating adequate funding would remain a challenge if NGOs adopted as a 
primary focus the promotion of development literacy and global solidarity, the 
funding required would be far less than that required for NGOs with a presence in 
the developing world.    
Alongside the difficulty of attracting sufficient income to conduct 
programme activity is the danger that official funding will have unattractive 
conditions attached.  Even when donors do not explicitly impose particular 
requirements (such as a ban on particular types of advocacy), fear of displeasing 
donors on whom organisations are financially dependent may discourage certain 
types of NGO activity.   
While funding fluctuations and conditions represent serious pragmatic 
reasons to alter NGO roles, as self-proclaimed values-based actors, normative 
reasons are also important.  A key first normative reason is that the assumed 
comparative advantages of NGOs that led to their identification as suitable service 
providers have generally not been proven.  Hence I suggest that as self-declared 
values-based organisations committed to the reduction of inequality and alleviation 
of poverty NGOs should not assume roles that can be conducted to a higher standard 
by other actors.  At the very least I would argue that there are relatively few 
instances in which Northern NGOs, given their almost universally declared 
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commitment to partnership and capacity-building, should compete against Southern 
NGOs for funding for activities that those Southern NGOs can themselves conduct.    
While it is not clear that NGOs are particularly good at either direct service provision 
or indirect programme activities through partnerships, there is also some evidence 
that their involvement in these roles has had adverse consequences.  For example, 
the charge has long existed that large-scale service provision by NGOs undermines 
the role of the state (Mercer, 2002) and it has also been argued that NGO service 
provision may actually prop up existing injustice – e.g. through whitewashing 
governments that have caused humanitarian emergencies (de Santisteban, 2005).   
Even when NGOs are efficient and effective at programme activities I argue that this 
rarely leads to significant progress in relation to NGOs long-term goals because 
global inequality is so inextricably linked to structural factors.  In order to progress 
their core objectives, therefore, NGOs need to look beyond programme activities as 
they impose a high opportunity cost in preventing NGOs from concentrating on 
potentially more transformative activities. 
I recommend a focus on the promotion of development literacy and global 
solidarity because changes to structural impediments to development require mass 
support from the populations of developed countries.  This is because although 
greater global equality might be in everyone’s interests long-term, in the short-term 
such changes would almost certainly lead to less money in the pockets of Irish 
people – e.g. changes in trade rules might lead to reductions in subsidies to Irish 
farmers and tackling climate change and sustainability issues might lead to a 
requirement that climate debts be paid by Ireland. While it may be possible for Irish 
NGOs to combine both service provision and other activities in the developing world 
with a role promoting development literacy and global solidarity with the latter being 
prioritised, I suggest that this would be very difficult because the pressures of 
obtaining adequate funding for programme activities along with possible conditions 
attached to funding would increase the likelihood of the potentially more 
transformative role being relegated to an inferior position. 
2.8.4 Why Ireland Now is Conducive to the Adoption of Roles Based on 
the Promotion of Development Literacy and Global Solidarity 
I argue that four factors make this a particularly opportune time for Irish 
NGOs to reconfigure their activities towards the promotion of development literacy 
49 
 
and global solidarity among the Irish public.  These relate to Irish Aid, the high 
levels of public support for and trust in Irish NGOs, the diversified funding base of 
Irish NGOs, and the current Irish financial crisis.   
 NGO literature abounds with prescriptions of caution in relation to dealings 
with donors.  Ironically, a review of Irish Aid’s interactions with Irish NGOs would 
suggest that far from undermining NGO independence or potential, Irish Aid has in 
fact encouraged those it has funded to fulfil the distinctive roles envisaged in their 
mission statements.  While much NGO funding available from Irish Aid has been for 
programme activities, Irish Aid has also offered substantial funding for activities 
including development education in Ireland and has been open to submissions from 
NGOs as to the most appropriate use of funding. 
 As already discussed, studies have consistently identified high levels of 
public trust of NGOs in Ireland.   In addition, NGOs have high levels of public 
support as indicated by their broad individual donor bases.  Together these imply 
that messages disseminated by NGOs would be listened to and could influence 
public opinion.  Related in part to their high levels of trust and broad support base is 
their generally diversified funding base, including Irish and international government 
donors, corporate donors, foundations and individual donors.  This affords Irish 
NGOs an opportunity to explore non-traditional activities that might not be available 
to NGOs depending on a smaller number of funders with particular objectives. 
 Finally, I suggest that the current Irish economic crisis offers a unique 
opportunity for Irish NGOs to advance understanding of development issues among 
Irish people.  For example, whereas discussions regarding the impact of IMF rescue 
packages were fundamentally divorced from the reality of most Irish people’s lives 
at the beginning of the timeframe considered in this study, by 2010 Irish people had 
themselves experienced a similar fate to many developing countries.  Issues such as 
indebtedness and structural causes of poverty are all now far easier to explain to an 
Irish audience given their relatedness to the current Irish experience.  Whereas this 
review has focused on poor people in developing countries exclusively, now appears 
an ideal time to make links between poverty and inequality throughout the world.  
The Irish financial crisis appears also to have trigged an Irish existential crisis, 
perhaps best exemplified by the 2011 electoral decimation of Fianna Fāil, the largest 
political party throughout the Irish state’s history.  With Irish society appearing to 
have untethered itself from past orthodoxies and to have lost faith in areas ranging 
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from banking to regulation to property speculation, Irish people may now be more 
open than ever to adopting fundamentally new ways of thinking about the world.  In 
addition, the decreased capacity of Irish people to financially support development 
initiatives may lead to a shift of emphasis from the size of contributions to 
potentially more meaningful measures such as their impact, and may make Irish 
people more willing to make non-financial contributions.    
2.8.5 Likely Challenges for Irish NGOs Seeking to Adopt Roles Based on 
the Promotion of Development Literacy and Global Solidarity 
 While I have suggested that now is a particularly opportune time for Irish 
NGOs to adopt roles based on the promotion of development literacy and global 
solidarity, such a transformation would not be easy.  In this section I briefly consider 
four likely challenges that NGOs would face in making such a move.  These relate to 
organisational growth imperatives, funding, prior NGO activities and recessionary 
introspection. 
 The role I am recommending for Irish NGOs is one that would likely lead to 
contractions in their size and budgets.  It would potentially also lead to the gap 
between the three largest Irish NGOs (Concern, GOAL and Trócaire) and the many 
others being reduced.  In discussing constituency-building, which is akin to the role I 
am recommending, Edwards (1999a) described how such a role would be in 
opposition to organizational growth imperatives as emphasis would be on building 
support for a particular cause rather than support for a particular organisation.  Given 
that NGOs in Ireland and elsewhere appear to have carefully cultivated and 
promoted their own brands and emphasised growth, this could prove challenging. 
To date, Irish NGO activities have overwhelmingly emphasised activities in 
developing countries.  As will be discussed in Chapter 3, by emphasising NGO 
administration costs Irish NGOs have long pushed the message that NGO funding is 
only being used effectively if it is spent directly in the developing world.  Citing 
Edwards (1999, p. 125) again, “NGOs have been telling the wrong story for 40 
years” and suddenly changing that story might undermine the trust that NGOs have 
built up among Irish people.  Suggesting, as I do, that NGOs have been emphasizing 
the wrong activities clearly leads to a questioning of why this is the case.  One 
possible answer that would serve to undermine the ability of Irish NGOs to promote 
development literacy and global solidarity is that some NGOs might not be very 
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developmentally literate or genuinely committed to global solidarity themselves.  I 
suggest that although a minority of Irish NGOs might fall into this category, if a 
significant element of the NGO sector start to emphasise development literacy and 
global solidarity this would result in increased questioning of NGOs and, ultimately, 
lead to the exposure of those that did not meet high standards in this regard. 
 Another challenge relates to funding.  While the role recommended here 
would be far less costly than traditional NGO activities in the developing world, 
raising the funding required for this type of role would be difficult.  In part this is 
because NGO have themselves emphasised to the public that money should be spent 
in the developing world and hence raising this money from the public might be 
initially unfeasible.  Secondly, major donors tend to have considerably less funding 
available for this type of work than for programme activities.   
 Finally, while I have argued that the changed reality of Ireland in 2011 
represents a window of opportunity for NGOs to convince the public to abandon 
outdated perspectives on development, this period may be short-lived as old attitudes 
may be re-adopted or new ways of thinking may quickly replace those that have been 
rejected.  If people form new attitudes they may differ very significantly from the 
notion of global solidarity and could lead to people adopting a more inward stance 
and seeking to protect their own short-term interests to an even greater degree than 
previously. 
 While these challenges are real I argue both that none of them is a sufficient 
reason for NGOs not to attempt to reorient their activities towards potentially more 
transformative activities and that none of them makes the task impossible.  For 
example, as discussed earlier in this chapter, AFRI has succeeded not only in 
reorienting itself in the broad direction that I recommend, but in sustaining itself in 
that position since 1982.  Apparent NGO dependence on donor trends may also be 
overstated and, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g. Ebrahim, 2005b), the relationship 
between NGOs and donors is characterised more by interdependence than 
dependence and NGOs may have more influence over donors than is sometimes 
suggested.  The relationship between Irish Aid and NGOs, in particular through the 
MAPS funding mechanism, provides a pertinent  example of a donor that explicitly 
invited the NGOs it funded to use its funding to further their own strategic 
objectives. The high levels of trust invested in Irish NGOs, which I have already 
referred to in this chapter, may also make it easier for them to convince people of the 
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need for a changed focus, even if this is different to the message that those NGOs 
have previously conveyed.  Finally, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, the concept of 
legitimacy may also assist Irish NGOs in advancing the role I propose. 
2.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that Irish NGOs should adopt roles based on the 
promotion of development literacy and global solidarity.  By this I intend that Irish 
NGOs should seek to educate the Irish population about development and global 
inequality and motivate them to either directly challenge the structural causes of 
poverty or to support the initiatives of others in this regard.  While I acknowledge 
that the adoption of such roles by Irish NGO roles would pose challenges for them, I 
suggest that there are sufficient pragmatic and ethical reasons in favour of such a 
reorientation to justify it.  I also suggest that Ireland in its current state of economic 
collapse provides an ideal location and time for the reorientation I have described to 
occur.  This chapter serves not alone to contextualise the discussion of Irish relief 
and development NGOs who are the focus of my empirical research, therefore, but 
also to develop the first prong of the argument that provides the rationale for this 
empirical research: that Irish relief and development NGOs should primarily focus 
on the promotion of development literacy and global solidarity among the Irish 
public. 
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Chapter 3 
Why Legitimacy and Accountability are Relevant for NGO 
Roles 
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3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 I argued that Irish NGOs should focus primarily on promoting 
development literacy and global solidarity.  In particular I suggested, firstly, that 
Irish NGOs should seek to convince the Irish public to embrace at least some 
development initiatives that take their lead from developing country agendas; and 
secondly, that Irish NGOs should aim to sufficiently educate and motivate the Irish 
public regarding development issues to lead them to critically regard all initiatives 
framed as developmental or likely to impact on development.  In this chapter I argue 
that the ways in which NGOs are linked with legitimacy and accountability may 
indicate the extent to which NGOs are already promoting development literacy and 
global solidarity and the extent to which members of the public already exhibit 
development literacy and global solidarity.  I begin this chapter by discussing 
reasons for the emergence of interest in NGO legitimacy and accountability before 
moving on to a detailed discussion of theorizing on legitimacy and accountability.  I 
then consider how the heightened interest in NGO legitimacy and accountability has 
been translated into practical initiatives and how NGO legitimacy and accountability 
have been considered and acted upon in Ireland.  Finally, I outline in detail the 
argument of this chapter.   
3.2 Origins of Interest in NGO Legitimacy and Accountability 
 In chapter 1 I suggested that the performance of NGOs in the aftermath of the 
1994 Rwandan genocide led to a widespread questioning of NGOs and, in particular, 
their accountability.  While Rwanda was clearly pivotal, a range of other internal and 
external stimuli were also partly responsible for this heightened NGO scrutiny. In 
addition, while most attention centred on NGO accountability, their legitimacy also 
came to the fore. 
Specific external reasons that have been cited for the emergence of an 
increased focus on both NGO legitimacy and accountability include public scandals 
in the sector and media criticism (Jordan, 2005, Gibelman and Gelman, 2004, 
Gibelman and Gelman, 2001).  Not only is the Rwandan  genocide especially 
noteworthy in this regard, but so too is Greenpeace’s erroneous analysis of the 
implications of the proposed Brent Spar oilrig disposal in the North Sea (Simmons, 
1998, Charnovitz, 2005).    The expansion of NGO advocacy both within and outside 
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structures of global governance (Beaudoin, 2004, Gereffi et al., 2001, Gordenker and 
Weiss, 1995) has also been linked with rising interest in NGO legitimacy (Anderson, 
2000, Naidoo, 2004).  The rising visibility of NGOs (Cavill and Sohail, 2007) and 
their increased funding and power (Lee, 2004) are also frequently identified as 
having led to an increase in interest in both NGO legitimacy and accountability.    A 
consistent thread within NGO legitimacy and accountability literature has pointed to 
the politically conservative nature of much of the external scrutiny of NGOs and 
explicitly linked the questioning of NGO legitimacy and accountability with the role 
NGOs have played in promoting progressive agendas and questioning the legitimacy 
and accountability of others (e.g. Jordan, 2005). “NGO Watch”, a project of the 
American Enterprise Institute, has been singled out for particular criticism (Gray et 
al., 2006, Naidoo, 2004, Bendell, 2006), although Edwards (2006) has also pointed 
to the Rushford Report in Washington DC and the NGO Monitor in Jerusalem as 
politically-motivated NGO critics.   
 It is claimed that since the September 2001 attacks in the USA the level of 
scrutiny of international NGOs has increased further, due to fears of terrorists using 
NGOs as a front for illegal operations (Kilby, 2004, McGann and Johnstone, 2005).   
3.3 Theorizing Legitimacy  
Scholars of political science, philosophy, international relations and 
organizational theory are among those to have grappled with the concept of 
legitimacy.  Just as users of the concept have varied so too have the objects of their 
scrutiny: on a macro level the legitimacy of entire organisational structures (e.g. 
systems of governance) have attracted attention, and on a micro level the focus has 
been on individual organisations.   
 At the heart of the definitional debate surrounding the concept of legitimacy 
lies a distinction dating back to Max Weber (1947) between theories of legitimacy 
that define what proper constraints on power should be and others that centre on the 
perceptions of those subject to that power.  Weber situated himself in the latter camp 
and argued that rule was legitimate when subjects believed it to be so.  This approach 
has gained traction across disciplines and ties in with the popular current notion of 
legitimacy as socially-constructed.  Although discussions of legitimacy routinely 
begin by acknowledging the parallel positions described by Weber, it is rare to find a 
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current definition of legitimacy that does not award a central role to perceptions.  For 
example, Suchman’s (1995, p. 574) definition of organizational legitimacy as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” is typical of current approaches.   
Much current writing on legitimacy is organised around two key foci.  At the 
macro level the legitimacy of the international system and its constituent actors, 
including NGOs, dominate legitimacy discussions (e.g. Hardt and Negri, 2000, 
Clark, 2003, Franck, 1988).  In the context of organizations, strategies for managing 
or enhancing legitimacy occupy a similarly prominent position (e.g. Tilling and Tilt, 
2010, O'Donovan, 2002, Deegan, 2007).  Such strategies are often discussed in the 
context of avoiding or dealing with “legitimation crises”.  Originally described by 
Habermas (1976) in the context of governments, a legitimation crisis was said to 
occur when a government retained the legal authority to govern but had lost the 
support of the electorate.   The same concept is now routinely applied to corporate 
and other entities. 
 Definitions of NGO legitimacy tend to either focus exclusively on perception 
or on perception in addition to other, apparently objective, indicators.  In a definition 
that focuses exclusively on perception, Slim (2002, p. 5), for example, has defined 
NGO legitimacy as “the particular status with which an organisation is imbued and 
perceived at any given time that enables it to operate with the general consent of 
peoples, governments, companies and non-state groups around the world”.  Drawing 
on earlier work, Ossewaarde et al. (2008, p. 44) have argued that “not only is INGO 
legitimacy dependant on perceived conformity to their normative claims, but it is 
also expected that INGOs comply with international law (regulatory legitimacy), are 
cognitively capable of acting on behalf of the stated mission (cognitive legitimacy), 
and are able to show the effectuation of their mission to their stakeholders (output 
legitimacy)”.  This definition combines an emphasis on apparently objective 
indicators of legitimacy with an emphasis on perceptions.   Finally, a widely-cited 
NGO definition by Edwards (2000, p. 20) described legitimacy as “the right to be 
and do something in society – a sense that an organization is lawful, admissible and 
justified in its chosen course of action”.   
Edwards’ reference to an NGO’s right to “do something in society” draws 
attention to the wide variety of NGO roles, each of which may require a separate 
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basis for legitimacy.  For example, although in a given context recipients of a 
particular NGO’s services may consider that NGO to be a legitimate service 
provider, this does not necessarily mean that those recipients would consider the 
same NGO to be a legitimate advocate for their interests.  Similarly, even if service 
recipients consider a particular NGO to be legitimate in undertaking certain 
activities, it does not automatically follow that that NGO’s donor will also consider 
it to be legitimate in undertaking those activities.  As will be discussed in more detail 
in the context of NGO accountability, the variety of potential NGO stakeholders 
makes it necessary for any NGO concerned with its legitimacy to be clear about 
which stakeholders it most wants to be perceived as legitimate by.   This argument 
ties in with Lister’s (2003) critique that much development literature fails to 
appropriately interrogate the concept of legitimacy as it asks whether organisations 
are legitimate without answering the key questions “legitimate for what?” and 
“legitimate to whom?”.  This questioning of what sources of legitimacy should be 
prioritised by NGOs harks back to the concept of alternative development, which 
emphasised the need for development to be bottom up. 
Although a blinkered focus on legitimacy as exclusively dependant on 
perception might suggest that anything could potentially lead to an NGO being 
considered legitimate, it is more common for analysts to identify particular 
characteristics or practices that are associated with NGO legitimacy.  Depending on 
one’s approach to legitimacy these can either be understood as objective sources of 
legitimacy or as characteristics likely to lead to NGOs being perceived as legitimate.       
The most frequently cited source of NGO legitimacy in various contexts, 
including advocacy and lobbying, is meaningful representation of an important 
constituency (Van Rooy, 2004).  Although a small number of NGOs are 
representative membership organisations, this is rare and NGO advocacy is routinely 
criticised on the grounds that NGOs are not representative (Hudson, 2002, Kelly, 
2009).  Representation as a key (or sole) criterion for legitimacy has in turn been 
widely criticised in NGO literature (Charnovitz, 2005, Edwards, 1999b).  For 
example, it has been argued that whereas parliamentary democracy is about 
representation, civil society is about participation with NGOs representing ideas 
rather than people (Marschall, 2002).  Responses to criticism regarding NGOs’ lack 
of representativeness have also highlighted the increasingly problematic nature of 
systems of representation in other domains.  For example, the contentious idea of 
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“politics of presence” suggests that fair representation implies proportionate  
representation on the basis of social characteristics rather than an exclusive reliance 
on shared ideas (Phillips, 1995).    
Suggested sources of NGO legitimacy other than representation include laws  
(Brown and Jagadananda, 2007, Edwards, 1999b), moral position or values (Hudson, 
2002, Van Rooy, 2004), technical experience and expertise (Naidoo, 2004), 
performance (Atack, 1999) and mechanisms of accountability (Pearce, 1997, 
Edwards, 1999b).  The identification of sources of legitimacy leads to the argument 
that just as in the case of corporate entities, NGOs may institute strategies designed 
at managing their legitimacy through actively influencing how they are likely to be 
perceived.   Given that legitimacy is sufficiently diffused among a wide range of 
stakeholders to make direct enhancement difficult, Brown (2008, p. 11) has 
recommended that this process be conceived of in terms of the construction of 
“legitimacy arguments”.  From this perspective each NGO must, therefore, not only 
clearly identify for itself what it believes makes it legitimate, but also articulate this 
to its stakeholders with a view to influencing those stakeholders’ perceptions.   
3.4 Theorizing Accountability 
The concept of accountability, like that of legitimacy, transcends disciplinary 
boundaries and has amassed both an extensive range of definitions and a diverse 
range of targets.  This section will begin by contrasting principal-agent and 
stakeholder approaches to accountability, which have dominated accountability 
theorizing across sectors, and then focus specifically on NGO accountability. 
Principal-agent theory, which underpins much early thinking on 
accountability (Mulgan, 2003), is premised on a relationship wherein certain 
organisations or individuals (principals) engage others (agents) to carry out agreed 
agendas on their behalf.  Accountability, according to this perspective, serves as a 
means for principals to check that their agendas have been carried out, and it requires 
that agents must answer to their principals.  At the heart of principal-agent 
approaches, therefore, is the notion of a clear authority to whom an agent is formally 
obliged to account.  A classic case of principal-agent accountability occurs in 
relation to democratically-elected governments, who gain a mandate from their 
electorate to carry out agreed agendas and must answer to that electorate at each new 
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election.  An equivalent corporate example is the right of a company’s owners or 
shareholders to hold that company to account.   
Stakeholder perspectives have been traced to work by Edward Freeman 
(1984 cited in Weisband and Ebrahim, 2007) that considered strategic management 
among private sector firms and defined stakeholders to include not only shareholders 
but also other individuals and groups that were likely to be affected by a firm’s 
activities.  In the context of accountability, stakeholder approaches refer to a belief 
that all those likely to be affected by an action should have the right to hold those 
responsible for that action to account. Stakeholder approaches to accountability have 
received particular attention in relation to the social accountability of privately 
owned corporations and are linked to a burgeoning literature on corporate social 
responsibility and ethics (Weisband and Ebrahim, 2007).   
Although one commentator (Kovach, 2006) has suggested that accountability 
should be viewed as a dynamic process in which stakeholders are involved at all 
stages of an organisation’s decision-making, this view is unusual with proponents of 
both principal-agent and stakeholder accountability generally limiting accountability 
to a means of retrospectively passing judgment on activities undertaken (Goetz and 
Jenkins, 2002).  
A common starting point for discussions of NGO accountability is a 
definition by Edwards and Hulme (1996a, p. 8) that described accountability as “the 
means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognised authority (or 
authorities) and are held responsible for their actions”. The separate references in 
this definition to “report[ing]” and being “held responsible” suggested that 
accountability was made up of two components, which may not both be present in a 
single accountability relationship – e.g. reporting to an authority is one component 
and being held responsible for actions taken is another.  Commentators have 
generally referred to these components as answerability and enforceability (Goetz 
and Jenkins, 2002, Cavill and Sohail, 2007).  Reverting to the language of principal-
agent accountability, answerability refers to an obligation on the part of an agent to 
answer to a principal; and enforceability refers to the rights and ability of a principal 
to impose sanctions if he is unhappy with an agent’s performance.   
 An acknowledgment that accountability is made up of at least two 
components forces the recognition that although NGOs may be accountable in some 
ways in some accountability relationships, they may not be accountable in all ways 
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in all accountability relationships.  The reference by Edwards and Hulme to a 
“recognised authority (or authorities)” raises the question of to whom accountability 
is owed.   As already noted, principal-agent theory presents accountability as 
something owed to those with formal power over an organisation or individual.  
While a small minority of authors who have written about NGOs continue to argue 
for a restriction of the understanding of accountability to a right on behalf of one 
actor to call another to account and to be practically able to hold that actor to account 
(Mulgan, 2003), there is substantial agreement within NGO literature that principal-
agent approaches are less suitable for the sector than stakeholder approaches.  As 
early as 1995, for example, Fry (p. 181) recommended that NGOs take a broad view 
of accountability when he spoke of aligning the “felt responsibility” of an 
organisation or individual with that for which they were formally accountable.  Just 
one year later Najam (1996), in a clear stakeholder perspective, identified three 
categories of accountability concerns that he claimed applied to NGOs: 
accountability to patrons, accountability to clients and accountability to themselves.  
Slim’s 2002 (p. 9) definition of NGO accountability as “the process by which an 
NGO holds itself openly responsible for what it believes, what it does, and what it 
does not do in a way that shows it involving all concerned parties and actively 
responding to what it learns” is typical of the currently dominant stakeholder view.  
The articulation of stakeholder approaches in NGO literature has frequently 
been accompanied by suggestions as to the stakeholders to whom NGOs should be 
accountable and it has become common to distinguish between upward, downward, 
inward and horizontal accountability (Cavill and Sohail, 2007, Lloyd, 2005).  
Upward accountability has been described as accountability to trustees, donors and 
host governments, and downward accountability has been described as 
accountability to partners, beneficiaries, staff and supporters (Edwards and Hulme, 
1996b). Upwards accountability in this context refers to accountability to those with 
formal power over an organisation whereas downward accountability refers to 
accountability to those over whom an organisation itself has power.  Inward 
accountability refers to accountability to an organisation’s own mission or 
conscience and corresponds with Fry’s (1995) notion of “felt responsibility”.  
Horizontal accountability refers to accountability to peers in the sector (Lloyd, 2005)  
The most broad directional label is 360˚ accountability, which is intended to imply 
accountability in all directions.     
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Not only have proponents of stakeholder approaches suggested the 
stakeholders to whom they believe NGOs should be accountable, but in some cases 
they have also suggested how stakeholders should be prioritised.  Bendell (2006, p. 
7) has described “democratic accountability”, which can be seen as a stakeholder 
approach, as requiring “decision making by the powerful to [be] accountable to those 
who are less powerful and are affected by those decisions”.   Similarly, some 
advocates of stakeholder approaches have argued that the moral right for an 
individual to participate in decisions over particular actions become stronger as the 
potential impacts on the life of that individual from the decision become greater 
(Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2006).  Understood in this way, stakeholder approaches 
provide a clear theoretical means of prioritising the accountability demands of 
different stakeholders if a clash of interests occurs.  This is important in the context 
of NGOs one of whose roles has been described as mediating between the (differing) 
interests of donors and clients (Martens, 2005).     
 In addition to considering to whom NGOs should be accountable, analysts 
have also considered for what NGOs are accountable.  An important distinction first 
made by Avina (1993) and later built on by Edwards and Hulme (1996a) is between 
functional accountability and strategic accountability.  Functional accountability 
broadly refers to accounting for resources, resource use and immediate impact; and 
strategic accountability broadly refers to accounting for impacts that an NGO’s 
actions have on the actions of other organizations and the wider environment.  It has 
been argued that new understandings of accountability, including stakeholder 
approaches, go beyond the conventional focus on whether procedures have been 
followed diligently to consider whether desirable outcomes have resulted (Goetz and 
Jenkins, 2002).    
A final point that merits mention is the emerging concept of mutual 
accountability, which is strongly associated with the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness.  This described mutual accountability as existing when donors and 
recipients “jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective country level 
mechanisms mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid 
effectiveness” (OECD, 2005, p. 8).  A UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) report (cited in De Renzio, 2006, p. 4) subsequently redefined 
mutual accountability as existing when  “two or more parties have shared 
development goals, in which each has legitimate claims the other is responsible for 
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fulfilling and where each may be required to explain how they have discharged their 
responsibilities, and be sanctioned if they failed to deliver”.  Although the concept of 
mutual accountability has gained a steady foothold in NGO literature (e.g. Brown, 
2007), the empirical research described in this study remains focused on principal-
agent and stakeholder approaches.  This is for two main reasons.  Firstly, mutual 
accountability theorizing remains in its infancy and the ambiguity surrounding it 
would make operationalising it in the context of a content analysis problematic.  
Secondly, the focus of this study is on how accountability is linked with NGOs in 
newspaper coverage from 1994-2009.  For much of this period the concept of mutual 
accountability was virtually unheard of.   
The move away from principal-agent approaches to NGO accountability 
appears to be underpinned by a belief that the sector is fundamentally different to 
other sectors in ways that make traditional approaches to accountability 
inappropriate.  In addition to the challenge of NGOs having multiple stakeholders 
and no widely agreed means of prioritizing their interests, the difficulty of measuring 
success in the development sector has also received considerable attention.  The 
argument commonly applied is that principal-agent approaches rely on performance 
measurement systems that are inappropriate in a context where process is often more 
important than product (Mawdsley et al., 2005, Morgan, 2004).   While this may be 
true, it is also the case that there has been an ongoing re-conceptualisation of 
accountability in other sectors and it may be the case that traditional approaches to 
accountability are becoming obsolete across sectors rather than in the NGO sector 
alone. For example, although still underdeveloped and dismissed by some critics as 
attempts to control and manipulate consumer perceptions (see, for example, literature 
on 'greenwashing' such as Clegg, 2009), it is argued that many businesses are now 
pursuing a “triple bottom line” that takes into account environmental and social goals 
as well as profit (Newell and Bellour, 2002).  The rapid rise of interest in issues 
including corporate social responsibility, social auditing and sustainability 
accounting within the corporate sector can also be seen to demonstrate that 
accountability is undergoing conceptual shifts outside of the NGO world too 
(Unerman et al., 2007, Garvey and Newell, 2005, Macleod and Lewis, 2004, 
Sinclair, 1995), although whether these changes in discourse are reflected in changed 
practices remains unclear.  
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3.5 Administration Costs 
 The administration costs of NGOs are being singled out for analysis in this 
study as a particular accountability mechanism.  Rhetoric on NGO administration 
costs suggests that cheapest is best – so an NGO with administration costs of 7% is 
invariably better than an NGO with administration costs of 11%.  While there is no 
agreed definition of NGO administration costs, the measure is usually associated 
with fundraising and some or all of an NGO’s head office costs.  Despite the lack of 
clarity on what precisely administration costs entail, reporting by NGOs on how 
much is spent on administration costs is common.  Long criticised within the NGO 
sector, it has been argued that the question of what percentage of one’s donation 
goes to “the cause” functions as a kind of “coercive, authoritative, life-sucking state 
that reigns over the whole nonprofit endeavour” (Pallotta, 2008, p. 129).   
 While I largely agree with Pallotta’s critique, I should make clear from the 
outset that regardless how appealing an NGO’s overall objectives or how committed 
its staff may be, I believe that no NGO should be excused for inefficiency or 
incurring higher costs than necessary in conducting its operations.   Furthermore I 
acknowledge that there are numerous ways in which NGOs can incur unnecessarily 
high costs including through recruitment and staff remuneration practices, inefficient 
procurement practices, inadequate planning, and failure to capitalise on funding and 
efficiency opportunities.  I believe that consideration of any of these or related 
specific issues in relation to NGOs is not only justifiable but could potentially be 
very helpful in highlighting or discouraging bad practices.  However, as I will argue 
below, judging NGOs based on their “administration costs” is unhelpful, because not 
alone can the measure not be relied upon to accurately convey how cost-effective or 
efficient NGOs’ administrative or other functions are, but, more damagingly in my 
opinion, the measure also orients analysis of NGOs away from the impact of their 
work.  
Before discussing problems with the notion of administration costs it is worth 
identifying likely reasons for its popularity.  For a start, the measure provides an easy 
way of differentiating between NGOs in a crowded sector.  Difficulties of measuring 
the impact of NGO humanitarian and development work are widely acknowledged 
and remain unresolved within the sector (Taylor and Soal, 2003, Spar and Dail, 
2002).  In this context a focus on administration costs allows donors to appear to 
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evaluate NGOs without having to engage beyond a simple percentage figure and 
allows NGOs a relatively easy basis on which to compete with each other. The 
notion of keeping administration costs - and by implication head office salaries -  
low also helps NGOs to distinguish their staff from apparently well-paid corporate 
staff and to further promote the notion of NGOs as ethical and value-driven 
operators who are worthy of public support. 
 The first problem with the administration cost measure is that it cannot be 
relied upon to convey how efficient or cost-effective an NGO’s administrative 
function is. There are many reasons for this.  Firstly, administration costs figures are 
generally produced by NGOs on the basis of their administration (however they 
choose to define administration) as a whole.  Therefore grossly inefficient elements 
of administration can be concealed within an overall figure. For example, very large 
senior management salaries could be concealed within an overall administration cost 
figure if an NGO pays its junior staff very modestly or uses volunteers or seconded 
staff members to whom salaries are not paid to carry out other functions.  Secondly, 
a wide range of creative accounting techniques have been reported to be in use by 
NGOs seeking to produce low administration costs (Smillie, 1997) with variations of 
up to 30% having been reported on the basis of different accounting practices alone 
(Sargeant and Jay, 2004).  For example, the administration costs for a fundraising 
event can appear to be eliminated if a sufficient number of attendees “sponsor” the 
costs of the event by giving the money they would expect to pay for their attendance 
directly to suppliers of goods and services.  In such cases an NGO can report 0% 
administration costs for their event without the figure giving any indication as to 
whether the NGO has secured the necessary supplies or services for the event at 
competitive prices.  Thirdly, NGO administration cost figures ignore the reality that 
it is harder and more expensive to raise money at some times than others and for 
some causes than others (Pallotta, 2008, Smillie, 1995).  For example, if in a given 
year a large humanitarian emergency occurs and receives significant news coverage 
NGOs that have identified themselves as operational in the area or are assumed to be 
operational in the area can expect to receive significant increases in public donations 
without any additional advertising expenses being incurred on their part.  This will 
result in reduced administration costs for that NGO that year compared to in years 
when no such large-scale coverage reminds people of their work.  This is despite the 
fact that the NGOs involved may be no more efficient in their administration during 
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the year in which this coverage has occurred.  Fourthly, NGO administration costs 
are generally only meaningful in comparative perspectives.  For example, if an NGO 
reported that it spent 8% on its administration costs it would be difficult to assess 
whether this represented efficient or inefficient administration unless there was 
another NGO that had conducted exactly the same work in exactly the same way 
with exact the same resources, circumstances and results and reported administration 
costs based on the same definition. However, no two NGOs do exactly the same 
work and the absence of agreed parameters as to what should be included or 
excluded from administration costs make comparisons virtually impossible to 
interpret. 
Not only do reports of NGO administration costs not convey how efficient or 
cost-effective an NGO’s administrative function is, but they also completely fail to 
indicate whether areas other than an NGO’s administration are efficient or cost-
effective.  Put another way, if an NGO reports administration costs of 5% and an 
individual donates €100, the administration cost figure is only concerned with 
reporting on how €5 of that donation is spent and completely disregards the far more 
substantial €95 of that donation.  There is, however, a very problematic assumption 
implicit in the reporting of administration costs that these costs will correlate with 
quality in other areas of an NGO’s work.  There is not necessarily any link between 
being cheap and being effective, however, and this assumed correlation is, in the 
words of one commentator, “like saying that the Lada is the best car in the world (or 
the most efficient) because it is the cheapest” (Smillie, 1997, p. 567).   
Clearly there are many criteria or combinations of criteria that can be 
employed when attempting assessments of NGO performance and the subject has 
generated a significant literature.  I believe an emphasis on NGO administration 
costs to be particularly problematic because it directs attention away from 
substantive issues such as the appropriateness and quality of NGO work from the 
perspective of those in whose name it is conducted, and, ultimately, the long-term 
impact of that work. Even if there were a way of defining and policing the reporting 
of the measure so that it did accurately reflect how much it cost NGOs to administer 
their activities, therefore, I believe that by focusing exclusively on cost and ignoring 
impact that this measure should at best only form a small part of overall assessments 
of NGOs. 
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Finally, it has been argued that having to maintain low administration costs 
can undermine the overall quality of NGO work by leading to the neglect of 
organizational learning (Edwards, 1997) and failure to invest in necessary 
organizational infrastructure (Pallotta, 2008).    
 There is a longstanding consensus among NGO analysts that administration 
costs have little relevance to programme success (Wenar, 2006, Smillie, 1995).  
Perhaps as a result of this consensus there has been relatively little empirical study 
into the use of the measure by NGOs.  There is, however, international evidence that 
perception of costs matter to charitable givers in general, who typically give more to 
organisations that allocate a greater proportion of their expenditure to programmes as 
against fundraising and administration (Sargeant et al., 2009, Callan, 1994).  A focus 
on administration costs also retains considerable rhetorical power internationally.  
Two key US charity watchdogs, the Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance 
and the American Institute of Philanthropy, both publish (among other 
recommendations) maximum recommended percentage figures that they believe 
charities should spend on administration (Better Business Bureau Wise Giving 
Alliance, 2009, American Institute of Philanthropy, 2009) thereby lending tacit 
approval to the measure.  Studies have also demonstrated a positive relationship 
between meeting the Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance standards and 
increased contributions from donors (Chen, 2009, Sloan, 2009).   
 Finally, and of particular relevance to this study, the use of administration 
costs as an indicator of relief and development NGO quality clearly benefits NGOs 
that are predominantly engaged in developing country activities.  Organisations that 
pursue roles similar to those I recommend will inevitably have high administration 
costs as their costs will be predominantly – or even exclusively – incurred in the 
developed world. 
3.6 NGO Legitimacy and Accountability: From Theory To Practice 
 As already described, the level of overall questioning of NGO legitimacy and 
accountability is said to have increased in recent decades.  In particular, an 
abundance of articles questioning the accountability of NGOs has appeared 
(Weidenbaum, 2007, Johns, 2000, Christensen, 2004, O'Beirne, 2004, Bond, 2000) 
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many of which compare the accountability of NGOs with that of governments, 
corporations or international institutions (Newell and Bellour, 2002, Mulgan, 2003).   
 Although legitimacy is sometimes mentioned alongside accountability in 
critiques of NGOs (Johns, 2000), and may be implicitly included under the concept 
of accountability without specifically being mentioned, there is a much smaller body 
of literature that explicitly considers NGO legitimacy.  Of the analyses that do exist, 
most focus on narrow definitions of legitimacy (e.g. based on formal representation) 
and compare specific NGO activities (e.g. involvement in global governance) with 
similar activities conducted by other actors and conclude that NGOs are less 
legitimate than other actors (Wolf, 1999).   
 Just as questioning of NGO legitimacy is limited, so too are 
recommendations for NGOs seeking to enhance their legitimacy.  An exception is 
provided by Brown and Jagadananda (2007, p. 8) who suggest four approaches they 
describe as moving “from pure alignment with existing expectations to actively 
changing the expectations that underpin legitimacy judgments”.   
 Whereas there can be said to be a paucity of proposals for enhancing NGO 
legitimacy, the same cannot be said for accountability.  In Chapter 2 I noted that the 
growth in numbers of NGOs from the 1980s onwards was partly due to the 
contracting out of services associated with managerialism, which in turn was 
associated with the imposition of specific accountability requirements on contracted 
service providers. These accountability requirements centred on stringent 
measurement and evaluation mechanisms such as performance indicators, detailed 
financial reporting and auditing that aimed to improve efficiency (Ferlie et al., 1996).  
Criticisms of managerialist approaches to accountability both within and outside the 
NGO sector abound.  It has been suggested, for example, that their emphasis on 
measurement undermines professional practice by orienting professionals towards 
predefined targets and away from client needs (O'Neill, 2000); that it encourages an 
emphasis on superficial outputs, which are easy to measure, and away from real 
impacts (Mawdsley et al., 2005, Taylor and Soal, 2003); and that it undermines the 
potential for learning as recipients feel compelled to emphasize successes and 
conceal failures in order to secure future funding (Taylor and Soal, 2003, Ebrahim, 
2005a).   
While managerialist accountability requirements were largely externally-
driven, a range of internally derived accountability mechanisms have also emerged.  
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These include codes of conduct and charters (People in Aid, 2003, Liaison 
Committee of Development NGOs to the European Union, 1997, Civicus, 2005, 
InterAction, 2007) and performance standards (HAP, 2007, Sphere, 2004, 
AccountAbility, 2003).  Perhaps surprisingly, it has been claimed that internally 
derived NGO accountability mechanisms have also been largely preoccupied with  
strengthening upward accountability to donors and governments to the neglect of 
increasing downward accountability to beneficiaries (Lloyd, 2005).  While 
stakeholder approaches to accountability have gained rhetorical dominance it 
appears that in practice upward accountability requirements that primarily emphasize 
financial probity still take precedence (Wenar, 2006) and either prevent or 
undermine attempts to prioritise downward accountability (Wallace and Chapman, 
2004, Christensen and Ebrahim, 2006, Dixon, 2006).  As described by Cavill and 
Sohail (2007, p. 245), NGO accountability in practice has amounted to a “technical 
fix that leaves unequal local relations almost completely unchallenged”.  Despite 
this, very few voices have emerged questioning whether accountability is an 
appropriate framework for discussing development relationships – an article by 
Dillon (2003) is an exception in this regard. 
3.7 Legitimacy and Accountability: Bringing the Concepts Together 
3.7.1 Introduction 
While it is common for accountability to be described as key to NGO 
legitimacy (Edwards and Hulme, 1996c), the exact nature of the relationship 
between NGO legitimacy and NGO accountability is rarely dissected.  This section 
will begin by contrasting two possible approaches and will then summarize key 
issues of particular relevance in relation to NGO legitimacy and accountability. 
3.7.2 Approaches to the Relationship between Legitimacy and 
Accountability 
Following a literature review  Lister (2003, p. 177) concluded that that “many 
authors highlight the crucial aspect of accountability in providing legitimacy for 
NGOs”.  A later review (Ossewaarde et al., 2008, p. 43) claimed that “many scholars 
argue that increased transparency and tightened accountability mechanisms are 
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necessary to maintain or enhance INGO legitimacy”.  The implication in both cases 
is that accountability may act as a source of legitimacy.   
An alternative approach sees accountability as a means of demonstrating 
legitimacy (Taylor and Warburton, 2003) or arguing for legitimacy (Slim, 2002).    
According to this perspective accountability serves as a means for NGOs to respond 
to stakeholders in relation to the elements of its performance or existence on which 
those stakeholders’ perceptions of legitimacy are built.  For example, if an NGO is 
perceived by clients to be a legitimate advocate for their interests based on its 
closeness to them then the onus is on that NGO to convince those clients by means 
of its accountability processes that it does indeed remain close to them.   
3.7.3 Legitimacy, Accountability and NGOs: A Summary of Key Issues 
 Firstly, it seems clear that NGO accountability has received far more 
attention internationally in both theory and practice than NGO legitimacy.  While the 
legitimacy of NGOs has attracted attention, consideration of it has generally been 
confined to certain aspects of NGO activities, in particular advocacy or activism 
(Pearce, 1997, Van Rooy, 2004).  In addition, accountability is often presented as a 
source of legitimacy (Edwards, 2000) leading the practical focus towards 
accountability and away from legitimacy.   
 Secondly, there appears to be a broad consensus among theorists and 
practitioners alike that principal-agent approaches to accountability are inappropriate 
for NGOs and that stakeholder perspectives are more compatible with NGO 
missions.  However, despite this rhetorical commitment to stakeholder approaches, 
the practice of accountability seems dominated by traditional principal-agent 
approaches. 
 Thirdly, there appears to be a broad consensus among theorists that NGO 
administration costs do not accurately reflect the quality or impact of NGO work.  
Despite this, however, the measure appears to retain considerable popular appeal. 
3.8 Legitimacy, Accountability and Irish NGOs 
 As in the international context, the attention paid to NGO legitimacy in 
Ireland appears overshadowed by that paid to NGO accountability; stakeholder 
approaches to NGO accountability appear to have gained a rhetorical but not 
practical advantage over principal-agent approaches; and an emphasis on 
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administration costs appears to retain popular appeal.  These trends will be discussed 
here. 
In the course of the last decade both Comhlámh (the Irish Association for 
Development Workers) and Dóchas (the Irish Association of Non-governmental 
Development Organisations) have endeavoured to raise the issue of accountability 
among their members.  Comhlámh commissioned a lengthy research report (Cronin 
and O'Reagan, 2002) specifically on NGO accountability that mentioned legitimacy 
only as one of ten elements that could both lead to and result from an enhanced level 
of accountability.  Similarly, Dóchas commissioned an NGO accountability review 
(Leen, 2006) that only briefly considered legitimacy in the context of accountability.  
Dóchas also undertook various other NGO accountability initiatives including the 
production of a 2008 accountability discussion paper and the coordination of a 
corresponding series of seminars.  It also co-produced and promoted a number of 
codes of conduct aimed at improving aspects of NGO accountability, most notably a 
code of corporate governance for NGOs (CGAI, 2008).   
While the specific foci of the Comhlámh and Dóchas publications differed, it 
is noteworthy that they both emphasized a need for NGOs to account to clients in 
addition to traditional principals.  Individual NGOs also declared and demonstrated 
their commitment to stakeholder approaches during this period.  Concern, for 
example, applied for and received accreditation from the Humanitarian 
Accountability Partnership (HAP), which is an international regulatory body that 
certifies that members  meet high standards of accountability to intended 
beneficiaries in the context of humanitarian work (HAP, n.d.).  In conjunction with 
Mango, a UK NGO, Concern also sought to develop systematic ways of managing 
downward accountability in the context of longer-term development work through its 
“Listen First” project (Jacobs and Wilford, 2010). 
While Concern appears to have been at the vanguard of experimentation with 
stakeholder approaches to accountability among indigenous Irish NGOs, several UK-
based NGOs with branches in Ireland have also taken concrete steps in a similar 
direction.  Both Tearfund and Christian Aid are full members of HAP.  Christian Aid 
Ireland’s approach to accountability, which is prominently displayed on its website 
(Christian Aid, 2010), is explicitly defined in terms of accountability to its key 
stakeholders which include its partners, staff, the people it exists to serve, and its 
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supporters.  Oxfam too has a substantial record of innovation in relation to 
accountability (see, for example, Roche, 2009).  
While no empirical evidence has hitherto been collected in Ireland on the use 
of NGO administration costs, there is some reason to believe that the measure 
remains widely applied.  For example, GOAL (2009a) has repeatedly endorsed the 
measure, and while Dóchas itself has rejected the validity of the measure (Leen, 
2006), it has also recognised that its use continues (Dóchas, 2008). 
Given the dramatic expansion of Irish Aid during the period of this study its 
approach to NGO legitimacy and accountability is important.  In relation to 
accountability, recent Irish Aid funding schemes have been described as seeking to 
achieve a balance between learning and accountability (Leen, 2006).  MAPS, in 
particular, has been described as taking a broad approach to accountability that 
encourages flexibility and innovation (Development Cooperation Ireland, 2006).  
Interestingly, a study of Irish NGO responses to Irish Aid attempts to encourage a 
broader approach to accountability concluded that many Irish NGOs resisted the new 
paradigm and remained fixated on functional accountability (O'Dwyer, 2006).  The 
attention paid by Irish Aid to NGO legitimacy seems considerably less than that paid 
to accountability.  While a requirement that MAPS agencies raise at least 30% of 
their overall income in Ireland was specifically identified as one means of ensuring 
their legitimacy (Gaynor, 2010), overall, legitimacy has received little attention. 
 In considering relevant empirical research, various studies by O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, deserve attention.  O’Dwyer (2005), for example, conducted a case study 
of the evolution of social accounting processes in the Agency for Personal Service 
Overseas (APSO), which found that despite a purported commitment to broad or 
holistic accountability, stakeholder voices had been effectively controlled by 
powerful organisational interests.    O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) also considered 
accountability mechanisms and practices within a single Irish advocacy NGO 
(Amnesty Ireland) and concluded that upward accountability was crowding out 
downward accountability.  Neither of these empirical studies considered NGO 
legitimacy.   
 A second set of relevant publications has stemmed from the LEARN project, 
which focuses on organisational learning in international aid organisations and was 
undertaken by the Centre for Global Health in Trinity College Dublin in conjunction 
with Irish Aid and Concern.  One of the ensuing publications focused in depth on 
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Irish NGO accountability and argued that reflexive organisational learning could 
lead to enhanced accountability (Barry et al., 2009b).  NGO legitimacy was not a 
focus of the LEARN project. 
 In summary it is clear that the trends detected internationally have been 
mirrored in Ireland with a paucity of attention paid to NGO legitimacy relative to 
NGO accountability, a considerable rhetorical commitment to stakeholder 
approaches to accountability within the NGO sector, and an ongoing emphasis on 
more traditional approaches to accountability in NGO practice.   
3.9 Discussion 
3.9.1 Introduction 
In this section I begin by outlining and discussing the approaches to 
legitimacy and accountability that I believe to be most appropriate for Irish NGOs.  I 
then develop the argument that the ways in which NGOs are linked with these 
concepts may indicate the extent to which NGOs are already promoting development 
literacy and global solidarity and the extent to which members of the public already 
exhibit development literacy and global solidarity.  Whereas empirical studies to date 
have tended to focus on the practice of NGO legitimacy and accountability, my focus 
is on how NGOs have used these concepts and how they have been used in relation 
to NGOs.  My argument is structured in terms of four key research questions each of 
which leads to one or more hypothesis, which in turn guide the empirical 
investigations of this study.  These research questions and hypotheses are outlined in 
full at the end of Chapter 4. 
3.9.2 NGO Legitimacy and Accountability: A Personal Perspective 
 Borrowing from Edwards (2000), I suggest that NGO legitimacy should be 
viewed as a perception by stakeholders that an organisation has a right to be and do 
something in society; and, influenced by multiple commentators, I suggest that 
accountability should be viewed as the process by which NGOs answer to those 
stakeholders.  In common with prevailing NGO sentiment I advocate stakeholder 
approaches to accountability that imply that NGOs are accountable to less powerful 
entities on whom they have an effect, for that effect, in a way that the affected party 
can change the behaviour of the NGO affecting them (Bendell, 2006).  In common 
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with the view of Brown (2008), I argue that even though legitimacy should be 
understood as socially-constructed, NGOs should also be considered capable of 
influencing what measures their stakeholders use to assess their legitimacy and 
ultimately how they are perceived.   
While acknowledging that both the concepts of legitimacy and accountability 
can assist NGOs in advancing their missions, I suggest that NGOs should prioritise 
legitimacy over accountability.  One reason for this is that most definitions of 
legitimacy are oriented towards the fundamental basis of NGO existence and 
activities – i.e. what gives them the right to do or say anything.  I believe that the 
unvarnished question as to what makes an organisation legitimate promotes an 
interrogation of underlying assumptions about the appropriateness of an NGO’s 
mission and how its activities serve to advance that mission.  Thus it offers a basis 
for NGOs to deeply question their existence and practices (and to learn as a result), 
and it offers the potential for others to meaningfully engage with NGOs and their 
activities.  Although I accept that the concept of legitimacy can be used superficially, 
I suggest that it lends itself particularly well to serious critique. 
In contrast, I suggest that as accountability generally only serves as a means 
of evaluation after an activity has been undertaken, it appears to assume a degree of 
NGO legitimacy or at least some rights on the part of NGOs to conduct certain 
activities.  Conceptions of accountability generally focus on what an organisation has 
done rather than the more fundamental question about what an organisation should 
have done or had the right to do.  Hence I suggest that in general the concept of 
accountability deflects attention from fundamental questions about NGOs towards 
more superficial issues regarding how they communicate and respond to concerns.   
While proposing that accountability be relegated to a lesser role than legitimacy, I 
acknowledge that it can still fulfil a useful purpose as a means of demonstrating 
legitimacy if legitimacy is itself considered independently.  If, however, 
accountability takes precedence over legitimacy, I suggest that rather than 
demonstrating legitimacy it may serve to obscure illegitimacy by highlighting 
individual acts of accountability that in reality deflect attention away from long-term 
impact and those most affected by activities.  While it may be possible for 
accountability (particularly if interpreted in stakeholder or mutual accountability 
terms) to fuel a deep critique of NGOs, therefore, I suggest that it more often serves 
as a means of articulating a relatively superficial questioning and consequently 
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obscuring legitimacy.  I suggest that the use of administration costs as an indicator of 
NGO quality is a particularly apt example as it obscures the truth about NGO costs 
and deflects attention from profound questions about NGO impact.  
I acknowledge that given the contested nature of the concepts and their varied 
conceptualisations it is possible that accountability could in certain instances fuel a 
more serious critique of NGOs than legitimacy.  For example, I believe that 
stakeholder approaches to NGO accountability afford the potential for a more serious 
critique of NGOs than principal-agent approaches as principal-agent approaches 
generally focus on how organisations answer to donors, which I suggest is a far more 
contained and easily answered question than how organisations answer to 
stakeholders in general.  Similarly, the concept of legitimacy could be confined to 
legitimacy in relation to a particular aspect of an organisation’s activities – e.g. the 
legitimacy of a single decision made by that organisation – and hence could provide 
a relatively superficial critique of the organisation as a whole. However I believe that 
my argument that a questioning of NGO accountability generally promotes a more 
superficial critique than a questioning of NGO legitimacy is justifiable both because 
of characteristics inherent to most conceptualisations of the concepts and because of 
the ways in which the concepts have generally been applied.   
Dealing firstly with the former, I suggest that the concept of legitimacy has 
inbuilt advantages over the concept of accountability in terms of facilitating a 
critique of NGOs in that in contrast to virtually all conceptualisations of 
accountability, it is not confined to evaluations of activities after those activities have 
been conducted.    While legitimacy can serve as a vehicle for considering activities 
that have already been conducted, it works equally well as a means of providing a 
broader critique, such as one based on an organisation’s existence as a whole in 
advance of or divorced from particular operations or activities by that organisation.  
Additionally, legitimacy appears to offer a more direct means of critique as it focuses 
directly on the rights or basis for an organisation’s existence or activities rather than, 
as in the case of accountability, on how an organisation answers for its existence or 
activities.  In relation to the application of these concepts, while research to date in 
relation to NGO legitimacy has been limited and not provided a clear indication as to 
how the concept has generally been applied, research on NGO accountability has 
clearly suggested that principal-agent approaches, which in my view generally 
facilitate a relatively superficial critique, tend to dominate in practice.   
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Not only do I suggest that consideration of NGO legitimacy is valuable in its 
own right and should be prioritised above accountability, but I also suggest that 
legitimacy should guide NGOs in their approach to accountability or, as described by 
Jepson (2005, p. 215), NGOs should take a “legitimacy-based approach to 
accountability”.  By this I mean that NGOs should, with reference to their mission 
statements, begin by reflecting on who their stakeholders are and in what order these 
stakeholders’ wishes should be prioritised.  Once an NGO has succeeded in 
identifying and prioritising its stakeholders and constructed an argument as to what 
in its view makes it legitimate, then the process of building an appropriate 
accountability system should (at least in theory) be uncomplicated.  For example, if 
an NGO concludes that its key stakeholder is a client and its perception as legitimate 
by that client depends on its ability to deliver services efficiently, then it logically 
follows that the NGO should prioritise accounting to that client above other 
stakeholders and that it should primarily account for its delivery of services.    
Of course, the process of identifying and prioritising stakeholders is likely to 
cause practical problems.  If an NGO believes its key stakeholders to be clients 
whose wishes are not allied with those of the donors on which the NGO is reliant for 
funding, and who may demand accountability in ways that reduce the legitimacy of 
the NGO in the eyes of those clients, then the NGO is faced with a dilemma as to 
whether or not to sacrifice legitimacy in order to sustain funding.  While such 
dilemmas are never going to be easy for NGOs, at least having thought about them in 
advance will enable NGOs to make informed decisions. While the practical costs of 
prioritising certain stakeholders in order to maintain an NGO’s legitimacy may be 
very high, I also believe that if NGOs are serious about their claims as value-based 
actors that they must accept that legitimacy is an absolute requirement and hence that 
it should be sought and protected regardless. 
Power has been considered in relation to accountability in terms of both 
power to define accountability and power to create and enforce the mechanisms of 
accountability (Newell and Bellour, 2002).  Clearly all of the talk of downward 
accountability and stakeholder approaches does not change the reality that NGOs are 
very powerful compared to clients and very weak compared to donors and 
governments (Bonbright and Batliwala, 2007).  While the emerging mutual 
accountability agenda offers some hope that donors and clients might eventually 
reach a consensus about performance goals and standards thereby reducing the 
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problem of asymmetrical power relationships, this seems unlikely to deal with all 
differences.  In recognition of the existing power dynamics, I suggest that NGOs 
should seek to influence how all stakeholders perceive their legitimacy by 
convincing all stakeholders of the need to accept prioritisation of those stakeholders 
that are most affected by their actions.  In particular, and given the common view 
that only power can balance power (Wenar, 2006), NGOs should seek to convince 
donors of the need to judge them based on the assessments or wishes of clients. 
While this type of “surrogate accountability” (Rubenstein, 2007) may sound 
somewhat naive in the face of a long history of strategically-driven aid, I suggest that 
given the problems with the implementation of mainstream approaches to 
development as described in Chapter 2, NGOs need to be prepared to embrace and 
promote radical agendas such as this one.   
In conclusion, I believe there has been an over-emphasis on accountability in 
the NGO sector that has imposed a high opportunity cost in diverting NGOs from the 
potentially more transformative concept of legitimacy.  While many commentators 
have attempted to mould the concept of accountability (for example through the 
notions of stakeholder and mutual accountability approaches) bringing it closer to 
legitimacy, I believe that it would be better if the concept was instead rejected as a 
key NGO organising principle.  While the prevailing accountability culture makes it 
difficult to openly relegate accountability to a lesser position than legitimacy, I 
suggest that this approach could assist NGOs in fulfilling their missions. 
3.9.3 Why Legitimacy and Accountability are Relevant for 
Considerations of Irish NGO Roles: An Argument 
In Chapter 2 I suggested that development literacy exists when the general 
public have sufficient knowledge of development thinking and practice to enable 
them to understand and critically assess proposals made in the name of development 
or likely to impact on development.  I suggested also that development literacy 
precludes superficial engagement with development issues or actors.   In this chapter 
I have argued that consideration of an NGO’s legitimacy generally amounts to a 
fundamental questioning of what gives it the right to do or say anything in contrast to 
the more superficial critique facilitated by the concept of accountability.  Hence a 
greater emphasis on NGO accountability than NGO legitimacy by members of the 
public may suggest a lack of development literacy on the part of the public and a 
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greater emphasis on NGO accountability than NGO legitimacy by NGOs may 
suggest a failure on the part of NGOs to promote development literacy.  In view of 
these arguments the first research question in this thesis considers whether 
newspaper coverage of NGO accountability is greater than that of NGO legitimacy – 
Chapter 4 provides a rationale for the use of newspaper coverage as a proxy or 
indicator for both the views of NGOs and the public.  This investigation is broken 
down to establish the extent to which NGOs themselves reportedly discuss the 
legitimacy and accountability of NGOs and the extent to which the public reportedly 
discuss the legitimacy and accountability of NGOs.  The data emanating from this 
research question are used as indicators both of the extent to which NGOs appear to 
be promoting development literacy by themselves fundamentally questioning issues 
concerning development and  the extent to which the public already exhibit 
development literacy by asking fundamental questions about NGOs. 
In Chapter 2 I suggested that global solidarity demands a recognition that 
people may be affected to a greater or lesser degree by particular actions and that the 
needs of those affected to the greatest degree should take precedence in relation to 
individual initiatives or decisions.  In this chapter I have suggested that stakeholder 
approaches to NGO accountability are more appropriate than principal-agent 
approaches as the latter have generally equated to the wishes of donors being 
prioritised above those of clients even though clients are generally affected to a 
greater degree than donors by NGO activities.  Given this I suggest that a greater 
emphasis on principal-agent approaches than stakeholder approaches to NGO 
accountability by members of the public may represent an absence of global 
solidarity by the public and a greater emphasis on principal-agent than stakeholder 
approaches to NGO accountability by NGOs may represent a failure to promote 
global solidarity.  In view of these arguments the second research question in this 
thesis asks whether the quantity of newspaper coverage of principal-agent 
approaches to NGO accountability is greater than the quantity of coverage of 
stakeholder approaches to NGO accountability.  This investigation is broken down to 
consider the extent to which NGOs themselves reportedly discuss NGO 
accountability in principal-agent or stakeholder terms and the extent to which the 
public reportedly discuss NGO accountability in principal-agent or stakeholder 
terms.  The data emanating from this question are used as indicators both of the 
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extent to which NGOs themselves appear to promote global solidarity and the extent 
to which the public already exhibit global solidarity. 
I suggest that an emphasis on NGO administration costs is anathema both to 
development literacy and global solidarity as it deflects attention away from 
substantive issues associated with NGO impact and generally entails a prioritisation 
of donors above clients as it is explicitly and exclusively concerned with how much 
money is spent on administering donated money rather than, for example, on the 
satisfaction of clients with the services that they receive.  The notion of NGO 
administration costs fails to allow accurate comparisons of how efficient or cost-
effective NGOs are at administering their activities and provides no indication of 
how efficient, cost-effective or appropriate its operational activities are.  An 
emphasis on NGO administration costs appears to imply that any use of NGO money 
is acceptable as long as this money is not spent on administrative activities.  
Consequently I suggest that an emphasis on NGO administration costs by the public 
could indicate an absence of development literacy and global solidarity by the public 
and an emphasis on NGO administration costs by NGOs could indicate a failure by 
NGOs to promote development literacy and global solidarity.  In view of these 
arguments the third research question in this thesis asks whether the quantity of 
newspaper coverage in which low NGO administration costs are presented as 
desirable is greater than the quantity of coverage in which than the use of 
administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality is questioned or disputed.  This 
investigation is broken down to consider the extent to which NGOs themselves 
reportedly refer to NGO administration costs and the extent to which members of the 
public reportedly refer to NGO administration costs.  The data emanating from this 
question are used as indicators of the extent to which NGOs appear to be promoting 
development literacy and global solidarity and the extent to which the public already 
exhibit development literacy and global solidarity. 
As described in Chapter 2, international literature on NGO legitimacy and 
accountability suggests that NGOs have come under greater scrutiny in recent years 
and that questioning of NGOs has often been politically motivated.  The final 
research question of this study seeks to explicitly examine how critical newspaper 
coverage is of NGOs in Ireland using as indicators coverage of questioning of NGO 
legitimacy and accountability.  Specifically, I investigate whether increased coverage 
of the questioning of the legitimacy and accountability of others by NGOs has been 
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associated with increased coverage of the questioning of the legitimacy and 
accountability of those NGOs by others, and whether reported questioning of the 
legitimacy and accountability of NGOs is more commonly directly at NGOs in 
general rather than specific NGOs.  In addition, I investigate whether there has been 
an increase in coverage of questioning of legitimacy and accountability of others by 
NGOs and of NGOs by others.  The data emanating from this research question will 
serve to indicate whether NGOs appear to be increasingly critical themselves (and 
hence exhibiting development literacy).  In addition, the data will indicate the extent 
to which the public appear to be already taking a critical approach to development 
(and hence exhibiting development literacy) through increased questioning of NGOs.  
Given the international suggestion of politically-motivated criticism of NGOs this 
research will also investigate whether there is evidence of such a trend in Ireland. 
3.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the ways in which NGOs are linked with 
legitimacy and accountability may indicate the extent to which NGOs are already 
promoting development literacy and global solidarity and the extent to which 
members of the public already exhibit development literacy and global solidarity. 
This view is primarily based on my argument that consideration of an NGO’s 
legitimacy generally amounts to a fundamental questioning of what gives it the right 
to do or say anything in contrast to the more superficial critique facilitated by the 
concept of accountability.  Hence development literacy and global solidarity may 
require a greater emphasis on NGO legitimacy than NGO accountability and on 
stakeholder approaches to NGO accountability than principal-agent approaches to 
NGO accountability.  Finally, I have argued that an emphasis on NGO 
administration costs may be anathema both to development literacy and global 
solidarity. This chapter serves, therefore, to develop the second prong of the 
argument that guides my empirical research: that the ways in which NGOs refer to 
the concepts of legitimacy and accountability may indicate the extent to which 
NGOs are promoting development literacy and global solidarity, and the ways in 
which the public refer to legitimacy and accountability in relation to NGOs may 
indicate the extent to which the public already exhibit development literacy and 
global solidarity. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In 2006 Dóchas (Dóchas, 2006) published a Code of Conduct on Images and 
Messages, which has since been adopted by 63 Irish NGOs.  This code is designed to 
assist NGOs in designing and implementing their public communication strategies 
and is underpinned by a belief that “the images and messages used to portray people, 
places and situations in the developing world can have an enormous impact on 
people’s perceptions and attitudes” (Dóchas Development Education Group, 2008).  
I share the view that what NGOs say or are portrayed as saying should be viewed as 
potentially influential and in this chapter will argue that the ways in which NGOs are 
linked with the concepts of legitimacy and accountability in Irish Times coverage 
may indicate both the extent to which NGOs appear to be promoting development 
literacy and global solidarity and the extent to which the Irish public appear to 
exhibit development literacy and global solidarity.  I base this argument in part on 
theory derived from the field of mass communication research, more specifically the 
theories of agenda setting and priming. 
 In order to situate the theories of agenda setting and priming within the 
broader context of mass communication research, this chapter begins with a brief 
history of the emergence and evolution of the field.   A detailed discussion of the 
theories of agenda setting, priming  and framing is then provided followed by a 
discussion of how and why the theories of agenda setting and priming are being used 
to support this research.  Finally, the study’s research questions and hypotheses are 
outlined.  References throughout this chapter to media should be understood to refer 
to the mainstream mass media. 
4.2 Overview of Mass Communication Research  
 Any discussion of mass communication research must make clear that the 
single preeminent theoretical trend within the discipline has been the absence of 
theoretical analysis from the vast majority of empirical studies (Bryant and 
Cummins, 2007).  Evidence for this assertion is provided by numerous content 
analyses of research from journals that publish mass communication research (Riffe 
and Freitag, 1997, Kamahawi and Weaver, 2003, Bryant and Miron, 2004).  The 
relatively uncommon use of theory does not, however, reflect an absence of relevant 
theory.  A second introductory point of relevance is that although much recent mass 
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communication research privileges a tripartite model based on description of the 
production, content and reception of media, for most of the last century the focus of 
mass communication research has been on media reception or effects (Bryant and 
Miron, 2004).  For that reason much of the historical overview that follows is 
focused on media effects. 
 The evolution of the field of mass communication theory will be described 
here based on the four eras identified by Baran and Davis (2011).  These eras each 
serve as an umbrella for a collection of theories and perspectives and are labelled 
mass society, limited-effects, challenges to limited-effects, and meaning-making.  
Mass society perspectives emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century when 
industrialization was leading to increased urbanization and the disintegration of the 
old social order.  The argument behind mass society theory is that the media subvert 
and disrupt the existing social order, but can also serve as a powerful force for either 
the restoration of the old order or its substitution with a new one.  The apparent 
success of propaganda in generating support for totalitarian leaders across Europe in 
advance of World Wars I and II lent credence to this thinking.   A prominent 
manifestation of this perspective was “hypodermic needle” or “magic bullet” theory, 
which envisaged the effects of mass media on audiences as powerful, direct and 
uniform.  The strength of mass society theory began to wane from the 1950s 
onwards due in part to the work of the psychologist, Paul Lazarsfeld. 
 From the 1930s onwards Lazarsfeld used empirical methods to investigate 
the mass society hypothesis.  By the mid-1950s he and colleagues (Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955) had concluded that the media were not all-powerful in the way that 
mass society thinking had suggested, as people’s attitudes were shaped by multiple 
competing factors and they could resist media influence.  Although Lazarsfeld did 
not use the term, this perspective later came to know as limited-effects theory as it 
claimed that whereas the media were responsible for limited effects, they did not 
necessarily exert a powerful influence on individuals.  A substantial number of 
empirical studies appeared to corroborate the limited-effects hypothesis leading a 
colleague of Lazarsfeld’s to suggest that there was simply nothing left to study in 
relation to mass media (Berelson, 1959). 
 Challenges to limited-effects theory began to appear from the late 1960s 
onwards.  In contrast to limited effects perspectives, emergent theories tended to 
focus on changes in culture and shared norms and understandings rather than specific 
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effects on individuals.  Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) have identified three 
particular developments during the 1970s as responsible for a resurgence of belief in 
powerful media effects.  Firstly, George Gerbner (1969) described his theory of 
cultivation, which stated that people  were immersed in the cultural environment 
created by the media and could not escape its “cultivating” influence.  Secondly, 
Noelle-Neumann (1973) introduced the concept of a “spiral of silence”, which 
suggested that media could effectively silence public discourse on topics by 
implying them to be settled in favour of one view or another.  Thirdly, agenda-
setting research, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, emerged 
following a ground-breaking initial study (McCombs and Shaw, 1972).    
 Baran and Davis (2011) defined the final era of media theory in terms of 
active audiences or meaning-making.  The theories encompassed by this title 
acknowledge that media can have strong effects, but focus on assessing how people 
use media and largely dismiss the notion of audiences as passive subjects of media 
influence.  These theories range from perspectives that focus on individual-level 
effects to those that consider the effects on societies as a whole.  They also range 
from theories that afford a central role to audience activity to those that consider 
audience activity as one of several factors that influence the degree of media effects.  
For example, reception theory is an audience-centred theory that suggests that 
audiences may either accept a dominant meaning in a media message, come up with 
an alternative meaning that differs from the dominant reading in certain ways, or 
deliberately interpret media messages in opposition to the dominant reading. 
 It is difficult to divorce the theories that arose as part of the four eras already 
described from the broader question of epistemology.  In 2004, a content analysis of 
articles from three key journals that published mass communication research 
between 1956 and 2000 was conducted (Bryant and Miron).  This showed that two 
epistemological positions or schools of thought were cited to a much greater degree 
than any others.  These were the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School.  Both will 
be discussed briefly here along with approaches associated with British Cultural 
Studies.  Although British Cultural Studies was cited substantially less than either of 
the other schools of thought it deserves mention as the data showed it to be in the 
ascendancy in the latter years of the study.  I will provide a more detailed overview 
of epistemological perspectives in Chapter 5. 
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 The Vienna Circle is associated with positivism.  Broadly speaking 
positivists argue for the application of scientific principles in the pursuit of 
knowledge.  Hence principles such as objectivity, replicability, validity, reliability 
and generalizability tend to be emphasized by researchers working in the positivist 
tradition.  While early versions of positivism stridently proclaimed the capacity of 
research based on scientific principles to fully explain the social world, this was 
subsequently replaced by a more modest version that remains influential today.  
Current positivist thinking (often termed postpositivist) continues to emphasize 
empirical investigations guided by the scientific method, but acknowledges that 
human behaviour is not as constant as elements in the natural world and that social 
reality can never be fully explained.  Within mass communication studies Paul 
Lazarsfeld, the pioneer of the limited effects hypothesis, was particularly strongly 
associated with positivism. 
 The Frankfurt School is associated with critical theory, which broadly aims 
to uncover underlying power relations within cultural phenomena and ultimately to 
effect change.  Critical theory is inherently political and posits that “knowledge is 
advanced only when it serves to free people and communities from the influence of 
those more powerful than themselves” (Baran and Davis, 2011, p. 17).  Critical 
theorists often start from the viewpoint that specific institutions, such as the media, 
impose or reinforce a mass culture that either help reproduce (or undermine) social 
systems of exploitation and domination and are responsible for particular social ills 
as a result. 
 As its name suggests, British Cultural Studies, along with cultural approaches 
in general, is predominantly concerned with culture and how meaning is produced 
and disseminated within specific cultural settings.  For example, Stuart Hall (1973), 
a prominent figure associated with British Cultural Studies, has described 
communication in terms of four relatively autonomous elements: production, 
circulation, use and reproduction, and argued that researchers should concern 
themselves with studying the context in which content is produced (encoding) and 
the consumption of that content (decoding).  Much work within this tradition has 
concentrated on oppositional readings of texts and the agency of individuals in 
resisting hegemonic discourses.   
The theoretical foundations of this study are provided by the theories of 
agenda setting and priming.  Attempting to locate these theories in one of the four 
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eras described above, or to definitively tie them to a single epistemological position, 
is problematic, as agenda setting has evolved very considerably since its first 
articulation in the early 1970s and both theories have been applied by researchers in 
very different ways.  Whereas in the view of some commentators early agenda-
setting studies appeared to adopt a limited effects media model (Willnat, 1997), 
agenda setting is also said to have been attractive to researchers frustrated by the 
limited effects perspectives of the time (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007).  Current 
articulations of agenda setting generally include a focus on individual differences 
and hence have moved the theory more towards notions of an active audience that is 
influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the media depending on various factors.  
Baran and Davis (2011) have suggested that both agenda setting and priming should 
be considered “moderate-effects theories” as they conceptualize media as capable of 
inducing important effects under certain conditions.  They are therefore very far 
removed from the theories of mass society that envisaged a wholly passive audience 
that absorbed messages in a direct and uniform way.  In addition, they are at odds 
with limited effects perspectives that denied that media could produce or lead to 
powerful effects.  Although agenda setting and priming could conceivably be applied 
from a variety of epistemological perspectives, the focus of the theories on providing 
an empirically testable hypothesis (broadly that the issues or attributes of issues that 
receive most media coverage come to considered important by the public) and 
incorporating systematic observations most obviously link them to modern versions 
of positivism. 
4.3 Agenda Setting, Priming and Framing 
4.3.1 Agenda Setting 
  In 1963 Bernard Cohen (p. 13) noted that the media “may not be successful 
much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in 
telling its readers what to think about”.  Although the term agenda setting was not 
coined until several years later, this statement has been widely cited as an important 
antecedent to the theory.  While Cohen’s assertion well describes ‘basic’ or “first-
level” agenda-setting theory, “second-level” or “attribute” agenda-setting theory, 
which emerged later, suggests that in some circumstances the media may not only 
tell people what to think about, but also influence what they think.   
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The formal emergence of agenda-setting theory is routinely traced to the 
1968 US presidential campaign when Maxwell McCombs and Don Shaw (1972) 
launched a research study in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.  Their aim was to 
investigate the hypothesis that the mass media set the public agenda of issues for a 
political campaign by influencing the salience of issues among voters.  The term 
McCombs and Shaw coined for this hypothesized mass media influence was agenda 
setting.  Testing this hypothesis required the comparison of two data sets: a 
description of the public agenda, which they ascertained through a random sample of 
undecided voters; and a content analysis of news sources used by these voters.   The 
study found the degree of importance accorded to issues by voters closely paralleled 
their prominence in media coverage.  Thus, agenda-setting research was born.  
Despite the hundreds of empirical studies based on agenda-setting research and the 
vast attention awarded to the theory since the Chapel Hill Study, McCombs has 
remained a dominant force behind agenda-setting theorizing up to this day (e.g. 
McCombs and Reynolds, 2009, McCombs and Shaw, 1993, McCombs, 2005, 
McCombs, 2004). Consequently, much of the discussion that follows will rely on 
work with which he has been involved. 
 The main idea underpinning basic agenda-setting theory is that by means of 
the media agenda, which refers to what is covered by media and the relative quantity 
and prominence of that coverage, the media have a significant influence on 
audiences.  In contrast to the ambitious claims of magic bullet or hypodermic needle 
theory that media can directly influence the views of its audience, the more modest 
claims of agenda-setting theory relate simply to the degree of importance or salience 
that audiences will attribute to individual issues.  According to basic agenda-setting 
theory, although people with similar media exposure may feel differently about 
individual issues, most people will agree on which issues are most important and 
their selection will largely correspond with the issues that have received most media 
coverage.   Not only does agenda-setting theory claim a correspondence between the 
salience of particular issues in media coverage and the salience of those issues on the 
public agenda, but it also claims a causal effect whereby the media coverage 
significantly influences the degree of salience of issues on the public agenda.  In 
other words, according to agenda-setting theory, the media set the public agenda. 
While the field of mass communication research has evolved and developed 
considerably since the Chapel Hill Study, basic agenda-setting research continues 
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and has found new territory in the realm of internet and electronic mass media (e.g. 
Roberts et al., 2002).  
“Second-level” or “attribute” agenda setting was first described in the 1990s 
(Ghanem, 1997).  It differs from its older sibling in that it suggests that agenda-
setting effects not alone focus public attention on particular objects, but also 
influence the public’s understanding and perspectives in relation to those objects.  
The rationale underpinning second-level agenda setting is that each object on the 
media or public agenda has numerous attributes or characteristics.  When the media 
cover different objects they give more, less or no attention to particular attributes 
thus influencing how the public think about those issues.  For example, whereas 
basic agenda setting might lead the public to believe that in an election campaign the 
three political candidates that received most coverage were the most salient, attribute 
agenda setting posits that the attributes of these candidates that were emphasized in 
media coverage would lead the public to believe that those attributes were most 
salient.  In other words, public attention is drawn to certain attributes and away from 
others thus influencing the ways in which issues are perceived.  The key difference 
between basic and attribute agenda setting is that whereas the former is concerned 
with the salience of objects, attribute agenda setting is concerned with the attributes 
or characteristics of objects.   As described by Takeshita (2005, p. 275), “the original 
agenda-setting hypothesis asserts that the media are influential in deciding what 
issues become major themes of public opinion, while the newly developed concept 
of the second level of agenda setting assumes that the media also have an influence 
on how people make sense of a given theme”.   
 Early agenda-setting research paid scant attention to either the cognitive 
mechanisms responsible for agenda-setting effects or the reasons for individual 
differences.  Latterly, however, agenda-setting scholars have proposed that the 
cognitive effects are largely explained by the concept of accessibility, which 
suggests that judgments and attitude formation are directly correlated with the ease 
with which instances or associations are brought to mind  (Tversky and Kahneman 
1973 in Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007).  In other words, some pieces of 
information are seen as being more accessible in a person’s mind than others, and the 
degree to which particular pieces of information are accessible is seen as depending 
on how much and how recently a person has been exposed to them (Kim et al., 
2002).   
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Individual differences have long been a focus of mass communication 
interest (Oliver and Krakowiak, 2009) and agenda-setting researchers have long 
acknowledged that there are significant individual differences in how people respond 
to the media agenda (McCombs, 2005). In early agenda-setting work issues were 
categorised as either obtrusive, which referred to issues that individuals encountered 
personally; or unobtrusive, which referred to issues that individuals encountered only 
in the news.  Broadly, it was suggested that the media had strong effects for 
unobtrusive issues and no effects for obtrusive issues (Weaver et al., 1981).  
Drawing on work by Weaver (1977 cited in McCombs and Reynolds, 2009, p. 8), 
McCombs (2005) argued that individual differences could more accurately be 
explained by the concept of orientation.  Orientation is based on the idea of 
individuals’ curiosity about the world.  Need for orientation is defined by the 
concepts of relevance and uncertainty.  Where the relevance of a topic to an 
individual is perceived to be low, their need for orientation is also low.  The level of 
uncertainty of individuals about a topic refers to their perceived need for more 
information about that topic.  If their perceived level of uncertainty is low, so too is 
their need for orientation.  Orientation is important in the context of agenda-setting 
research, because the greater an individual’s need for orientation in the realm of 
public affairs, the more likely they are to attend to the agenda of the mass media.  
McCombs (2004) has identified a wide range of studies that all provide evidence for 
the validity of the concept of orientation in agenda-setting research.  Matthes (2006) 
is also currently associated with refinements to the concept of orientation in the 
context of agenda-setting research. 
 As already noted, agenda-setting theory asserts that the salience of 
objects or their attributes in media coverage will influence the salience of the same 
objects or attributes on the public agenda.  Salience is most commonly defined in 
terms of attention and prominence.  Attention generally refers to the number of news 
stories concerned with a particular object or attributes of an object and can be 
operationalised by simple counts of articles; and prominence refers to the relative 
importance of the coverage and can be operationally defined by features including 
page placement and length of article (McCombs, 2005).   
 So far this discussion has referred to corroborating evidence for basic and 
attribute agenda-setting effects without discussing individual studies or meta-
analyses.  While the Chapel Hill Study was notable for its innovation and for 
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demonstrating that the issues that received most media coverage also featured most 
prominently in the public agenda, it failed to demonstrate a causal link between the 
media agenda and the public agenda and allowed for the possibility that the media 
were responding to the public agenda rather than influencing it.  A series of 
laboratory-based experiments conducted during the 1980s by Iyengar and Kinder 
(1987), however, found that people’s perceptions of what the most important issues 
were matched the issues that had been emphasized on a selection of news 
programmes that they had watched.  In other words, these experiments (and many 
others that followed) demonstrated causality.  The sheer number of individual 
agenda-setting studies conducted since the 1970s has facilitated recent meta-
analyses.  In a 2006 meta-analysis of 90 basic agenda setting studies Wanta and 
Ghanem (2006, p. 46) identified significant agenda-setting effects for studies 
involving a variety of methodologies demonstrating “how wide ranging the agenda-
setting  influence of the news media is”.  McCombs (2004, p. 19) too has provided 
an overview of the accumulated evidence from studies into the effects of agenda 
setting and concluded not only that the news media “can exercise an agenda-setting 
influence on the public”, but also that journalists and media content “do significantly 
influence their audience’s picture of the world”. 
4.3.2 Priming 
While Weaver’s concept of “orientation” provided a theoretical explanation 
for the agenda-setting process that took into account individual differences, it did not 
deal with how a person’s prior knowledge or beliefs might influence the effects of 
agenda setting.  Priming emerged to fill this gap and was named after the process 
whereby liquid is added to a pump to enable it to work on its own.  According to 
Willnat (1997, p. 53), priming is “built on the assumption that the frequency, 
prominence, or feature of a stimulus activates previously learnt cognitive structures 
and influences interpretations of an ambiguous stimulus”.  Although priming has 
been traced to a 1975 study by Weaver, McCombs and Spellman (1975 cited in 
Weaver, 2007) that speculated that the media may suggest which issues to use in 
evaluating political actors, the first use of the term priming in the context of media 
research was by Iyengar and Kinder (1987) who conducted controlled field 
experiments that linked television agenda-setting effects to evaluations of the U.S. 
president.  In laying out the terrain for the new field of media priming research 
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Iyengar and Kinder (p. 63) argued that “by calling attention to some matters while 
ignoring others, television news influences the standards by which governments, 
policies and candidates for public office are judged”.  Although priming research has 
been predominantly applied in studies analysing the effects of news coverage on 
audience perceptions of political figures, it has also been applied in other contexts – 
e.g. racial stereotyping (Dalisay and Tan, 2009).   
As in the case of agenda setting, priming theorists have suggested 
explanations for the cognitive processes underlying priming.  According to Iyengar 
and Kinder (1987 p. 114),  “priming presumes that when evaluating complex 
political phenomenon, people do not take into account all that they know – they 
cannot, even if they are motivated to do so.  Instead, they consider what comes to 
mind, those bits and pieces of political memory that are accessible”  Priming, 
therefore, appears similar to agenda-setting in that both are memory-based models of 
information processing that assume that people form attitudes based on the issues 
that are most accessible in their minds. 
The exact relationship between agenda setting and priming is disputed (see, 
for example, Willnat, 1997, Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007).  The most common 
view is to see priming as a consequence or extension of agenda setting as once an 
issue has been primed or made salient it will play a larger role in evaluations of 
leaders and issues (Edy and Meirick, 2007, Valenzuela, 2009).  Agenda setting has, 
however, also been described as a variant of priming (Price & Tewksbury 1995 in 
Willnat, 1997) and as unrelated to priming (Kosicki, 1993). 
 A meta-analysis of the empirical media priming literature was conducted in 
2007 (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al.).  It revealed that media priming has received very 
little attention compared to agenda setting with only 48 published articles 
representing 63 studies having been identified by the authors.  In addition, the 
authors found very little focus on the mechanisms and processes underlying media 
priming.  Questions such as whether the same processes were responsible for 
reported priming effects in vastly different domains (e.g. media violence and 
political news) had not been adequately researched in the views of the authors.  In 
addition, the authors concluded that more research was needed to answer questions 
including whether media primes fade with time and whether more intense media 
primes result in stronger priming effects.  The conclusion of the meta-analysis was 
that although the combined data strongly suggested that the media could act as a 
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prime and that this was occurring, future research was needed to ascertain the precise 
characteristics of media priming and focus on the development of theoretical 
explanations of the phenomenon. 
4.3.3 Critiques of Agenda Setting and Priming 
 Agenda-setting theory has been the subject of various criticisms.  As priming 
is most commonly seen as a consequence or extension setting, these can be said to 
also apply to priming. 
As already alluded to, early critiques of agenda setting charged its theorists 
with failing to provide explanations for how agenda-setting effects occurred 
(Willnat, 1997).  Although the promotion of accessibility as an explanation for the 
process has satisfied some critics, Takeshita (2005) argues that questions remain 
over the validity of this explanation.  In particular, he questions the assumption of 
equivalence held by some commentators in relation to salience and accessibility and 
suggests that agenda-setting effects may occur through more than one process.  This 
view that more research is required into the precise mechanisms responsible for 
agenda setting and the consequent causes of individual differences is shared by many 
proponents of agenda setting (e.g. McCombs, 2005), but does not cast doubt on the 
demonstrated effect of agenda setting on the public agenda as a whole.  As such, 
while this point could greatly undermine the usefulness of this theory in studies 
concerned with individual effects, I suggest that it does not in the case of this study, 
which is concerned with potential effects on audiences as a whole. 
A second critique of agenda setting concerns its inherent assumption of a 
homogenous media agenda at least at a national level.  This assumption was born out 
in the original Chapel Hill study, which found substantial agreement across the nine 
media outlets that were the dominant sources of news identified by research 
participants (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) and has remained a central assumption of 
the theory ever since.   While one could hypothesize that media agendas may always 
have been more fragmented than agenda setting supposed, some commentators 
suggest that the rise of new media have facilitated a greater fragmentation of media 
and hence public agendas (Chaffee and Metzger, 2001).  Others, however, claim that 
despite the potential offered by new media in this regard, media has in recent years 
become increasingly homogeneous (Louw, 2001, Witschge et al., 2010, Davies, 
2009).  I believe that possible fragmentation of media and public agendas is a 
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legitimate concern and will discuss it in the context of the Irish Times specifically 
later in this chapter.  However, I also believe that these theories are relevant for this 
study regardless of how many media outlets emerge as they serve to demonstrate that 
NGOs should care about they are linked with certain terms in media content given 
that there is at least a potential for an agenda-setting or priming function.    
A third criticism of agenda setting centres on the source of the media agenda.  
Although there appears to be broad (but not total) agreement that a causal link 
between the media agenda and the public agenda has been established (Louw, 2001, 
Grossberg et al., 2006), agenda-setting theory can be criticised for failing to provide 
a convincing answer as to what sets the media agenda.  Although other media are 
frequently cited in response to this question (Davies, 2009), there is an increasing 
recognition that more work needs to be done on identifying the sources of the media 
agenda itself (McCombs, 2005).   
Finally, agenda setting has been criticised for its reliance on quantitative 
methods (Kwansah-Aidoo, 2001).  While I accept that this may deem it unsuitable 
for certain types of research, I suggest that it does not undermine its usefulness in 
this or many other studies.  In sum, therefore, while I acknowledge that valid and 
serious criticisms of agenda setting and priming exist and make extravagant claims 
as to the effects of media content unjustifiable, I suggest that the empirical evidence 
for these theories allow for modest claims as to likely effects, such as those advanced 
in this study, to be made. 
4.3.4 Framing 
 Framing theory has enjoyed a rapid rise in popularity in mass communication 
research in recent years (Bryant and Miron, 2004, Weaver, 2007).  This is despite its 
conceptual ambiguity or “scattered conceptualization” (Entman, 1993, p. 51), which 
has attracted considerable criticism (Weaver, 2007, Kim et al., 2002, Scheufele, 
1999).   
 Framing theory can be traced to writings by Erving Goffman (1974) who saw 
frames as a means by which individuals make sense of the world around them.  In 
general terms, frames can be said to suggest how issues should be thought about, 
thereby encouraging audiences to understand them in particular ways and, 
subsequently, to respond to them in particular ways.  One commonly-cited definition 
of framing was provided by Entman (1993 p. 52) who stated that “to frame is to 
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select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item described”.  Reese (2001 in Reese, 2007, p. 150) has criticised this definition 
for being overly restrictive in emphasizing manifest content captured in salience and 
proposed a broader definition of frames as “organizing principles that are socially 
shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the 
social world”.   
 Much discussion of media framing theory, including a 2007 special issue of 
the Journal of Communication, has focused on its relationship with the theories of 
agenda setting and priming.  In a view consistent with the 1993 definition of framing 
by Entman already cited, McCombs (2004) has claimed that framing amounts to 
attribute agenda setting.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, several of the contributors to the 
2007 special issue have disagreed with this view (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007, 
Weaver, 2007, Reese, 2007). In a detailed review of commonalities and differences 
between agenda setting and framing,  Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) organise 
their commentary under the headings of news production, news processing and locus 
of effect.  In the context of news production they point out that how forces and 
groups in society try to shape public discourse about an issue by establishing 
predominant labels is of far greater interest from a framing perspective than from an 
agenda setting one.  In the context of news processing they suggest that audiences 
may need to pay more attention to news messages for a framing effect to occur than 
in the case of an agenda-setting effect.  Finally, in the context of the locus of 
cognitive effect they argue that the difference comes down to the theoretical 
premises on which the two theories are based, which they are argue are accessibility 
in the case of agenda setting and applicability in the case of framing.  As already 
described, accessibility refers to the ease with which particular ideas or associations 
are brought to mind.  Applicability refers to the outcome of a message that suggests a 
connection between two concepts such that, after exposure to the message, audiences 
accept that they are connected (Price and Tewksbury 1997 cited in Scheufele and 
Tewksbury, 2007).  The implication is that how individuals will react to particular 
media content will depend on their pre-existing schema of interpretation.   
 On balance, there appears to be a stronger constituency that support the 
notion of framing as a separate model than those that suggest it is a part of agenda 
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setting.  However, it clearly comes down to how framing is defined with some 
definitions matching the core ideas of attribute agenda setting and others deviating 
widely from it.  Considerations of the empirical evidence for framing effects are 
hampered both by its varied definitions and its relatively recent emergence.  There 
has also been considerable criticism of existing framing research.  Kinder (2007), for 
example, has pointed to the extreme reliance of framing research on experimental 
settings and called for greatly increased research in natural settings.  The cumulative 
result of these limitations, which may simply be attributable to the emergent nature 
of media framing theory, is a marked hesitancy, even on the part of declared 
enthusiasts of media framing, to make significant empirical claims about media 
framing.   
 As noted already, framing theory will not be applied or relied upon in this 
study for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, there is limited empirical evidence pertaining 
to framing theory currently available and this lack is particularly pronounced in 
relation to the effects of frames on audiences.  Secondly, there is considerable 
theoretical ambiguity surrounding the concept making its application more 
problematic than is the case in relation to the theories of agenda setting and priming.  
Thirdly, it can be argued that framing sits more comfortably with research that is 
conducted from an explicitly cultural perspective and that either combines 
quantitative research methods with more interpretative qualitative methods or applies 
interpretative qualitative methods exclusively.  Finally, the definitions of framing 
that appear most relevant to this study already overlap with definitions of attribute 
agenda setting. 
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The theories of agenda setting and priming together suggest that media 
coverage (such as coverage of NGOs and legitimacy and accountability) can 
influence both the salience of issues on the public agenda and the ways in which 
particular issues are perceived.  Put simply, these theories suggest that media 
coverage can have a significant impact.  Not only is this the case, but the fact that the 
Dóchas Code of Conduct on Images and Messages has been signed by 63 Irish 
NGOs  (Dóchas Development Education Group, 2008) suggests that a large number 
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of Irish NGOs themselves believe that the ways in which they communicate or are 
represented as communicating has a significant influence.  In Chapter 3 I argued that 
the ways in which NGOs refer to the concepts of legitimacy and accountability may 
indicate the extent to which NGOs are promoting development literacy and global 
solidarity and that the ways in which the public refer to legitimacy and 
accountability in relation to NGOs may indicate the extent to which the public 
already exhibit development literacy and global solidarity.  While I cannot 
reasonably assert that newspaper coverage (or, more particularly, Irish Times 
coverage) necessarily provides an accurate reflection of NGO or public views, in this 
chapter my task is to more modestly argue that Irish Times coverage of how NGOs 
refer to legitimacy and accountability may reflect how NGOs actually refer to these 
concepts and that newspaper coverage of public references to legitimacy and 
accountability may reflect how the public actually refer to these concepts.  
In this section I will begin by providing a justification for my exclusive 
reliance on Irish Times coverage and then discuss why I believe that Irish Times 
coverage may indicate NGO and public attitudes.   I then discuss how the theories of 
agenda setting and priming suggest that media coverage linking NGOs with 
legitimacy and accountability would influence the public agenda and how issues are 
perceived by the public.  I conclude this section by discussing more generally why I 
deem these theories useful for this research. 
4.4.2 Justification for Reliance on Irish Times Coverage 
This study is based on coverage from the daily broadsheet newspaper The 
Irish Times, which, it has been argued (Titley, 2010, p. 35), serves as an 
“enormously influential mediator of public debate” in Ireland.  Unlike the majority 
of Ireland’s newspapers, which are commercially-run , the Irish Times is managed by 
a trust, which claims its central objective to be “to publish an independent newspaper 
primarily concerned with serious issues for the benefit of the community throughout 
the whole of Ireland free from any form of personal or of party political, commercial, 
religious or other sectional control” (The Irish Times, 2011, p. 1).  The ideological 
position of the paper, if one exists, is contested.  One commentator (Browne, 2006) 
has chronicled opinions of Irish journalists on the issue and reported that these 
include the (common) view that the paper has clearly shifted to the right in recent 
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years, the view that the paper has never been a paper of the left or right, and the view 
that it remains soft left of centre.  
Regardless of possible shifts in its ideological position, the Irish Times has 
been long been described both as “Ireland’s unofficial national newspaper of 
reference” (Mac Einri, 2001, p. 1) and “a newspaper of record” (Mulcahy, 1995, p. 
454), terms which are common in international media research (e.g. Martin and 
Hansen, 1996, Erickson and Mitchell, 1996).  The Irish Times editor between 1986 
and 2002, Conor Brady (2005, p. 63), described the paper as “the newspaper to 
which readers will look almost instinctively when important news develops, when 
significant issues arise in public life or when it is necessary to know what contending 
ideas are at play”. While this may appear as hubris coming from an Irish Times 
insider, evidence for a similar external perception is found in the  significant 
precedence for exclusive reliance on the Irish Times in Irish media research on the 
grounds of the newspaper’s perceived status (e.g. Clarke and O'Neill, 2001, Conway, 
2006, Mulcahy, 1995).   
While the Irish Times has consistently held one of the two top broadsheet 
newspaper positions in both circulation and readership statistics throughout the 16 
years of the study period– see the circulation statistics produced by the Audit Bureau 
of Circulations (ABC, 2004, ABC, 2005b, ABC, 2005a, ABC, 2006b, ABC, 2006a, 
ABC, 2007b, ABC, 2007a, ABC, 2008b, ABC, 2008a, ABC, 2009) and Appendix A 
which gives details of its readership compared to that of other Irish newspapers - it 
was never the most commonly read newspaper in Ireland during this period.  As 
outlined in Appendix A, whereas the daily readership of Ireland’s most popular 
newspaper, the Irish Independent, ranged from 14.7% to 21% of those aged over 15 
between 1997 and 2009, the readership of the Irish Times ranged from 9.3% to 
11.2% during the same period.  Furthermore, the Irish Independent is part of 
Ireland’s largest media consortium, International News and Media, which one could 
argue might make it both more representative of Irish newspaper coverage and more 
reflective of Irish public opinion.   
I have chosen to focus exclusively on Irish Times content for three reasons: 
its consistent and relatively high readership; its apparent status as a mediator of 
public debate, which implies that its impact may be greater than its readership 
figures alone suggest; and the easy online availability of its content – at the time of 
conducting this study content from the two Irish newspapers that routinely had 
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higher readership figures than the Irish Times, the Irish Independent and the Irish 
Daily Star, was not fully accessible online.  
While I believe my reliance on the Irish Times to be justifiable, I 
acknowledge there is a limitation inherent in relying on a single newspaper  for this 
study and that there is potentially a particular limitation associated with relying on 
the Irish Times due to its apparently unique status within the context of Irish print 
media.   This limitation has implications for the strength of claims that this study can 
make in relation to how the coverage analysed may reflect both NGO and public 
opinions.   
4.4.3 Newspaper Coverage as a Reflection of NGO and Public Attitudes 
As already noted, my task in this chapter is to argue that Irish Times coverage 
of how NGOs refer to legitimacy and accountability may reflect how NGOs actually 
refer to these concepts and Irish Times coverage of how the public refer to these 
concepts may reflect how the public actually refer to these concepts.  
 Dealing with the former first, while it is possible that Irish Times coverage 
purporting to present Irish NGOs’ views on legitimacy and accountability might be 
wholly or partially unrepresentative of their actual views on these issues, I suggest 
that this is unlikely for two reasons.  Firstly, given Irish NGOs’ self-professed view 
that what they say or are reported to say is influential, and the theoretical support for 
this view as provided by the theories of agenda setting and priming, one could 
reasonably assume that if Irish NGOs were routinely being incorrectly or 
inappropriately represented in relation to particular concepts that these NGOs would 
make public their objections.  Given the perception that the Irish Times is a 
particularly influential media source in Ireland I suggest that NGOs would be 
particularly keen to correct any inaccurate presentations relating to them that 
appeared in it.  Even if the Irish Times were unwilling to respond to such objections 
one would expect NGOs to be able to find other public channels for such objections 
(e.g. their own websites or niche media).  However, I found no trace of any such 
objections in the literature review I conducted as part of this research.  Furthermore, 
and as outlined in Chapter 7, I found some corroborating evidence for the findings of 
this study, which further support the notion that the Irish Times coverage of NGO 
approaches to legitimacy and accountability may reflect NGO views on the concepts.   
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Although I have found no external commentary to suggest that Irish Times 
coverage of NGOs and legitimacy and accountability might be significantly different 
to coverage provided in other Irish newspapers thereby reducing the likelihood that it 
could exert an influence in the way that agenda setting and priming suggest, I accept 
that this is possible and that the results reported in the final chapter of this study 
could have been more confidently expressed had additional media sources been 
included.   
It is also possible that Irish Times coverage purporting to present public 
views on NGO legitimacy and accountability might be wholly or partially 
unrepresentative either of public views in general of even of that slice of the public 
comprising Irish Times readers or contributors.  Indeed it could be suggested that the 
apparently elevated status of the Irish Times within the Irish media makes it a 
particularly unlikely indicator of public attitudes.  I acknowledge that this is a 
genuine concern and accept that reliance on the Irish Times exclusively necessarily 
leads to tentative conclusions in this regard.  However, as described in Chapter 7, 
there is some corroborating evidence for the findings of this study in relation to 
public attitudes, which adds weight to these conclusions.  
 
4.4.4 Agenda Setting, Priming and Likely Implications of Coverage of 
NGOs and Legitimacy and Accountability 
Having suggested that media coverage may reflect NGO and public opinion, 
I now outline what evidence there is to suggest that Irish print media is an important 
source of information about development issues for the Irish public and how the 
theories of agenda setting and priming suggest that media coverage of NGOs and 
legitimacy and accountability would be likely to influence how issues are perceived 
by the public.   I suggest that the fact that the impact of media coverage is potentially 
significant justifies the reliance on newspaper coverage when considering the extent 
to which NGOs appear to be promoting development literacy and global solidarity 
among the public.  I structure this discussion in relation to the four research 
questions underpinning this study.  
Firstly, Irish newspapers appear to be an important source of information for 
the Irish public about the developing world, and possibly development NGOs as a 
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result, and are generally considered a reliable source of information.  For example, in 
2002 a nationally representative sample of 1,000 people aged over 15 were surveyed 
in relation to their views on development cooperation in Ireland (Weafer, 2002).  
This found that 65% of respondents used newspapers (second only to television 
news) to get information about developing countries and 81% of respondents 
considered the media a very reliable or fairly reliable source of information on 
developing countries.  A replication of this survey conducted among 900 university 
students during 2006 and 2007 (Connolly et al., 2008) found that 68% of 
respondents used newspapers (again second only to television) as a source of 
information on developing countries and 62% of those considered the media a very 
reliable or reliable source of information on developing countries.   
The first research question guiding this research asks whether the quantity of 
coverage of NGO accountability is greater than the quantity of coverage of NGO 
legitimacy.  Attribute agenda-setting theory suggests that if certain attributes of 
organisations (e.g. accountability) are salient on the media agenda they will also 
become salient on the public agenda and, conversely, that if certain attributes of 
organisations (e.g. legitimacy) are not salient on the media agenda that they are less 
likely to become salient on the public agenda.  Priming extends this reasoning to 
suggest that the more salient ideas or attributes are, the more likely they are to be 
used in evaluating organisations.  This is pertinent to my argument that the 
promotion of development literacy requires NGOs to encourage the Irish public to 
take a critical approach to all undertakings in the name of development, and that 
questioning of NGO legitimacy amounts to a more critical engagement with NGOs 
than questioning of accountability. 
The second research question guiding this research asks whether the quantity 
of coverage of principal-agent approaches to NGO accountability is greater than the 
quantity of coverage of stakeholder approaches to accountability.  As already noted, 
attribute agenda-theory suggests that if certain attributes of organisations (e.g. 
principal-agent accountability) are salient on the media agenda they will also become 
salient on the public agenda and, conversely, that if certain attributes of organisations 
(e.g. stakeholder accountability) are not salient on the media agenda they are less 
likely to become salient on the public agenda.  Priming extends this reasoning to 
suggest that the more salient ideas or attributes are, the more likely they are to be 
used in evaluating organisations.  This is pertinent to my argument that the 
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promotion of global solidarity requires NGOs to encourage the Irish public to 
prioritise the interests of those in whose name development initiatives are being 
undertaken above their own, and that stakeholder accountability allows for such a 
prioritisation in contrast to principal-agent accountability. 
The third research question guiding this research asks whether the quantity of 
coverage in which low NGO administration costs are presented as desirable is 
greater than the quantity of coverage in which the use of low administration costs as 
an indicator of NGO quality is questioned or disputed. As already noted, attribute 
agenda-setting theory suggests that if certain attributes of organisations (e.g. 
administration costs) are salient on the media agenda they will also become salient 
on the public agenda.  Priming extends this reasoning to suggest that the more salient 
ideas or attributes are, the more likely they are to be used in evaluating organisations.  
This is pertinent to my argument that the promotion of development literacy and 
global solidarity requires NGOs to encourage the Irish public to take a critical 
approach to all undertakings in the name of development and to prioritise the 
interests of those in whose name development initiatives are being undertaken, and 
that use of administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality amounts to a lack of 
critical engagement and a failure to prioritise those in whose name development 
initiatives are being undertaken. 
The final research question guiding this research asks how critical is 
newspaper coverage of Irish relief and development NGOs.  Basic agenda setting 
suggests that the issues that are salient on the media agenda also become salient on 
the public agenda.  Hence the extent of questioning of NGO accountability or 
legitimacy on the media agenda is relevant for the likely salience of these issues on 
the public agenda.  This is pertinent to my argument that development literacy 
requires a critical approach to all undertakings in the name of development. 
4.4.5 Rationale for Application of Theories of Agenda Setting and 
Priming in this Study 
Having identified ways in which these theories are relevant to the research 
questions underpinning the study, some general discussion as to their 
appropriateness is also merited.  Firstly, I have selected these theories as there is 
precedence for their application in a wide range of studies.  Although basic agenda 
setting and priming were traditionally associated with political communication 
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research, more recently the theories have been applied in diverse contexts unrelated 
to political campaigns or individuals – e.g. SARS (Kalpana and Pavlik, 2003), organ 
donation (Quick et al., 2007), and media entertainment content (Holbert et al., 2003). 
Secondly, these theories deal with media effects at a societal (rather than 
individual) level, which is the focus of this study.  Thirdly, individual differences 
notwithstanding, there is undisputed empirical evidence for the agenda-setting effect 
and substantial reason to believe in the priming effect.   
Fourthly, I am personally attracted to these theories because of their 
relatively modest claims.  Both theories avoid the extremes of mass communication 
theory with its suggestion of an omnipotent media that can directly transmit 
messages intact from sender to receiver on the one hand, and some cultural 
approaches to media that attribute absolute power to audiences to resist media 
influence on the other.  Instead they acknowledge individual differences and offer 
what appears a more nuanced and credible hypothesis.  Finally, I believe that these 
theories provide a suitable framework for this research because of their compatibility 
with my philosophical position, which I will describe in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
4.5 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question 1: Is the quantity of coverage of NGO accountability greater than 
the quantity of coverage of NGO legitimacy? 
Hypothesis 1.1: (a) The total quantity of articles containing references to the 
accountability of NGOs will be greater than the total quantity of articles containing 
references to the legitimacy of NGOs; and (b) the quantity of articles containing 
references to the accountability of NGOs will be greater than the quantity of articles 
containing references to the legitimacy of NGOs in each time period being analysed 
in the study. 
Hypothesis 1.2: The quantities of articles in which (a) NGOs refer to their own 
accountability or that of other NGOs, (b) NGOs refer to their own legitimacy or that 
of other NGOs, (c) others refer to the accountability of NGOs, and (d) others refer to 
the legitimacy of NGOs will have increased over the period of the study. 
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Research Question 2:  Is the quantity of coverage of principal-agent approaches to 
NGO accountability greater than the quantity of coverage of stakeholder approaches 
to NGO accountability? 
Hypothesis 2.1: (a) The total quantity of articles containing references to NGO 
accountability that imply a principal-agent approach will be greater than the total 
quantity of articles containing references to NGO accountability that imply a 
stakeholder approach; and (b) the quantity of articles containing references to NGO 
accountability that imply a principal-agent approach will be greater than the quantity 
of articles containing references to NGO accountability that imply a stakeholder 
approach in each time period being analysed in the study. 
Hypothesis 2.2:  The quantities of articles in which (a) references by NGOs to NGO 
accountability imply a stakeholder approach, (b) references by NGOs to NGO 
accountability imply a principal-agent approach, (c) references by others to NGO 
accountability imply a stakeholder approach, and (d) references by others to NGO 
accountability imply a principal-agent approach will have increased over the period 
of the study. 
 
Research Question 3: Is the quantity of coverage in which low NGO administration 
costs are presented as desirable greater than the quantity of coverage in which the 
use of low NGO administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality is questioned or 
disputed? 
Hypothesis 3.1: (a) The total quantity of articles in which low NGO administration 
costs are presented as desirable without any discussion as to the validity of the use of 
NGO administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality will be greater than the 
total quantity of articles in which the validity of low administration costs as an 
indicator of NGO quality is questioned or disputed; and (b) the quantity of articles in 
which low NGO administration costs are presented as desirable  without any 
discussion as to the validity of the use of NGO administration costs as an indicator of 
NGO quality will be greater than the quantity of articles in which the validity of low 
administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality is questioned or disputed in each 
time period being analysed in the study. 
 
Research Question 4: How critical is Irish newspaper coverage of relief and 
development NGOs? 
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Hypothesis 4.1: The quantities of articles containing references to (a) NGOs 
questioning or disputing the accountability of others, (b) NGOs questioning or 
disputing the legitimacy of others, (c) others questioning or disputing the 
accountability of NGOs, and (d) others questioning or disputing the legitimacy of 
NGOs will have increased over the period of the study. 
Hypothesis 4.2: (a) The frequency with which specific named NGOs have 
questioned or disputed the accountability of others will have co-varied with the 
frequency with which others have questioned or disputed those NGOs’ own 
accountability; and (b) the frequency with which specific named NGOs have 
questioned or disputed the legitimacy of others will have co-varied with the 
frequency with which others have questioned or disputed those NGOs’ own 
legitimacy. 
Hypothesis 4.3:  (a) The total quantity of articles in which others question or dispute 
the accountability of NGOs in general will be greater than the total quantity of 
articles in which others question or dispute the accountability of specific named 
NGOs; (b) the quantity of articles in which others question or dispute the 
accountability of NGOs in general will be greater than the quantity of articles in 
which others question or dispute the accountability of specific named NGOs in each 
time period in the study; (c) the total quantity of articles in which others question or 
dispute the legitimacy of NGOs in general will be greater than the total quantity of 
articles in which others question or dispute the legitimacy of specific named NGOs; 
and (d) the quantity of articles in which others question or dispute the legitimacy of 
NGOs in general will be greater than the quantity of articles in which others question 
the legitimacy of specific named NGOs in each time period in the study. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
  In this chapter I have argued that Irish Times newspaper coverage may serve 
as a reflection of NGO and public views in relation to legitimacy and accountability.  
I have based the first element of this argument in part on the media theories of 
agenda setting and priming, which suggest that media coverage can have a 
significant influence on public opinion.  Given this and the self-professed view of 
Irish NGOs described in this chapter that what NGOs say or are reported as saying is 
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potentially influential, I have suggested that Irish NGOs could have been expected to 
counter any views attributed to them that were inaccurate in such an apparently 
influential Irish media source as the Irish Times.  While I cannot definitively claim 
that Irish Times coverage attributed to the public reflects public views in relation to 
legitimacy and accountability my more tentative claim that this coverage may reflect 
public views is, I suggest, strengthened by the fact that there is some corroborating 
evidence for some of the findings of this study in relation to public views. This 
chapter serves, therefore, to develop the third prong of the argument that guides my 
empirical research: that Irish Times newspaper coverage may serve as a reflection of 
NGO and public views in relation to legitimacy and accountability.   
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Chapter 5 
Philosophy and Methods 
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5.1 Introduction 
 In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 I developed the background argument that underpins 
this research.  In this chapter, I begin by identifying my philosophical perspective 
and approach to research ethics.  I then provide a brief overview of content analysis 
in general and quantitative content analysis in particular.  I follow this with a 
detailed description of how I applied quantitative content analysis in this study 
before concluding with some reflections on the limitations associated with it.   
5.2 Philosophical Perspectives 
5.2.1 Introduction and Terminology 
Much published social science research avoids mention of ontology, 
epistemology or methodology.  It is easy to imagine why, as even a brief perusal of a 
sample of relevant texts reveals these subjects to be mired in contention.  Debates on 
the philosophy of social science are ongoing, frequently heated and have generated a 
voluminous literature.  The vastness of the terrain and nuanced nature of individual 
positions make a comprehensive overview impossible given the confines of this 
research.  Hence while I will identify in passing some of the main twentieth-century 
philosophy of social science perspectives, I acknowledge from the outset that my 
labelling of these perspectives, my selection of them as particularly important, and 
my descriptions of them may not be accepted by all readers.  In this section I also 
briefly identify the philosophical position underpinning this research while again 
acknowledging that there are tensions implicit in adopting the position that I do.   
Before beginning, brief explanations of ontology, epistemology and 
methodology are required.  Ontology is concerned with theories of the nature of 
reality, and ontological claims have been described as “claims and assumptions that 
are made about the nature of social reality, claims about what exists, what it looks 
like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other” (Blaikie, 
2000, p. 8).  Epistemology is concerned with theories of knowledge or “how we 
know what we claim to know” (Jenkins, 2002, p. 91).  Methodology has been 
defined as “theory of the way in which knowledge is acquired” (Delanty, 2003, p. 4)   
and is logically linked to research methods.  While the research methods for this 
study will be discussed in detail from Section 5.4 onwards, this section deals with 
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ontology, epistemology and methodology.  Given the practical confines of this 
document, these will not, for the most part, be individually considered, but rather 
will be treated as components of particular philosophies of social science.  Following 
Guba’s (1990) lead, the four key philosophies or “paradigms” that he has identified 
will be briefly discussed here.  These are positivism and three later perspectives that 
Guba (p. 17) has identified as having “emerged to challenge (replace? parallel?) it”: 
postpositivism, critical theory and constructivism.  As an introductory comment it 
seems worth noting that while there is said to currently be a “powerful anti-positivist 
orthodoxy in sociology” (Jenkins, 2002, p. 89), there also appears to be a growing 
backlash against both pseudoscience and explicitly anti-positivist perspectives (e.g. 
Gross and Levitt, 1998, Goldacre, 2008). 
5.2.2  Major twentieth-century paradigms 
Positivism, it has been claimed, “serves as much to fuel a polemic as it does 
to identify a distinct epistemological theory or movement” (Fischer, 1998, p. 140).  
While criticisms of positivism abound (e.g. Nekrasas, 2005), studies have shown that 
versions of positivism remain dominant in research methods textbooks (Baronov, 
2004) and very influential in published social research (Gartrell, 1996). So, what is 
positivism?  Like every significant perspective there are many variations.  Early 
positivism can be regarded as a fundamentalist version of empiricism (Phillips and 
Burbules, 2000).  John Locke, who is most associated with empiricism, believed that 
our ideas originate from experience and have to be warranted by experience.  These 
ideas were accepted by Auguste Comte who gave positivism its name and who 
argued that the method of science was the best method of arriving at knowledge.  
After these early beginnings, the Vienna Circle, or Logical Positivists, emerged in 
the 1920s and 1930s. They combined empiricism with a version of rationalism, the 
idea that our knowledge includes a component that is not derived from direct 
observation.  This enabled them to advocate the study of things that were not 
observable as long as concepts could be connected to observations by a set of rigid 
rules.  The ontological position underpinning positivism is realism, which asserts 
that there is a real world driven by natural causes, which, according to positivists, 
science can reveal.  Science itself was believed by Logical Positivists to be objective 
and value-free.  Two central critiques that contributed to the demise of traditional 
positivism were produced by Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn.  Firstly, Popper’s work 
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rejected the idea of classical empiricism in favour of empirical falsification, which 
argued that theories can never be proved true by multiple observations but can be 
proved false by a single disconfirming instance.  Secondly, Kuhn’s work on 
paradigm shifts suggested that the emergence of scientific knowledge was dependant 
on cultural factors as well as neutral sense experience.  This undermined the Logical 
Positivists’ emphasis on empiricism. 
Postpositivism, which can also be referred to as neo-positivism or a moderate 
version of positivism, can be understood as a revised form of positivism that 
responds to the criticisms levelled at Logical Positivism.  Like positivism, it is based 
on an ontological realism that envisages a reality that exists independently of its 
observer and it emphasises empirical observation guided by the scientific method.  
Postpositivism differs from positivism in asserting that human knowledge can never 
be absolute as all observation is fallible and all theories are subject to revision based 
on new evidence.  In contrast to the positivist emphasis on the acquisition of “truth” 
or “facts”, postpositivism is concerned with “seeking appropriate and adequate 
warrants for conclusions” (Phillips and Burbules, 2000, p. 86). Postpositivists also 
emphasize the notion of a “critical community of interpreters” (Fischer, 1998, p. 
145) and suggest that research advances are made when researchers independently 
arrive at similar conclusions about given social phenomenon (Schutt, 1999, Baran 
and Davis, 2011).  Like positivism, postpositivism tends to emphasize statistical 
research. 
Critical Theory, according to Guba (1990) at least, encompasses a series of 
perspectives, including neo-Marxism and feminism, that see inquiry as a means of 
raising the consciousness of particular groups with a view to transforming the world 
and that reject the claims of value-freedom made by positivists and (largely) 
postpositivists.  These explicitly ideologically-directed perspectives entail a critical 
realist ontology and a subjectivist epistemology that envisages research as intimately 
related to the researcher’s values.  These perspectives are frequently grouped under 
an umbrella of interpretivism, which has been defined as concerned with “culturally 
derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world” (Crotty, 
1998, p. 67).   
Finally, constructivism differs most radically from positivism as it asserts 
that all knowledge is human construction.  Whereas positivists see knowledge as 
“out there” ready for discovery, constructivists see knowledge as resulting from the 
109 
 
process by which it is constructed by humans.  This implies that any inquiry can 
result in multiple incompatible interpretations and asserts that there can be no 
absolute truth, but, rather, multiple realities.  Constructivism can be said to be based, 
therefore, on a relativist ontology and a subjectivist epistemology. 
5.2.3 Philosophical Perspective Underpinning this research 
 If forced to choose a label, I would identify this research as postpositivist.  In 
order to provide a clearer picture of what that means for this research, I will outline 
my approach to objectivity, values in research, truth, and whether social research 
should be scientific.  The use of these concepts as an explanatory framework 
borrows from work by Phillips and Burbules (2000). 
As already described, objectivity is seen as a cornerstone of traditional 
positivist research and refers to a perceived need for the removal of personal bias.  
Whereas early positivists believed that research could be truly objective, objectivity 
is embraced in this research as an ideal worth striving for and is understood as what 
is socially agreed upon.  As described by Neuendorf (2002), the emphasis here is not 
on what is true, but on what is agreed to be true, which can also be referred to as 
intersubjectivity.  The commitment to objectivity in this research does not imply a 
denial that researchers approach research from different points of view.  Clearly, 
every researcher has a perspective and may see phenomena differently from other 
researchers  But, in common with the view of Phillips and Burbules (2000), I suggest 
that relativity of perspective does not necessarily lead to subjectivity and this 
research design incorporates specific features aimed at maximising its objectivity.   
One significant critique of the notion of objectivity in research is based on 
the claim that value neutrality is unattainable in research.  For example, it is 
commonly pointed out that values enter the research process in terms of the choice of 
research topics. In addition, some perspectives assert that particular value systems 
have become so deeply embedded as to be unconsciously held by researchers (e.g. 
Marxist scholars would point to the values of Western capitalism and feminist 
scholars to male interests as value systems that meet this description).  Dealing 
firstly with values in subject choice, I accept that my values played a part in the 
selection of this research topic but do not believe that this prevented me from 
conducting the research (once the topic had been selected) objectively.  Similarly, I 
reject the notion that this research may have been unduly influenced by deeply 
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embedded values such as Western capitalist thinking on the grounds that it has not 
been demonstrated that such values either hold the dominance that is sometimes 
assumed or that their existence serve to misdirect or bias research in the way posited.   
This research makes a relatively strong claim to truth, understood not in 
absolute terms, but in terms of presenting strong evidence for claims.  As described 
by Phillips and Burbules (2000), John Dewey suggested substituting the term 
“warranted assertibility” for “truth” in the context of research.  The term “warrant” is 
taken from the legal sphere and implies having sufficient evidence to convince an 
authority that a particular course of action is justified – e.g. to search a premises.  
This idea of “warranted assertibility” well describes the approach to truth in this 
study as it conveys my belief that the conclusions being presented in this thesis are 
sufficiently well grounded to justify actions being taken in response to them.  Of 
course, this immediately leads on to the question as to what makes evidence 
convincing and how such warrants can be obtained.  The answer I propose is 
adherence to scientific principles. 
In addition to objectivity, which I have already discussed, my approach to 
research embraces a range of scientific principles.  For example, I applied an a priori 
design in this study by deriving testable hypotheses from existing literature and using 
them as the basis for my research.  I have sought to ensure the replicability of this 
study by comprehensively reporting on how I conducted it. As I will describe later in 
this chapter I conducted detailed reliability tests.  I also believe that the extensive 
literature review that preceded this study maximises its potential to exhibit face 
validity and that the study exhibits a degree of empirical validity as there is some 
independent evidence to support the inferences I draw from this content analysis. 
5.3 Ethical Considerations 
This research was conducted under the auspices of University College Cork 
(UCC) and complies with the UCC Code of Good Conduct in Research (UCC, 
2007).  Due to the nature of the research, and in particular the absence of human 
research participants, obtaining formal approval from a UCC research ethics 
committee or any other ethics body was not necessary.  I acknowledge possible 
conflicts of interest as I worked for one of the NGOs being considered (GOAL) from 
1999 to 2009, held a voluntary part-time position with another (Oxfam) in 1999, and 
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was a member of three of the other NGOs at various stages during the study period 
(Comhlámh, Amnesty and the Galway One World Centre).  In order to minimise any 
possible problems associated with these associations, and to enable readers to 
independently assess the merits of the research or to replicate the study, I have aimed 
for maximum possible transparency in the description of this research process.  
Although, as described, the formal ethics requirements of the study were minimal, I 
accept that there are ethical dimensions to all research and have complied with the 
Ethical Guidelines of the Sociological Association of Ireland (SAI, 2008) and Social 
Research Association (SRA, 2003) in conducting this research. 
5.4 Introduction to Content Analysis and Justification for the Use of 
Quantitative Content Analysis 
5.4.1 Introduction to Content Analysis 
The current popularity of content analysis is reflected in its routine inclusion 
in research methods and data analysis textbooks, (e.g. Robson, 2002, Hardy and 
Bryman, 2004), its in-depth dissection in content analysis manuals (e.g. 
Krippendorff, 2004, Neuendorf, 2002, Roberts, 1997), and its regular appearance in 
academic journals ranging across diverse disciplines (e.g. Singer, 1982, Black, 1993, 
Morris and Adley, 2001, Smith, 2006). 
As highlighted by a detailed overview of the development of content analysis 
(Neuendorf, 2002), content analysis is a very broad field that can be conducted from 
a variety of perspectives (including the social sciences, psychology, artificial 
intelligence and linguistics) and, depending on one’s definition of the method, on a 
wide variety of types of materials (including written texts, films, visual art, facial 
expressions and music).   
As in other forms of research, the dichotomy between quantitative and 
qualitative research has exerted a strong influence in content analysis theorizing.  As 
this dichotomy will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections, for now it is 
sufficient to state that this research identifies itself as quantitative content analysis 
and that, unless otherwise stated, all references to content analysis from this point 
forward should be understood to refer to quantitative content analysis.  As such, the 
main theorists whose work will be repeatedly referred to in this chapter, and whose 
academic backgrounds are overwhelmingly situated in the field of communication, 
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all deal substantially with quantitative content analysis.  This list is made up of 
prominent early authors such as Harold Lasswell, Bernard Berelson and Ole Holsti, 
and also includes more recent commentators such as Klaus Krippendorff, Kimberley 
A. Neuendorf and Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy and Federick Fico  (e.g. Krippendorff, 
2004, Riffe et al., 2005, Neuendorf, 2002, Berelson, 1952, Lasswell et al., 1952, 
Holsti, 1969).  
Before considering quantitative content analysis specifically, it is necessary 
to explain in brief five technical terms that pepper the remainder of this chapter.  
Coding in the context of content analysis refers to the process by which units (e.g. 
newspaper articles) are assigned (by individuals or computer programmes) to 
particular categories to indicate that they contain certain features or imply certain 
meanings.  A variable in the context of content analysis refers to “a definable and 
measurable concept that varies; that is, it holds different values for different 
individual cases or units” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 95).  For example, a variable in this 
study was “type of article”. Categories in content analysis refer to ways in which a 
variable may be coded.  For example, in the context of “type of newspaper article”, 
the categories included “page 1 article” and “letter to the editor”.  Category values 
refer to the actual codes allocated to indicate to which category a unit has been 
assigned.  For example, in the context of the variable discussed above, page 1 
articles were coded “1”, letters to the editor were coded “2” and so forth.  Finally, a 
coding protocol refers to a detailed instruction manual that guides coders.   
 
5.4.2 Introduction to Quantitative Content Analysis 
5.4.2.1 Definitions of Quantitative Content Analysis 
Following a review of earlier definitions Neuendorf (2002, p. 10) defined 
content analysis as “a summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on 
the scientific method (including attention to objectivity, intersubjectivity, a priori 
design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) and 
is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in 
which the messages are created or presented”.   
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5.4.2.2 Reliability and Validity in Quantitative Content Analysis 
Reliability and validity are key concerns in quantitative content analysis and 
hence merit discussion here.  Reliability, firstly, is generally understood as 
agreement among coders about the categorization of data.   
 When testing reliability levels researchers begin by choosing a reliability 
coefficient.  Although 39 such coefficients have been identified (Popping 1998 cited 
in Lombard et al., 2002), only a small number are widely known.  In particular, 
percent agreement (often described as Holsti’s method in the context of content 
analysis), Scott’s pi and Cohen’s kappa warrant discussion, because meta-analyses 
have shown them to be consistently among the most commonly identified measures 
(Hughes and Garrett, 1990, Perreault and Leigh, 1989, Riffe and Freitag, 1997). 
Percent agreement in the context of content analysis reliability refers simply 
to the number of categories that coders code in the same way divided by the number 
of units they code.  Holsti’s (1969) method is identical to percent agreement in cases 
when two coders code the same units.  Assessments of the merits of percent 
agreement measures vary considerably.  Banerjee et al. (1999, p. 5) declare the 
measure to be “clearly inadequate”.  Similarly, Krippendorff (2004, p. 245) describes 
it as an “uninterpretable agreement measure”.  Neuendorf (2002), on the other hand, 
while acknowledging some drawbacks to percent agreement, does not reject outright 
its use.  Riffe et al. (2005) and Lombard et al. (2002) go further and recommend that 
agreement figures should be reported. 
The main objection to percent agreement is its failure to take chance into 
account and the attendant possibility that it may overinflate reliability.  For example, 
if there were two coding possibilities and two coders they would have a 50% chance 
of choosing the same code even if they selected codes without ever looking at the 
material they were coding.  Consequently, theorists generally agree that coefficients 
that take chance into account should be used either on their own or in addition to 
percent agreement (Neuendorf, 2002, Krippendorff, 2009, Riffe et al., 2005, 
Lombard et al., 2002). 
 Scott’s pi (1955) is one such coefficient.  Scott’s pi computes the agreement 
expected by chance by calculating how often individual category values are used in a 
given study and then calculating chance agreement based on that usage.  Values are 
expressed in a normal range from .00 (agreement at chance level) to 1.00 (perfect 
agreement).  Scott’s pi, along with Cohen’s kappa, has been criticised as being 
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overly conservative as it gives credit only to agreement beyond chance.  In other 
words, it contains a built in assumption that a certain proportion of coding decisions 
are due to chance even though this may not be the case.  Scott’s pi is calculated using 
the formula 
Pi = Percent agreement observed – percentage agreement expected 
1-percent agreement expected 
 Cohen’s kappa (1960) is calculated using the same formula as Scott’s pi and 
the measures differ only in terms of how expected agreement is calculated.  Whereas 
Scott’s pi disregards which of two coders has allocated a particular code, Cohen’s 
kappa checks for systematic biases by accounting for differences in how individual 
coders allocate their values across the coding categories.   Much has been written 
about which approach is preferable.  Whereas Krippendorff (1978), for example, 
rejects outright the validity of Cohen’s kappa based on its method of calculating 
expected agreement, Fleiss (1978) has identified its approach to expected agreement 
as a strength compared to that contained in Scott’s pi.  Most commentators have, 
however, not taken a stance on the matter (e.g. Riffe et al., 2005, Neuendorf, 2002, 
Lombard et al., 2002). 
    Once an agreement measure has been decided upon, content analysts must 
decide how much content to test for reliability. Again there is no definite consensus 
on this. Neuendorf (2002), following a review of commentary on the issue, has 
recommended that at least 10% of the full sample or a minimum of 50 units be 
tested.   
 The very notion of reliability testing raises the question as to what an 
acceptable level of reliability is.  Recommendations differ widely.  Landis and Koch 
(1977) have suggested that a kappa score between 0.00 and 0.20 indicates poor 
agreement, a score between 0.21 and 0.40 indicates fair agreement, a score between 
0.41 and 0.60 indicates moderate agreement, a score between 0.61 and 0.80 indicates 
substantial agreement and a score between 0.81 and 1.00 indicates almost perfect 
agreement.  Banerjee et al. (1999) have suggested that a kappa score of .75 upwards 
indicates excellent agreement and .40 to .75 indicates fair to good agreement.  
Krippendoff (2004) has recommended an alpha, which is equivalent to a kappa in 
research involving nominal data, of .80 or higher, although he allows for more 
tentative conclusions to be drawn about variables with reliabilities between .67 and 
.80.   
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The fact that there is any difference in opinion regarding the meaning of 
reliability results draws attention to the fact that reliability is itself a construct.  
While critics might suggest that this undermines the scientific claims of content 
analyses, I suggest that differing interpretations of reliability scores are consistent 
with the moderate approach inherent in a postpositivist outlook.   
Validity refers to the extent to which a instrument measures what it claims to 
measure.  Validity (and in particular empirical validity) is widely acknowledged to 
be problematic in content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004, Potter and Levine-
Donnerstein, 1999, Janis, 1965).   Krippendorff (2004) has usefully distinguished 
between three types of validity that are relevant to content analysis: face, social and 
empirical.  We appeal to face validity when we accept research findings because they 
appear intuitively to “make sense”.   Research has social validity when the findings 
are sought out and meaningful to a particular constituency.  Empirical validity is “the 
degree to which available evidence and established theory supports various stages of 
a research process, the degree to which specific inferences withstand the challenges 
of additional data, of the findings of other research efforts, of evidence encountered 
in the domain of the researcher’s research questions, or of criticisms based on 
observations, experiments, or measurements as opposed to logic or process” 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 315).  Each content analyst should be able to identify what, 
in their view, makes their analysis valid. 
5.4.2.3 Key Debates in Quantitative Content Analysis 
 While quantitative content analysts largely agree on what entails quantitative 
content analysis, important points of contention do exist between them.  Two of 
these, which will be discussed here, relate to the purpose of content analysis and the 
distinction between latent and manifest content.   
Three potential purposes of content analysis are to describe communication, 
to draw inferences about the context of the production of communication, and to 
draw inferences about the context of the consumption of communication.  Whereas 
early textual content analysis tended to focus solely on describing trends in 
communication content and some commentators continue to identify a role for 
purely descriptive content analysis (Riffe et al., 2005), this application is now 
routinely criticised for being disconnected from social life (Shapiro and Markoff, 
1997).  While it is common for modern content analyses to be explicitly concerned 
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with making inferences, therefore, whether this is an essential or optional element of 
quantitative content analysis is contested.  
 Another area of contention between content analysts concerns whether 
analysis may or must go beyond the manifest to include consideration of latent 
content.  Shapiro and Markoff (1997) point out that positions adopted on this 
question range from the view that only manifest content may be analysed to the 
alternative extreme that implies that only latent content is of genuine interest.  The 
meanings of manifest and latent content warrant interrogation.  Holsti (1969, p. 12) 
defined manifest content simply as “the surface meaning of a text” in contrast to 
latent content, which he defined as “the deeper layers of meaning embedded in the 
document”.  The notion of manifest content implies that content is inherent to texts 
although, as Krippendorff (2004) notes, alternative definitions suggest that content 
can be the property of the source of a text or only emerge in the process of a 
researcher analysing a text relative to a particular context.  A key question concerns 
how manifest content (if it exists) can be identified and distinguished from latent 
content (if it exists).  In most texts that deal with this issue the norm is to suggest that 
manifest content should be equated with the existence of widespread agreement on 
what a text means (e.g. Riffe et al., 2005).  Although this definition of manifest 
content is common, it is not universal.  George (1959), for example, argued that 
experts may well achieve high reliability in coding latent meanings.   
 Given the  contention surrounding the concepts of manifest and latent 
content, it is not clear to what extent the labelling of particular elements of content as 
manifest or latent aids clarity, and a number of researchers have criticized the 
application of the dichotomy on the basis that no clear cut distinction exists (Shapiro 
and Markoff, 1997).  Neuendorf (2002), for example, has suggested that a continuum 
approach be applied with content being considered in a range from highly manifest 
to highly latent.  
5.4.3 Justification for the Use of Quantitative Content Analysis 
While there are several authors who have argued for a merging of 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis (Wilson, 1993, Waitzkin, 1990, 
Mayring, 2000), quantitative content analysis as applied in this study is quite 
different to qualitative content analysis as it is commonly understood.  In seeking to 
distinguish between qualitative and quantitative forms of content analysis it is 
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necessary firstly to point out that there are a very large number of approaches that 
may be included under the rubric of qualitative content analysis.  While a thorough 
discussion of these is far beyond the scope of this study, a few broad points can be 
made about qualitative content analysis that serve to distinguish most forms of it 
from most forms of quantitative content analysis.   
Firstly, category development in qualitative content analysis is generally 
based on readings of the texts to be analysed.  This contrasts with the approach of 
quantitative content analysis in which category formulation proceeds from theory 
and prior research.  Secondly, whereas in quantitative content analysis the coding 
protocol is seen to guide the coding, in qualitative content analysis the investigator is 
central.  Consequently, coding is seen as a task suited only to those who have a deep 
understanding of the research subject, unlike the blind coding typical of quantitative 
content analysis.  A third difference concerns the notion of objectivity, which 
underpins quantitative content analysis, but is rejected as unattainable by most 
qualitative content analysts.  A fourth difference concerns reliability.  Whereas 
quantitative content analysts embrace the classical concept of reliability, many 
qualitative analysts argue that the concepts of validity and reliability are of limited 
use in qualitative research (Kracauer, 1952, Wodak and Meyer, 2009, Waitzkin, 
1990). 
I deemed quantitative content analysis a suitable method for this research 
firstly, because it is unobtrusive and nonreactive.  Secondly, and unlike qualitative 
variations, it allows for the analysis of large volumes of material and hence is 
suitable for analysing trends in media coverage over a relatively long period.   While 
I accept that qualitative analysis would have allowed for a more in-depth 
consideration of some of this content, the nature of qualitative research makes it less 
suited than quantitative content analysis to longitudinal research.  I believe that a 
longitudinal quantitative overview of Irish Times newspaper coverage of 
accountability, legitimacy and administration costs was best suited to provide 
answers to the research questions advanced in this study.  Thirdly, quantitative 
content analysis is well suited for use in contexts where the available literature is 
sufficient to generate clear research questions or hypotheses as was the case in this 
study.  Finally, I chose to pursue quantitative rather than qualitative content analysis 
because its assumptions most closely correspond with my philosophical position.  
This position, while acknowledging the agency of individual readers and ensuing 
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variations in interpretation, nonetheless entails a commitment to strive for objectivity 
in research.  This commitment translates in practical terms into the integration of 
reliability testing in research, a willingness to reject any elements of research that fail 
to meet standards deemed acceptable (e.g. removing individual questions from a 
content analysis protocol if high agreement rates between coders cannot be achieved) 
and an emphasis on ensuring that studies are replicable.  
5.5 Design and Execution of this Study   
5.5.1 Introduction 
 In this study I use content analysis both to describe Irish Times content 
relating to NGOs and legitimacy and accountability and to draw inferences about this 
content.  Neuendorf’s (2002, p. 10) definition of content analysis as “a summarizing, 
quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method (including 
attention to objectivity, intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, 
generalizability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the 
types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are 
created or presented” well describes my approach to content analysis.  While I accept 
that content may be understood by people in different ways, given my aim of making 
inferences about Irish Times content, my focus is on content that is likely to be 
understood in the same way by most people as verified by reliability checks between 
coders.   
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Figure 5.1 Chronological overview of this research* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.2 Identification of Content  
 To source relevant Irish Times articles for this study I began by identifying 
19 keyword search terms (e.g. accountability), 77 specific NGO names (e.g. 
Trócaire) and 15 generic subject search terms (e.g. charity).  These are outlined in 
 
1. Theory and Rationale.  The theory and rationale for this study are described in 
Chapters 1 – 4 and culminate in the research questions and hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter 4. 
 
↓ 
 
2. Identification of Content.  As described in Section 5.5.2 and in Appendices D and F, I 
indentified 215 Irish Times newspaper articles published between 1994 and 2009 for 
analysis in this study.  Given the relatively small number of articles involved I 
determined it feasible to analyse all of these without the need for further sampling. 
 
↓ 
 
3. Preparation for Coding.  As described in Section 5.5.3, I prepared a detailed coding 
protocol and coding sheet based on my literature review that described each variable 
and the rules to govern the coding process. 
 
↓ 
 
4. Identification and Training of Second Coder.  In a strategy compatible with the 
recommendations of Krippendorff  (2004) and as described in Section 5.5.4, I acted as 
a first coder myself and hired a second coder through a local university.   I conducted 
two training sessions with this second coder and pilot tests of reliability before coding 
began. 
 
↓ 
 
5. Coding and Reliability Testing.  As described in Section 5.5.5, the second coder and I 
independently coded the same 108 articles (50% of all articles) for the purposes of 
reliability testing.  Having determined that reliability levels were acceptable for all 23 
variables included in the study, I used the results from this coding as part of the final 
data set randomly selecting coding choices from my coding or that of the second coder 
in instances when we had disagreed.  I then coded an additional 54 articles and the 
second coder coded an additional 53 articles to make up the total of 215 articles.   
 
↓ 
 
6. Tabulation and Reporting.  As described in Section 5.5.6 I used a range of statistical 
methods to analyse the results obtained.  These results are outlined in Chapter 6. 
 
*Note that the headings in this flowchart borrow from Neuendorf’s (2002, p. 50)“flowchart 
for the typical process of content analysis research”. 
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Annex 1 to Appendix B, Appendix C and Annex 3 to Appendix B respectively.  The 
exact procedure I followed to identify these search terms is described in Appendix D.  
I then used the database Nexis UK, an image of which appears in Appendix E, to 
source the articles. The original Nexis UK search produced 969 articles, which I then 
“filtered” to produce a final universe of 215 articles. Figure 5.2 describes the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria for these articles in summary form and in order to 
facilitate the replicability of this study Appendix F describes the article searching 
and filtration procedures in greater detail.   
The names of all 215 articles included in this content analysis are listed in 
Appendix G.  For the purposes of clarity, and unless stated otherwise, all references 
to “specific named NGOs” from this point forward should be understood to refer to 
the specific named NGOs listed in Appendix C.  All references to “NGOs in 
general” should be understood to refer to NGOs as described using any of the 
generic subject search terms that are outlined in Annex 3 to Appendix B. 
 
Figure 5.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria for newspaper articles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Articles were included in the initial article set if they met ALL of the following criteria: 
 
 Were published in the Irish Times between 1st January 1994 and 31 December 2009; 
 Contain a specific reference to one or more of 77 NGOs listed in Appendix C 
AND/OR one or more of 23 generic subject search terms listed in Annex 3 to 
Appendix B; 
 Contain a reference to one or more of the following keyword search terms 
“accountability”, “legitimacy”, “administration costs” AND/OR any of the derivatives 
of these keyword search terms specified in Annex 1 to Appendix B. 
↓ 
 
This produced an initial total of 969 articles. I then reviewed each article individually and 
removed any that: 
 Did not refer using one or more of the terms “legitimacy”, “accountability” or 
“administration costs” (or any of the derivatives of these terms as outlined in Annex 1 
to Appendix B) to the legitimacy, accountability or administration costs of EITHER 
one or more of the 77 NGOs listed in Appendix C OR NGOs in general as indicated 
by BOTH the use of one or more of the generic subject search terms listed in Annex 3 
to Appendix B AND the absence of a qualifying description that precluded relief and 
development NGOs, OR did not include additional commentary by NGOs in relation 
to accountability or legitimacy. 
↓ 
This produced a final total of 215 articles. 
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Having chosen Irish Times articles as my unit of analysis I decided to 
consider not only the number of articles in relation to each variable, but also the 
prominence of those articles.  Choosing indicators of prominence is not 
straightforward as there is no agreed single measure or combination of measures 
among content analysts who consider newspaper content.  Although a small number 
of studies apply a long list of indicators of prominence (e.g. Westwood and 
Westwood, 1999), in general, content analysts tend to limit their consideration of 
prominence to a small number of indicators.  These include: appearance of an article 
on a front page (Singer, 1982, Barabas and Jerit, 2009), appearance of a photograph 
alongside an article (Durrant et al., 2003), and article section (e.g. editorial) and length  
(Barnes et al., 2008). 
 An additional problem that arises in considering prominence in relation to 
recent Irish Times (and much other newspaper) content, is that it has had an online 
presence since 1994 and there is reason to believe that online readership of the 
newspaper is sufficiently high to justify its consideration when selecting measures of 
prominence.  For example, a daily average of 149,212 users accessed one of the Irish 
Times sites during November 2009 (ABC, 2010).   Studying the content of 
newspapers that have online and hardcopy editions is problematic from the 
perspective of selecting measures of prominence, because the same measures may 
not be suitable for both editions.  For example, whether coverage is above or below 
the traditional newspaper fold becomes considerably less relevant when content is 
being viewed online.  Similarly, the likelihood that online users will skip directly to 
particular sections (e.g. the letters page or the Editorial), rather than going through 
each page of content in turn and having their attention drawn to longer articles or 
those with photographs, arguably makes the length of article or accompanying 
photographs less important in online than hardcopy editions. 
 Taking into account both the availability of information from Nexis UK (e.g. 
photographs were not available) and the implications of dual online and hardcopy 
versions of the Irish Times, I considered articles to be prominent if they met one or 
more of the following criteria: appeared on the front page, were editorials, or were 
longer to a statistically significant degree than the other articles with which they 
were being compared.  
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5.5.3 Preparation for Coding 
 A coding protocol relies on the selection of categories that are exhaustive, 
mutually exclusive and unambiguously defined.  In other words, for every variable 
there must be one (but no more than one) appropriate code for each article being 
coded and the coders should be clearly instructed about how to recognise the 
phenomenon under consideration.  
I constructed a first draft of the study’s protocol over a two-month period 
based on a thorough literature review.  After a three-month gap I reviewed the 
protocol in conjunction with relevant newspaper content including both some of the 
actual content that had been selected for consideration in the study and some other 
relevant content that fell outside the timeframe of the study.   During this review I 
identified some category lists that were not exhaustive and others that were not 
mutually exclusive.  I rectified these problems by adding additional codes in some 
instances and subdividing categories in others.  I also revised a small number of 
variable definitions as part of this review.   
 I then created an Excel coding sheet, which was colour coded to clearly 
distinguish between primary codes, which had to be answered for each question, and 
secondary codes, which were only required in some cases.    This also contained 
built-in drop down lists for the primary codes to ensure that only allowable codes 
were selected by the coders.  Appendix H shows an image of the Excel coding sheet 
for the first five variables. 
5.5.4 Identification and Training of Second Coder 
I hired a humanities research postgraduate student unknown to me and 
without prior experience or particular knowledge relating to NGO legitimacy or 
accountability to work as a coder and provided two training sessions each lasting less 
than two hours for her.  At the first session I explained the coding protocol and we 
jointly coded ten articles that were not contained in the actual universe of articles.  
Following the first session she and I blindly coded twenty-five additional non-
universe articles.  When I tested these for reliability they indicated satisfactory 
agreement levels for twenty-one of the twenty-three variables.  At the second 
training session I outlined revised variable definitions for the two variables that had 
not achieved satisfactory reliability results and we jointly coded an additional six 
articles.  Following the second training session she and I blindly coded twenty-five 
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articles from among the actual articles for the study.  These yielded satisfactory 
reliability results and so I decided that coding should proceed without further 
revisions. 
5.5.5 Coding and Reliability Testing 
 I chose to assess reliability using both percent agreement and Cohen’s kappa.  
I chose  Cohen’s kappa as a measure that takes chance into account both because of 
the extent of precedence of its use and because its method of calculation of expected 
agreement taking individual coder distributions into account is more personally 
convincing to me than that of Scott’s pi.  I chose percent agreement as an 
accompanying measure because it compensates, to some degree at least, for some of 
the limitations of Cohen’s kappa, which I will discuss later in this section. 
The second coder and I initially coded one third of the articles (72) for the 
purposes of reliability testing.  I randomly selected these articles using the website 
www.random.org.  However, while testing the reliability of the 72 jointly-coded 
articles it became apparent that very few instances of certain category values had 
been present in the reliability sample.  In order to enhance my reliability data I then 
increased the reliability sample from one third (72 articles) to one half (108 articles). 
 I then conducted reliability testing on the 108 articles.  The results of these 
tests are outlined for each variable individually in the table below.  The final three 
columns of the table indicate the significance of the agreement figure achieved 
according to the commentators identified (Krippendorff, 2004, Landis and Koch, 
1977, Banerjee et al., 1999). I have chosen Krippendorff’s assessments as examples 
of relatively conservative guidelines and Landis and Koch and Banerjee et al.’s 
assessments as examples of more liberal guidelines. 
Three of the variables in this study (year of article, month of article and 
number of words in article) were not formulated as multiple choice questions and 
hence were not amenable to testing using Cohen’s kappa.  In each case percent 
agreement was 100%.  Of the remaining 20 variables, 18 achieved either Cohen’s 
kappa reliability scores >0.80 or percent agreement scores >90%.  I decided to allow 
for a high percent agreement rate as an alternative to a high kappa score as the data 
set yielded a significant incidence of units for which there was very limited variation 
in terms of the variables being studied.  For example, in the case of variable 20, the 
kappa scores was 0 despite 99.07% reliability being achieved between coders.  In 
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this instance the coder and I coded the articles to indicate that in 107 of the 108 
articles being studied the content did not include a reference to an NGO claiming to 
be legitimate. Hence we both coded 107 of the 108 articles with the value 1.   The 
reason the kappa was so low in this instance is that variation is a requirement for 
reliability to be demonstrated.  Without variation coders could simply have agreed to 
code everything in the same way or could have habitually coded articles in the same 
way due to boredom or inertia.  Of course it is also possible that the coders simply 
agreed on what the appropriate values were in 107 of the 108 cases.   I suggest that 
to exclude variables that achieved low kappa scores as a result of insufficient 
variation would be inappropriate for two reasons.  Firstly, there was a high number 
of variables in the study in which both greater variation and higher kappa figures 
were produced by the coding.  This casts doubt on the assumption of careless or 
duplicitous coding, which presumably would not have been isolated to a small 
number of variables.  Secondly, if, in the case discussed, one more article had been 
coded 1 by both coders, this would have yielded a kappa of 1 to indicate perfect 
agreement.  Although in such a case variation would have been even less and there 
would have been more reason to suspect unthinking allocation of the same value, no 
theorist would suggest that such a result indicated anything other than perfect 
reliability.  In such cases the “benefit of the doubt” is applied and coding is assumed 
to have resulted from genuine agreement.  I suggest that it is internally inconsistent 
to apply such a logic in cases of 100% agreement but not in cases of 99% agreement.    
High percent agreement is being used, therefore, as an alternative to high kappa 
scores in incidents in which insufficient variation arose.  To allow readers to 
independently confirm that insufficient variation was the problem leading to the low 
kappa scores, Appendix I presents the kappa calculation tables for the variables in 
question.   
Finally, it is worth mentioning that although not identified as warranted due 
to insufficient variation, there is precedent for the use of percent agreement as an 
alternative to high kappa scores in a study by Lombard et al., (2002) which 
considered variables with an alpha of 0.7 or higher or a percent agreement rate of 
90% of higher.   
As outlined in the table below, two variables (10 and 11) did not achieve the 
threshold applied of Kappa >0.80 or percent agreement >90.  Although the kappa 
score for variable 10 would not generally be considered acceptable by Krippendorff, 
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it has been included in the results for the study as it would be considered acceptable 
by others including Landis and Koch and Banerjee et al.  Variable 11 would be 
considered acceptable to all three commentators, although Krippendorff would only 
consider it acceptable for tentative conclusions.   
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Table 5.1 Kappa reliability results and selected interpretations thereof 
 
No. Title of Variable % Cohen’s 
kappa 
Krippend
orff  
Landis & 
Koch 
Banerjee 
et al. 
1 Year of article 100% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 Month of article 100% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
3 Number of words in article 100% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
4 Type of article 100% 1 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
5 References to NGO accountability 97.22% 0.927 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
6 NGOs questioning or disputing the 
accountability of NGOs or other 
actors 
93.53% 0.880 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
7 Other actors questioning or disputing 
the accountability of NGOs 
95.37% 0.856 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
8 Claims of accountability by NGOs 97.22% 0 not usually 
acceptable 
slight poor 
9 Claims of NGO accountability by 
other actors 
100% 1 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
10 Definitions of accountability applied 
by NGOs and other actors 
70.37% 0.620 not usually 
acceptable 
substantial fair to 
good 
11 Accountability to whom 77.78% 0.690 suitable for 
tentative 
conclusion 
substantial Fair to 
good 
12 Other NGO references to 
accountability 
95.37% 0.912 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
13 Other references by other actors to 
NGOs and accountability 
96.30% 0.885 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
14 References to NGO administration 
costs 
99.07% 0.896 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
15 References made by NGOs to NGO 
administration costs 
99.07% 0.852 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
16 References made by other actors to 
NGO administration costs 
98.15% 0.329 not usually 
acceptable 
fair  poor 
17 References to NGO legitimacy 97.22% 0.820 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
18 NGOs questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of NGOs or other actors 
90.74% 0.523 not usually 
acceptable 
moderate fair to 
good 
19 Other actors questioning or disputing 
the legitimacy of NGOs 
97.22% 0.652 not usually 
acceptable 
substantial fair to 
good 
20 Claims of legitimacy by NGOs 99.07% 0 not usually 
acceptable 
slight poor 
21 Claims of NGO legitimacy by other 
actors 
97.22% 0.613 not usually 
acceptable 
substantial Fair to 
good 
22 Other NGO references to legitimacy 90.74% 0.768 suitable for 
tentative 
conclusion 
substantial excellent 
23 Other references by other actors to 
NGOs and legitimacy 
98.15 0.865 can be 
relied on 
almost perfect excellent 
Selected Interpretations  
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5.5.6 Tabulation and Reporting 
I used binomial tests and Pearson’s chi-square tests (often referred to simply 
as chi-square tests) to analyse the hypotheses that involved frequency data.  
Binomial tests determine the exact statistical significance of deviations from 
theoretically expected distributions in cases when there are only two categories.  
Chi-square tests are commonly used as an equivalent to binomial tests when there 
are more than two categories.  Put more succinctly, binomial and chi-square tests 
allow researchers to determine whether frequencies of occurrences across categories 
deviate from randomness to a statistically significant extent (e.g., in the case of two 
categories, whether the observed frequencies differ significantly from a 50:50 or 
chance level).   
Like all statistical procedures, binomial tests and chi-square tests rely on 
certain assumptions.  In the case of binomial tests, the main assumption is that the 
variable is dichotomous with two values that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
in all cases (i.e., that there are two categories of frequency data that, if random, 
would be evenly balanced).  Binomial tests also rely on an assumption of 
independence of observations.  This means that the same observations must appear 
in only one category and, in this study, meant that in some cases overlapping articles 
needed to be removed from the analysis.  As in the case of all tests of significance, 
binomial tests also assume that random sampling has occurred.  Chi-square tests 
share with binomial tests the assumptions of random sampling and independence of 
observations.  In addition, adequate cell sizes are assumed.  A common application 
of this principle, which was applied in this analysis, is that at least 80% of expected 
cell frequencies must be greater than five and all expected frequencies must be equal 
to or greater than one.  Both binomial test and chi-square test calculators are widely 
available online and in statistics packages.  For the purposes of this study I used an 
Excel binomial test calculator and conducted chi-square calculations using an online 
calculator (Preacher, 2001). 
Both binomial and chi-square tests produce significance values expressed as 
p. The smaller the p value, the more statistically significant the finding is.  
Statisticians commonly accept a probability or p value of less than .05 as indicative 
of significance (GraphPad) and this value is routinely identified as an appropriate 
minimum significance level in statistics textbooks (e.g. Mendenhall et al., 2009) .  
Put simply, this means that an observation has a probability of less than 5% of 
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occurring by chance.  Clearly, the more tests one conducts the more likely it 
becomes that one or more of the findings will be due to chance.  This is particularly 
the case if the p values obtained are close to the cut-off threshold of .05.  The 
Bonferroni correction, and modifications thereof, have been proposed as means of 
“correcting” for the increased likelihood of chance playing a role when multiple tests 
are conducted (e.g. Simes, 1986).   The application of this adjustment requires that 
the chosen significance level (e.g., .05) be divided by the number of tests performed 
to produce a lower significance threshold.  Although commonly applied, the 
Bonferroni correction has been the subject of detailed criticism (e.g. Perneger, 1998).  
The most obvious problem with the procedure is that it implies that comparisons 
should be interpreted differently depending on how many other tests have been 
conducted.  For example, a single test might or might not be considered significant 
depending on whether it was conducted alone or in a study involving multiple tests.  
This does not seem logical and, if Bonferroni corrections were universally implied, 
would make the comparison of results extremely difficult.  In this study I applied the 
traditional threshold for significance of p = .05 and did not apply  Bonferroni 
corrections because of the shortcomings mentioned above.    
As already described, I considered three measures of article prominence in 
this study: appearance of an article on page 1, designation of an article as an 
editorial, and length of article.  As outlined in Table 6.1 in Chapter 6, there was a 
very small number of relevant instances of the first two of these criteria (six articles 
in total).  Hence I chose to disregard both appearance of an article on the front page 
and designation of an article as an editorial in the final analysis, but I considered 
length of article in relation to each hypothesis for which a significant finding was 
obtained.  The article length data concerned continuous entities (i.e. interval 
measurement) rather than frequencies within categories (i.e. nominal measurement).  
As such, the data were not directly amenable to analysis using binomial or chi-square 
tests. Initially, I considered the use of analysis of variance (ANOVA).  However on 
exploratory testing it became apparent that key assumptions of ANOVA, including 
sample size and a normal distribution of data, were not met.   Consequently, I chose 
two non-parametric alternatives: the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and the Kruskal-
Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks.  These can be considered to fulfil a 
similar purpose to ANOVA, but they use the ranks of data rather than their values.  
Importantly, they also do not assume a normal distribution.  Both the Wilcoxon-
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Mann-Whitney test and the Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks 
serve to establish whether the values or cases in different groups differ significantly 
from each other.   Sample values almost invariably differ somewhat and these tests 
assess whether the differences signify genuine population differences or whether 
they merely represent the type of variations that are to be expected among random 
samples from the same population (Siegel and Castellan, 1988).  The main difference 
between the two tests is that whereas the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is suitable 
for two groups only, the Kruskal-Wallis test can be used with three or more groups. 
For the purposes of this study all Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney calculations were 
conducted by hand using the appropriate formula and all Kruskal-Wallis calculations 
were conducted using an online calculator (McDonald, 2009). 
As already noted, this study covers a 16-year period from 1994 to 2009.  To 
enable longitudinal trends to be described I divided the data into three time periods 
from 1994 to 1999, 2000 to 2004 and 2005 to 2009.  I based analyses that considered 
changes across time on these divisions and compared them against the total number 
of Irish Times articles published during each of those time periods.  I used Nexis UK 
to calculate these totals, which were as follows: from 1994 to 1999, 364,049 Irish 
Times articles were published; from 2000 to 2004, 297,816 Irish Times articles were 
published; and from 2005 to 2009, 267,247 Irish Times articles were published. 
5.6 Criticisms and Limitations of Quantitative Content Analysis 
5.6.1 Introduction 
Quantitative content analysis, like other methods, has attracted criticism.  In 
this section I will deal separately with criticisms of the method that have already 
received considerable attention and other challenges posed by the method that have 
received less attention but I nonetheless believe to be important. 
5.6.2 Popular Criticisms 
Critics of quantitative content analysis commonly dismiss the method as 
simplistic on the grounds that it is concerned with “mere word counts” (Hsieh, 2005, 
p. 1283)  or “rash quantification”(Mayring, 2000, p. 2) .  Wilson (1993, p. 1), for 
example, declares that “a count of the word ‘good’ in a text, for example, may be 
misleading; how many of these instances are negated and thus express the opposite 
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of the concept ‘good’?” While Wilson’s suggestion that such word counts miss the 
context of content is correct, this does not undermine the potential of the method, 
which is commonly concerned with the occurrence of themes, phrases and other 
content characteristics that are not susceptible to this problem associated with word 
frequency counts alone.  In this content analysis, for example, while one variable (Q. 
5) is concerned simply with quantifying the number of instances in which the term 
“accountable” or a derivative thereof is used in relation to NGOs, seven other 
variables (Q. 6 – 12) are solely concerned with identifying the context in which this 
term is used. 
While I suggest that quantitative content analysis based on themes or phrases 
can allow for the consideration of both the context and tone of individual units of 
content, clearly there are forms of analysis to which the method is unsuited.  For 
example, Waitzkin (1990) argues that quantitative content analysis does not deal 
with the complexity of discourse.  Certainly I accept that more qualitative forms of 
analysis would be more appropriate if the aim of an individual study were to 
consider in depth a small quantity of content. 
Quantitative content analysis can also be criticised on the grounds that the 
choice of search terms may lead to the omission of content that appears to be 
concerned with the subject matter under consideration but uses terms other than 
those identified by the researcher to convey this subject.  For example, one could 
speculate that the terms transparency or responsibility may have been used in lieu of 
accountability to discuss NGO accountability in Irish Times content.  I accept that 
this could be viewed as a limitation of the method, but believe that the nuances 
associated with different terms would make it difficult both to identify all the 
potentially overlapping terms associated with accountability, legitimacy and 
administration costs and to accurately measure when these terms were in fact being 
used as alternatives to accountability, legitimacy and administration costs.  In this 
study at least, therefore, I suggest that any benefits inherent in this approach would 
be outweighed by the reduction in objectivity that it would entail.  In addition, I 
suggest that the longitudinal nature of this study lessens the potential problems 
associated with the omission of content using alternative terms as the focus in much 
of this analysis is on what changes have occurred during a particular period and, 
obviously, I have used the same terms to identify content for all of this period. 
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Finally, quantitative content analysis has also been criticised based on poor 
applications of the method, which detractors would be correct to note appear in 
abundance.  Kolbe and Burnett (1991), for example, found significant weaknesses in 
the application and reporting of procedures relating to objectivity and reliability in a 
meta-analysis of 128 content analyses dealing with consumer behaviour.  In a 
separate review of multiple meta-analyses of content analyses, Riffe et al. (1997) 
found a significant percentage of studies to be atheoretical.  Although these problems 
are real, they do not undermine the potential of the method or the many quantitative 
content analyses in which these problems were avoided.  It should, of course, also be 
pointed out that poor applications of other methods also abound (see, for example, 
the discussion of discourse analysis in Antaki et al., 2003).   
5.6.3 Additional Challenges posed by the method 
5.6.3.1 Introduction 
Three additional categories of criticism, which have received far less popular 
attention than those already mentioned, but in my view are substantive, are 
acknowledged here.  These relate to the construction of categories, coder training, 
and issues of reliability.   
5.6.3.2 Category Development 
Despite the assertion that categories are potent entities and that “each 
category valorizes some point of view and silences another” (Bowker and Star, 2000, 
p. 5), it has been claimed that “classical content analysis has few answers to the 
question from where the categories come, how the system of categories is 
developed” (Mayring, 2000, p. 3).  Certainly it would appear true that theorists of 
quantitative content analysis have paid relatively little attention to this issue and this 
trend is repeated in individual published content analyses, with one meta-analysis 
reporting insufficient information on categorical reliability to enable them to 
evaluate the issue (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991). 
Category development may proceed in different ways including from a 
literature review, a single piece of previous research or a group of researchers 
devising specific new measures.  I suggest that, as a minimum, all content analyses 
should state the process that led to the adoption of particular categories and their 
definition in particular ways.  While it is common for published content analyses to 
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state that the coding protocol will be made available to any interested parties, 
constraints on space make it impossible for coding protocols to be attached to most 
published content analyses.  I suggest that all published content analyses should 
include, as a minimum, the full variable definitions, and that, where possible, a 
website address where the protocol is available for download should be included.    
5.6.3.3 Coder Training 
Coder training is seen as an integral part of protocol development with 
discussion among coders on disagreements typically leading to the refinement of 
categories and alteration of instructions until acceptable levels of reliability can be 
achieved.  Coder training is, however, also problematic, as when coders participate 
in this way it becomes difficult to determine whether they have merely become more 
careful or have instead developed a new, group-specific unwritten consensus 
concerning what is expected of them (Krippendorff, 2004).  Although empirical 
studies on coder training are virtually non-existent, one small study (Hak and Bernts, 
1996) found that coder training worked not only through the communication of the 
protocol to coders, but also through socialization of coders into practical rules.  This 
is a problem, because it suggests that instead of the protocol governing coding (as is 
the received wisdom), in fact coding is partially determined by informal rules, which 
will not be known to future coders who may participate in replications of individual 
content analyses.  Krippendorf’s (2004) recommendations to mitigate against this 
problem involve incorporating everything that transpired during coder training into 
the protocol and testing the finalized instructions with a fresh set of coders.  
Although both of these steps are possible, they may prove difficult as the more 
information that a protocol contains the more difficult it is for coders to remember it, 
and a new set of coders would also require at least some training to ensure their 
familiarity with the instructions. 
I acknowledge that coder training is problematic and, as a minimum, I 
recommend that details of the number, duration and content of training sessions 
should be documented.  Although the absence of significant research on coder 
training outcomes makes more specific recommendations problematic, I suggest that 
while a small number of training sessions involving the joint coding of test articles 
may be unavoidable, if several training sessions involving lengthy discussions on 
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individual categories are required before acceptable reliability levels are obtained, 
then new coders should be used to avoid the problem of socialization.   
5.6.3.4 Reliability 
 Reliability poses various challenges in the context of content analysis.  While 
the absence of consensus on a coefficient or an appropriate level of agreement have 
been widely discussed in previous literature and have been mentioned already in this 
chapter, two other methodological challenges that became obvious in the course of 
this study will be discussed here. 
Firstly, Section 5.5.5 discusses in detail the problem of insufficient variation. 
This arose as a particular challenge in this study and was dealt with by the 
substitution of high percent agreement figures for kappa scores in the case of the 
affected variables.  Secondly, the sample sizes required for reliability testing 
presented a challenge in this study.  While it is generally recommended that random 
sampling be used for the selection of units for reliability testing, and the sample sizes 
recommended by theorists are generally relatively small, small samples may be 
insufficient to allow for the testing of all distinctions.  Using a larger sample for 
testing can be a problem, particularly in the context of the pilot reliability test, when 
either there may be an insufficient number of articles that are relevant but not part of 
the actual sample/universe, or if actual units are being used, the sample size required 
to test all critical distinctions may amount to a significant proportion of the actual 
universe.  This is potentially problematic because if reliability levels are not 
sufficiently high and category definitions end up being revised following the pilot 
test, this could result in an insufficient number of actual unseen articles left to use for 
subsequent reliability testing.  Although this was not required in this study, a 
potential means of alleviating this problem would be to thoroughly test the protocol 
with one set of coders first before transferring to a second team for a second round of 
testing.  Presumably if high agreement levels were achieved with the first set of 
coders then very few additional changes would be required to the protocol following 
testing with the second team.  Hence this would maximise the chance that there 
would be an adequate number of units to allow for unseen reliability testing and 
subsequent individual coding. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have described the philosophical approach underpinning this 
study.  I have also outlined the form of quantitative analysis I used and described in 
detail how I applied quantitative content analysis from the point of the identification 
of content to the analysis of the data.  While acknowledging that there are limitations 
associated both with quantitative content analysis in general and my application of 
quantitative content analysis in particular, I have suggested that this method provided 
a suitable means of investigating the research questions and testing the hypotheses 
which guide this research and are outlined in Chapter 4.   
As described in Chapters 1-4, my research questions and hypotheses were 
themselves guided by a three-pronged background argument: that Irish relief and 
development NGOs should reorient their activities towards the promotion of 
development literacy and global solidarity; that the ways in which NGOs refer to the 
concepts of legitimacy and accountability may indicate the extent to which NGOs 
are promoting development literacy and global solidarity and the ways in which the 
public refer to legitimacy and accountability in relation to NGOs may indicate the 
extent to which the public already exhibit development literacy and global solidarity; 
and that  Irish Times newspaper coverage may serve as a reflection of NGO and 
public views in relation to legitimacy and accountability and hence may serve as an 
indicator both of the extent to which NGOs are already promoting development 
literacy and global solidarity and the extent to which the Irish public already exhibits 
development literacy and global solidarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
Chapter 6 
Results 
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6.1 Introduction and Overview of Content Analysed 
As described in earlier chapters this thesis comprises two distinct parts: a 
background argument and empirical research.  The background argument suggests, 
firstly, that Irish relief and development NGOs should reorient their activities 
towards the promotion of development literacy and global solidarity among the Irish 
public; secondly, that the ways in which NGOs refer to the concepts of legitimacy 
and accountability may indicate the extent to which NGOs are promoting 
development literacy and global solidarity and that the ways in which the public 
refer to legitimacy and accountability in relation to NGOs may indicate the extent to 
which the public already exhibit development literacy and global solidarity; and, 
thirdly, that Irish Times newspaper coverage that links NGOs with legitimacy and 
accountability may reflect NGO and public views regarding legitimacy and 
accountability.  Stemming from this background argument the empirical research in 
this thesis involved a content analysis of Irish Times newspaper coverage of NGOs, 
legitimacy and accountability.  This content analysis was guided by four research 
questions each of which has one or more associated main hypotheses.  Both the 
original research questions and main hypotheses were developed in advance of the 
data collection.  Arising from the analysis four supplementary hypotheses were also 
developed to facilitate a more in-depth exploration of particular issues.  In this 
chapter I begin by presenting in table format a summary of the characteristics of the 
Irish Times content analysed.  I then describe in detail the analysis and findings 
pertaining to each of the four research questions, and the associated main and 
supplementary hypotheses, in advance of a more general discussion of these findings 
in Chapter 7.  References to significance in relation to findings, which appear 
throughout this chapter, should be understood to refer to statistical significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 
 
Table 6.1 Characteristics of Irish Times articles analysed 
Number of articles that met 
inclusion criteria and were 
analysed in this study 
215 For more details on inclusion criteria see 
Chapter 5 and Appendices D and F 
Number of those articles that 
appeared on the front page 
4  
Number of those articles that 
were editorials 
2  
Number of the 77 Irish relief 
and development NGOs that 
I searched for that were 
specifically identified in that 
coverage 
23 See Appendix C for a list of the 77 NGOs I 
searched for and Annex 2 to Appendix B for a 
list of the 23 NGOs that feature in the articles 
analysed. 
Number of the 18 keyword 
search terms that appeared in 
that coverage 
12 See Annex 1 to Appendix B for a list of the 18 
keyword search terms searched for.    All of 
these except “accountably”, “unaccountably”, 
“illegitimacy”, “legitimation”, “legitimisation” 
and “legitimises” appeared in the articles 
analysed. 
 
6.2 Analysis and Findings 
6.2.1 Analysis and Findings Pertaining to Research Question 1 
6.2.1.1 Main Hypothesis 1.1: (a) The total quantity of articles containing 
references to the accountability of NGOs will be greater than the total quantity 
of articles containing references to the legitimacy of NGOs; and (b) the quantity 
of articles containing references to the accountability of NGOs will be greater 
than the quantity of articles containing references to the legitimacy of NGOs in 
each time period being analysed in the study. 
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 Between 1994 and 2009 there were significantly more articles containing 
references to NGO accountability (n=55) than NGO legitimacy (n=19 ) [p<0.001]. In 
each separate time period (P1, P2 and P3) there were more articles that contained 
references to NGO accountability than NGO legitimacy, but the difference only 
reached statistical significance for P1.  
 The lengths of the articles containing references to NGO 
accountability were not statistically different to the lengths of the articles containing 
references to NGO legitimacy either for the time period 1994-2009 (p = 0.37, 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) or the time period 1994-1999 (p = 0 .44, Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test).  
 
 
55 
25 
14 16 
19 
2 
6 
11 
1994 - 2009 (P1 - P3) 1994 - 1999 (P1) 2000 - 2004 (P2) 2005- 2009 (P3) 
Figure 6.1 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) to NGO accountability or NGO 
legitimacy 
Articles with reference(s) to NGO accountability 
Articles with reference(s) to NGO legitimacy 
 * = binomial tests 
 Reference(s) to NGO accountability = one or more references by one or more NGOs AND/OR one or more 
references by one or more others to NGO accountability 
Reference(s) to NGO legitimacy = one or more references by one or more NGOs AND/OR one or more 
references by one or more others to NGO legitimacy 
Note that the figures above exclude one 2007 article that contained references to both NGO accountability 
and NGO legitimacy. 
p < 0.001* 
p < 0.001* 
p = 0.12* 
p = 0.44* 
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6.2.1.2 Supplementary Hypothesis 1.1.1:  (a) The total quantity of articles 
containing references by NGOs to their own accountability or that of other 
NGOs will be greater than the total quantity of articles containing references by 
NGOs to their own legitimacy or that of other NGOs; and (b) the quantity of 
articles containing references by NGOs to their accountability or that of other 
NGOs will be greater than the quantity of articles containing references by 
NGOs to their own legitimacy or that of other NGOs for each time period being 
analysed in the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Between 1994 and 2009 there were significantly more articles containing 
references by NGOs to NGO accountability (n=12) than references by NGOs to 
 
 
Reference(s) by NGO(s) = one or more references by one or more NGOs. 
 
Note that there were no articles that contained references by NGO(s) to both NGO accountability and 
NGO legitimacy and hence no articles were excluded from this analysis.  However, three of the 
articles included here that contained reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO accountability also contained 
references by others to NGO legitimacy.  Two of these were published in 1997 and one in 1999. 
12 
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1994 - 2009 (P1 - P3) 1994 - 1999 (P1) 2000 - 2004 (P2) 2005- 2009 (P3) 
Figure 6.2 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO accountability or 
NGO legitimacy 
Articles with reference(s) by NGOs to NGO accountability  
Articles with reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO legitimacy 
 * = binomial tests 
p = 0.02* 
p = 0.04* 
p = 1* 
p = 0.37* 
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NGO legitimacy (n=2) [p<0.001]. In each separate time period (P1, P2 and P3) there 
were more articles that contained references by NGOs to NGO accountability than 
articles that contained references by NGOs to NGO legitimacy, but the difference 
only reached statistical significance for P1.  
 The lengths of the articles containing references by NGOs to NGO 
accountability were not significantly different to the lengths of the articles containing 
references by NGOs to NGO legitimacy for the period 1994-2009 (p = 0.48, 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test). It was not possible to compare article lengths for P1 
as there were no articles containing references by NGOs to NGO legitimacy. 
 
Example of reported NGO reference to NGO accountability 
 In a 1997 article (O'Shea, p. 15), the CEO of GOAL argued that Irish Aid 
should channel a greater proportion of its funding through Irish NGOs and 
missionaries and asked “why are accountable Irish missionaries and aid agencies not 
significant recipients of Irish taxpayer’s money?” 
 
Example of reported NGO reference to NGO legitimacy 
 In a 2000 article (Howell, p. 14), the chairman of Dóchas responded to a 
previously published critique of aid agencies and noted that Dóchas “has been 
campaigning for improved statutory regulation of the charity sector in Ireland, in the 
interests of the public and of legitimate charities”. 
 
6.2.1.3 Supplementary Hypothesis 1.1.2: (a) The total quantity of articles 
containing references by others to the accountability of NGOs will be greater 
than the total quantity of articles containing references by others to the 
legitimacy of NGOs; and (b) the quantity of articles containing references by 
others to the accountability of NGOs will be greater than the quantity of articles 
containing references by others to the legitimacy of NGOs for each time period 
being analysed in the study.  
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 Between 1994 and 2009 there were significantly more articles containing 
references by others to NGO accountability (n=46) than articles containing 
references by others to NGO legitimacy (n=17) [p <0.001]. In each separate time 
period (P1, P2 and P3), there were more articles that contained references by others 
to NGO accountability than NGO legitimacy, but the difference only reached 
statistical significance for P1.  
 The lengths of the articles containing references by others to NGO 
accountability were not significally different to the lengths of the articles containing 
references by others to NGO legitimacy for the period 1994-2009 (p = 0.32, 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) or for the period 1994-1999 (p = 0.16, Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference(s) by others = one or more references by one or more others. 
Note that the above figures exclude one 2007 article that contained references by others to both NGO 
accountability and NGO legitimacy.  In addition, three of the articles referred to above that contained 
references by others to NGO accountability also contained references by NGOs to NGO 
accountability.  Two of these were published in 1997 and one was published in 1999. 
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Figure 6.3 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by others to NGO accountability or 
NGO legitimacy 
Articles with reference(s) by others to NGO accountability  
Articles with reference(s) by others to NGO legitimacy 
 * = binomial tests 
p  = 0.83* 
p < 0.001* 
p < 0.001* 
p  = 0.15* 
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Example of reported reference by others to NGO accountability 
 In a 1999 article (O'Morain, p. 2), the Irish Times Social Affairs 
Correspondent wrote in relation to Ireland that “the country has a large, well-off, 
powerful and unaccountable charity sector”. 
Example of reported reference by others to NGO legitimacy 
 In a 2004 article (Anon., p. 15), the reporter stated that it was time “for the 
government to vigorously implement its commitment to join the charity sector in a 
thorough scrutiny of how groups collect and distribute money and of their 
legitimacy.” 
 
6.2.1.4 Main Hypothesis 1.2: The quantities of articles in which (a) NGOs refer 
to their own accountability or that of other NGOs, (b) NGOs refer to their own 
legitimacy or that of other NGOs, (c) others refer to the accountability of 
NGOs, and (d) others refer to the legitimacy of NGOs will have increased over 
the period of the study. 
  
I attempted to analyse of each of the above hypotheses using chi-square tests 
taking into account the quantity of relevant articles as defined by the question and 
the total quantity of Irish Times articles for each time period (i.e. 364,049 articles 
were published from 1994-1999, 297,816 articles were published from 2000-2004 
and 267,247 articles were published from 2005-2009).  As outlined in figures 6.4-6.7 
below analysis was not possible in relation to (a), (b) or (d) as key assumptions of 
chi-square were not met.  Analysis was possible in the case of (c) and no statistically 
significant deviation in the extent to which others referred to the accountability of 
NGOs was found.  The graphs that follow do not depict the overall quantity of Irish 
Times articles published for each time period as these numbers are so large relative 
to the number of articles analysed as to make visual comparisons difficult.  However 
the chi square tests conducted took the number of articles published per time period 
into account. 
In sum, therefore, the total quantity of articles reporting references by others 
to NGOs accountability did not increase to a statistically significant degree between 
1994 and 2009 and it was not possible to analyse the other hypotheses.  
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Articles containing reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO accountability = articles containing one or more 
references by one or more NGOs to NGO accountability whether or not the same articles also 
contained one or more references by one or more other actors to NGO accountability or one or more 
references by one or more NGOs to NGO legitimacy. 
Using a chi square test it was not possible to analyse whether the changes over time were statistically 
significant as the assumption of chi square that not more than 20% of expected frequencies are less 
than 5 was not met.  
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Figure 6.4 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO accountability 
Articles containing reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO legitimacy = articles containing one or more 
references by one or more NGOs to NGO legitimacy whether or not the same articles also contain one 
or more references by one or more other actors to NGO legitimacy or one or more references by one or 
more other NGOs to NGO accountability. 
Using chi square tests it was not possible to analyse whether the changes over time were statistically 
significant as the assumption of chi square that no frequencies be less than 1 was not met. 
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Figure 6.5 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO legitimacy 
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Articles containing reference(s) by others to NGO accountability = articles containing one or more 
references by one or more others to NGO accountability whether or not the same articles also contain 
one or more references by one or more NGOs to NGO accountability or one or more references by one 
or more others to NGO legitimacy. 
Using a chi square test no statistically significant deviation over time was found (p = 0.51). 
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Figure 6.6 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by others to NGO accountability 
Articles containing reference(s) by others to NGO legitimacy = articles containing one or more 
references by one or more others to NGO legitimacy whether or not the same articles also contain one 
or more references by one or more NGOs to NGO legitimacy or one or more references by one or 
more others to NGO accountability. 
Using a chi square test it was not possible to analyse whether the changes over time were statistically 
significant as the assumption of chi square that not more than 20% of expected frequencies are less 
than 5 was not met.  
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Figure 6.7 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by others to NGO legitimacy 
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6.2.2 Analysis and Findings Pertaining to Research Question 2 
6.2.2.1 Main Hypothesis 2.1: (a) The total quantity of articles containing 
references to NGO accountability that imply a principal-agent approach will be 
greater than the total quantity of articles containing references to NGO 
accountability that imply a stakeholder approach; and (b) the quantity of 
articles containing references to NGO accountability that imply a principal-
agent approach will be greater than the quantity of articles containing 
references to NGO accountability that imply a stakeholder approach in each 
time period being analysed in the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
* = binomial tests 
 
 
Reference(s) to NGO accountability that imply principal-agent approaches = one or more references 
by one or more NGOs AND/OR one or more references by one or more others to NGO accountability 
that imply principal-agent approaches 
Reference(s) to NGO accountability that imply stakeholder approaches = one or more references by 
one or more NGOs AND/OR one or more references by one or more others to NGO accountability that 
imply stakeholder approaches 
Note that there were no articles containing references to NGO accountability that implied both 
principal-agent and stakeholder approaches and hence no articles were excluded from this analysis.   
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Figure 6.8 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) to NGO accountability that imply 
principal-agent or stakeholder approaches 
Articles with reference(s) to NGO accountability implying principal-agent approaches 
Articles with reference(s) to NGO accountability implying stakeholder approaches 
 * = binomial tests 
p <0.001* 
p <0.006* 
p = 0.02* 
p = 0.003* 
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 Between 1994 and 2009 there were significantly more articles containing 
references to NGO accountability that implied principal-agent approaches (n=32) 
than articles containing references to NGO accountability that implied stakeholder 
approaches (n=2) [p <0.001]. In each separate time period (P1, P2 and P3) there 
were also significantly more articles that contained references to NGO accountability 
that implied principal-agent approaches than articles that contained references to 
NGO accountability that implied stakeholder approaches.  
 The lengths of the articles containing references by others to NGO 
accountability were not significantly different to the lengths of the articles containing 
references by others to NGO legitimacy for the period 1994-2009 (p = 0.37, 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) or for the period 1994-1999 (p = 0.35, Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test).  It was not possible to compare article lengths for P2 and P3 as 
there were no articles containing references to NGO accountability that implied 
stakeholder approaches in either case. 
 
6.2.2.2 Supplementary Hypothesis 2.1.1: (a) The total quantity of articles 
containing references by NGOs to NGO accountability that imply principal-
agent approaches will be greater than the total quantity of articles containing 
references by NGOs to NGO accountability that imply stakeholder approaches 
and (b) the quantity of articles containing references by NGOs to NGO 
accountability that imply principal-agent approaches will be greater than the 
quantity of articles containing references by NGOs to NGO accountability that 
imply stakeholder approaches in each time period being analysed in the study.  
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 Between 1994 and 2009 and in each separate time period (P1, P2 and P3) 
there were more articles containing references by NGOs to NGO accountability that 
implied principal-agent approaches than articles containing references by NGOs to 
NGO accountability that implied stakeholder approaches.  However, these results 
were not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference(s) by NGOs = one or more references by one or more NGOs 
Note that there were no articles that contained references by NGO(s) to NGO accountability that 
implied both principal-agent and stakeholder approaches and hence no articles were excluded from this 
analysis.  However, two of the articles included in this analysis that contain reference(s) by NGO(s) to 
NGO accountability that imply principal-agent approaches also contained reference(s) by others to 
NGO accountability that imply principal-agent approaches.  These were both published in 1997. 
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Figure 6.9 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO accountability that 
imply principal-agent or stakeholder approaches 
Articles with reference(s) by NGOs to NGO accountability implying principal-agent approaches  
Articles with reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO accountability implying stakeholder approaches 
 * = binomial tests 
p = 0.13* 
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Example of reported NGO reference to NGO accountability that implies a principal-
agent approach 
 In a 2004 article concerned with overseas volunteering (O'Mahony, p. 13), a 
representative from GOAL was reported as stating that “‘quality’ accountants are 
needed in every field, where the concept of chartered accountancy may not exist.  
Accountability is essential in an organisation that depends on the goodwill of 
donors”. 
Example of reported NGO reference to NGO accountability that implies a 
stakeholder approach 
 In a 1998 letter to the editor written in reply to earlier criticism (Kilcullen, p. 
19), Trocáire’s Director referred to “Trocáire’s public accountability” and went on to 
note that Trocáire sent an annual leaflet to over one million homes in Ireland as well 
as making available 3,000 copies of its extended annual report. 
 
6.2.2.3 Supplementary Hypothesis 2.1.2: (a) The total quantity of articles 
containing references by others to NGO accountability that imply principal-
agent approaches will be greater than the total quantity of articles containing 
references by others to NGO accountability that imply stakeholder approaches; 
and (b) the quantity of articles containing references by others to NGO 
accountability that imply principal-agent approaches will be greater than the 
quantity of articles containing references by others to NGO accountability that 
imply stakeholder approaches for each time period being analysed in the study. 
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 Between 1994 and 2009 there were significantly more articles containing 
references by others to NGO accountability that implied principal-agent approaches 
(n=28) than articles containing references by others to NGO accountability that 
implied stakeholder approaches (n=1) [p <0.001]. In each separate time period (P1, 
P2 and P3) there were also significantly more articles that contained references by 
others to NGO accountability that implied principal-agent approaches than 
references by others to NGO accountability that implied stakeholder approaches.  
 The lengths of the articles containing references by others to NGO 
accountability that implied principal-agent approaches were not significantly 
different to the lengths of the articles containing references by others to NGO 
accountability that implied stakeholder approaches for the period 1994-2009 (p =  
 
 
Reference(s) by others = one or more references by one or more others. 
Note that there were no articles that contained references by others to NGO accountability that implied 
both principal-agent and stakeholder approaches and hence no articles were excluded from this 
analysis.  However, two of the articles included in this analysis that contain reference(s) by others to 
NGO accountability that imply principal-agent approaches also contained reference(s) by NGOs to 
NGO accountability that imply principal-agent approaches.  These were both published in 1997. 
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Figure 6.10 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by others to NGO accountability that 
imply principal-agent or stakeholder approaches 
Articles with reference(s) by others to NGO accountability implying principal-agent approaches 
Articles with reference(s) by others to NGO accountability implying stakeholder approaches 
 * = binomial tests 
p <0.001* 
p <0.003* 
p = 0.04* 
p = 0.008* 
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0.43, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) or for the period 1994-1999 (p = 0.40, 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test).  It was not possible to compare article lengths for P2 
and P3 as there were no articles containing references by others to NGO 
accountability that implied stakeholder approaches in either case. 
 
 
Example of reported reference by others to NGO accountability that implies a 
principal-agent approach 
 In a 2008 article that considered a new code of corporate governance for 
NGOs (Downes, p. 3),  Peter Power, the then Minister for State for Overseas 
Development, was reported as saying that “it was important that the public who 
contribute and the taxpayers who contribute ... have confidence that the money  is 
being dispensed in an accountable way, and in a way that has proper systems of 
audit, proper systems of oversight and accountability”. 
Example of reported reference by others to NGO accountability that implies a 
stakeholder approach 
A 1996 article (Siggins, p. 2) reported that a charter published by the Irish El 
Salvador Support Committee stated that “all aspects of aid intervention should be 
reviewed, and should be publicly accountable in terms of impact on local community 
development, political structures, environmental factors, improvement in living 
conditions and global development”. 
 
6.2.2.4 Main Hypothesis 2.2:  The quantities of articles in which (a) references 
by NGOs to NGO accountability imply a stakeholder approach, (b) references 
by NGOs to NGO accountability imply a principal-agent approach, (c) 
references by others to NGO accountability imply a stakeholder approach, and 
(d) references by others to NGO accountability imply a principal-agent 
approach will have increased over the period of the study. 
 
 I attempted to analyse of each of the above hypotheses using chi-square tests 
taking into account the quantity of relevant articles as defined by the question and 
the total quantity of Irish Times articles for each time period (i.e. 364,049 articles 
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were published from 1994-1999, 297,816 articles were published from 2000-2004 
and 267,247 articles were published from 2005-2009).  As outlined in figures 6.11-
6.15 below, analysis was not possible in relation to (a), (b) or (d) as key assumptions 
of chi-square were not met, but analysis was possible in relation to (c).  In the case of 
(c) no statistically significant change in the extent to which others implied a 
principal-agent approach to NGO accountability was found. The graphs that follow 
do not depict the overall quantity of Irish Times articles published for each time 
period as these numbers are so large relative to the number of articles analysed as to 
make visual comparisons difficult.  However the chi square test conducted took the 
number of articles published per time period into account. 
In sum, therefore, there was no statistically significant change in the quantity 
of articles in which reported references by others to NGO accountability implied a 
principal-agent approach across the period of the study and no analysis was possible 
in relation to the other hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Articles containing reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO accountability that imply principal-agent 
approaches = articles containing one or more references by one or more NGOs to NGO accountability 
that imply principal-agent approaches whether or not the same articles also contain one or more 
references by one or more NGOs to NGO accountability that imply stakeholder approaches or one or 
more references by one or more others to NGO accountability that imply principal-agent approaches. 
Using a chi square test it was not possible to analyse whether the changes over time were statistically 
significant as the assumption of chi square that not more than 20% of expected frequencies are less 
than 5 was not met. 
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Figure 6.11 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO accountability 
that imply principal-agent approaches 
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Articles containing reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO accountability that imply stakeholder approaches 
= articles containing one or more references by one or more NGOs to NGO accountability that imply 
stakeholder approaches whether or not the same articles also contain one or more references by one or 
more NGOs to NGO accountability that imply principal-agent approaches or one or more references 
by one or more others to NGO accountability that imply stakeholder approaches. 
Using chi square tests it was not possible to analyse whether the changes over time were statistically 
significant as the assumption of chi square that no frequencies are less than 1 was not met. 
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Figure 6.12 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by NGO(s) to NGO accountability 
that imply stakeholder approaches 
Articles containing reference(s) by others to NGO accountability that imply principal-agent approaches 
= articles containing one or more references by one or more others to NGO accountability that imply 
principal-agent approaches whether or not the same articles also contain one or more references by one 
or more others to NGO accountability that imply stakeholder approaches or one or more references by 
one or more NGOs to NGO accountability that imply principal-agent approaches. 
Using a chi square test no statistically significant deviation over time was found (p = 0.48). 
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Figure 6.13 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by others to NGO accountability that 
imply principal-agent approaches 
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6.2.3 Analysis and Findings Pertaining to Research Question 3 
6.2.3.1 Main Hypothesis 3.1: (a) The total quantity of articles in which low NGO 
administration costs are presented as desirable without any discussion as to the 
validity of the use of NGO administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality 
will be greater than the total quantity of articles in which the validity of low 
administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality is questioned or disputed; 
and (b) the quantity of articles in which low NGO administration costs are 
presented as desirable  without any discussion as to the validity of the use of 
NGO administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality will be greater than 
the quantity of articles in which the validity of low administration costs as an 
indicator of NGO quality is questioned or disputed in each time period being 
analysed in the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Articles containing reference(s) by others to NGO accountability that imply stakeholder approaches = 
articles containing one or more references by one or more others to NGO accountability that imply 
stakeholder approaches whether or not the same articles also contain one or more references by one or 
more NGOs to NGO accountability that imply stakeholder approaches or one or more references by 
one or more others to NGO accountability that imply principal-agent approaches. 
Using chi square tests it was not possible to analyse whether the changes over time were statistically 
significant as the assumption of chi square that no frequencies are less than 1 was not met. 
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Figure 6.14 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) by others to NGO accountability that 
imply stakeholder approaches 
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 Between 1994 and 2009 there were significantly more articles containing 
references to NGO administration costs that implied that low NGO administration 
costs were desirable (n=11) than articles in which the validity of NGO 
administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality was questioned or disputed 
(n=1) [p = 0.009]. In each separate time period (P1, P2 and P3) there were also more 
articles containing references to NGO administration costs that implied that low 
NGO administration costs were desirable than articles in which the validity of NGO 
administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality was questioned, but these 
differences were not statistically significant. 
 A comparison of the word counts of the 11 articles in which low 
administration costs were presented as desirable with the word count of the single 
 
 
Note that there were no articles in which low NGO administration costs were both presented as 
desirable and questioned as a measure of NGO quality and hence no articles were excluded from this 
analysis.  However, the 12 articles accounted for here is less than the 15 articles in total in which NGO 
administration costs were mentioned as in the other 3 articles the approach was either not discernible 
or multiple approaches were implied. 
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Figure 6.15 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) in 
which low NGO administration costs are presented as desirable 
or the validity of which as an indicator of NGO quality is 
questioned 
Articles in which low NGO administration costs are presented as desirable 
Articles in which the validity of administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality is questioned 
 * = binomial tests 
p = 0.009* 
p = 0.13* 
p = 1* 
p = 0.22* 
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article in which the validity of administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality 
was questioned revealed that the latter was significantly longer than the former (p = 
0.04, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test).  However, the fact that there was such a 
significant difference in quantities of articles in these two categories (p = 0.009, 
binomial test) compared to a barely significant difference in their word counts (p = 
0.04, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) would suggest that the increased prominence of 
the single article questioning the validity of NGO administration costs could not 
have compensated for the effect of the much larger quantity of shorter articles in 
which low NGO administration costs were presented as desirable.   
 
Example of article in which low NGO administration costs were presented as 
desirable 
A 1999 article concerned with charitable giving (Ward, p. 61) acknowledged that 
administration costs may vary depending on the purpose of different charities but 
nonetheless suggested that “most charities should keep costs below 12 per cent of a 
donation”. 
 
Example of article in which the validity of low NGO administration costs as an 
indicator of NGO quality was questioned 
 In a 2005 article concerning how Ireland’s aid is spent  (Cullen, p. 11), Hans 
Zomer, the director of Dóchas, was reported as saying that “the issue of 
administration costs is a ‘red herring’.  If you had Eur 1 million to give, would you 
hand it to the person who would do the best work with it, or to someone claiming to 
have the lowest administration costs.  If you pay peanuts, you get monkeys.  Why do 
people assume that NGOs will work for free and still do a good job?” 
 
 While the relatively small quantity of articles in which NGO administration 
costs were referred to does not allow for detailed statistical analysis, some additional 
description of the data is warranted.  Firstly, it is clear that references implying that 
low administration costs serve as an indicator of NGO quality were attributed to 
NGOs throughout the study period.  Of the 15 articles in total in which NGO 
administration costs were referred to, in 11 cases NGOs themselves were reported as 
referring to administration costs and in ten of these NGOs reportedly implied that 
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low administration costs were desirable.  While one NGO (GOAL) accounted for 
five of the ten instances, representatives from Concern and Trócaire also reportedly 
implied that low NGO administration costs were desirable without discussing any 
possible problems with the measure.  The fact that the three largest Irish NGOs were 
reported to have promoted, or at least tolerated, the use of the measure is noteworthy. 
 A second point discernible from the data is that reported NGO references to 
administration costs that imply that low administration are desirable have not been 
challenged in Irish Times coverage.  References by others to NGO administration 
costs were reported in seven articles (in three of these there were also reported 
references by NGOs) none of which included a questioning of the measure.  In the 
only article identified in which the use of the measure was challenged, this challenge 
was attributed to Dóchas, itself an NGO and a representative for many of the NGOs 
in the sector.  In two articles the public also reportedly presented low NGO 
administration costs as desirable without any discussion regarding potential 
problems with the measure. 
6.2.4 Analysis and Findings Pertaining to Research Question 4 
6.2.4.1 Main Hypothesis 4.1: The quantities of articles containing references to 
(a) NGOs questioning or disputing the accountability of others, (b) NGOs 
questioning or disputing the legitimacy of others, (c) others questioning or 
disputing the accountability of NGOs, and (d) others questioning or disputing 
the legitimacy of NGOs will have increased over the period of the study. 
  
I attempted to analyse of each of the above hypotheses using chi-square tests 
taking into account the quantity of relevant articles as defined by the question and 
the total quantity of Irish Times articles for each time period (i.e. 364,049 articles 
were published from 1994-1999, 297,816 articles were published from 2000-2004 
and 267,247 articles were published from 2005-2009).  As outlined in figures 6.16-
6.19 analysis was not possible in relation to (d) and (b) as key assumptions of chi-
square were not met.  In the case of  (c) analysis was possible and no statistically 
significant deviation was found either in the extent to which NGOs were reported to 
have questioned the legitimacy of others or others were reported to have questioned 
the accountability of NGOs.  In the case of (a) there was a significant increase over 
time in the number of articles in which NGOs were reported to have questioned or 
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disputed the accountability of others.  For these articles there was no significant 
difference in terms of individual article lengths across the three time periods (p = 
0.59, Kruskal-Wallis test). The graphs that follow do not depict the overall quantity 
of Irish Times articles published for each time period as these numbers are so large 
relative to the number of articles analysed as to make visual comparisons difficult.  
However the chi square tests conducted took the number of articles published per 
time period into account. 
  
 
 
Articles containing reference(s) to NGO(s) questioning or disputing the accountability of others = 
articles containing one or more references to one or more NGOs questioning or disputing the 
accountability of one or more others whether or not the same articles also contain one or more 
references to one or more NGOs questioning or disputing the legitimacy of one or more others or one 
or more references to one or more others questioning or disputing the accountability of one or more 
NGOs. 
A chi square test found a statistically significant deviation (increase) over time (p = 0.02). 
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Figure 6.16 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) to NGO(s) questioning or disputing 
the accountability of others 
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Articles containing reference(s) to NGO(s) questioning or disputing the legitimacy of others = articles 
containing one or more references to one or more NGOs questioning or disputing the legitimacy of 
others whether or not the same articles also contain one or more references to NGO(s) questioning or 
disputing the accountability of others or one or more references to others questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of NGOs. 
Using chi square tests it was not possible to analyse whether the changes over time were statistically 
significant as the assumption of chi square that not more than 20% of expected frequencies are less 
than 5 was not met.. 
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Figure 6.17 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) to NGO(s) questioning or disputing 
the legitimacy of others 
Articles containing reference(s) to others questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs = 
articles containing one or more references to one or more others questioning or disputing the 
accountability of one or more NGOs whether or not the same articles also contain one or more 
references to one or more others questioning or disputing the legitimacy of one or more NGOs or one 
or more references to one or more NGOs questioning or disputing the accountability of one or more 
others. 
A chi square test found no statistically significant deviation over time (p = 0.44). 
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Figure 6.18 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) to others questioning or disputing the 
accountability of NGOs 
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6.2.4.2 Main Hypothesis 4.2: (a) The frequency with which specific named 
NGOs have questioned or disputed the accountability of others will have co-
varied with the frequency with which others have questioned or disputed those 
NGOs’ own accountability; and (b) the frequency with which specific named 
NGOs have questioned or disputed the legitimacy of others will have co-varied 
with the frequency with which others have questioned or disputed those NGOs’ 
own legitimacy. 
 
Tables 6.2 to 6.5 give details of the quantities of articles in which NGOs 
reportedly questioned or disputed the accountability or legitimacy of others and the 
quantities of articles in which NGOs reportedly had their own accountability or 
legitimacy questioned or disputed by others.  Although the quantities of relevant 
articles are too small to allow for statistical analysis there appears to be no link 
between the extent of coverage in which NGOs reportedly questioned or disputed the 
accountability or legitimacy of others and the extent of coverage in which the 
accountability or legitimacy of those same NGOs was reportedly questioned or 
disputed by others.  It is noteworthy, for example, that two of the three NGOs that 
were reported most frequently to have questioned or disputed the accountability of 
Articles containing reference(s) to others questioning or disputing the legitimacy of NGOs = articles 
containing one or more references to one or more others questioning or disputing the legitimacy of one 
or more NGOs whether or not the same articles also contain one or more references to one or more 
others questioning or disputing the accountability of one or more NGOs or one or more references to 
one or more NGOs questioning or disputing the legitimacy of one or more others. 
Using chi square tests it was not possible to analyse whether the changes over time were statistically 
significant as the assumption of chi square that no frequencies are less than 1 was not met. 
 
 
 
0 
4 
6 
1994 - 1999 (P1) 2000 - 2004 (P2) 2005 - 2009 (P3) 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
s 
Figure 6.19 Number of Irish Times articles (1994 - 2009) 
containing reference(s) to others questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of NGOs 
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other actors (Amnesty and the Debt and Development Coalition) did not have their 
own accountability questioned or disputed in a single article during the study period.  
Similarly, while the same two NGOs were reported to have questioned the 
legitimacy of other actors to a greater extent than any other NGOs, not a single 
article reported another actor questioning or disputing their legitimacy. 
 
Table 6.2  Number of Irish Times articles containing reference(s) to specific 
named NGO(s) questioning or disputing the accountability of others 
Name of NGO Quantity of 
articles from 
1994-1999 
Quantity of 
articles from 
2000-2004 
Quantity of 
articles from 
2005-2009 
Quantity of 
articles from 
1994-2009
*
 
Amnesty 4 12 14 30 
GOAL 4 2 8 14 
Debt and Development 
Coalition 
5 1 5 11 
Trócaire 3 3 1 7 
Christian Aid 4 0 2 6 
Concern 2 1 1 4 
Dochas 0 0 4 4 
Oxfam 1 1 2 4 
AFRI 1 1 0 2 
Sierra Leone Ireland 
Partnership 
0 1 0 1 
Volunteer Missionary 
Movement 
0 1 0 1 
*a
 While these figures are correct for each NGO, due to some overlapping articles, 
the total quantity of articles for all NGOs combined is 78 rather than the 84 
accounted for here.  
 
 
Table 6.3  Number of Irish Times articles containing reference(s) to others 
questioning or disputing the accountability of specific named NGO(s) 
Name of NGO Quantity of 
articles from 
1994-1999 
Quantity of 
articles from 
2000-2004 
Quantity of 
articles from 
2005-2009 
Quantity of 
articles from 
1994-2009*
 
GOAL 5 2 0 7 
Concern 0 2 0 2 
Gorta 1 1 0 2 
Trócaire 0 2 0 2 
*
 While these figures are correct for each NGO, due to some overlapping articles the 
total quantity of articles for all NGOs combined is ten rather than the 13 accounted 
for here. 
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Table 6.4  Number of Irish Times articles containing reference(s) to specific 
named NGO(s) questioning or disputing the legitimacy of others 
Name of NGO Quantity of 
articles from 
1994 – 1999 
Quantity of 
articles from 
2000 – 2004 
Quantity of 
articles from 
2005 – 2009 
Quantity of 
articles from 
1994 - 2009 
Amnesty 2 3 2 7 
Debt and Development 
Coalition 
0 1 4 5 
GOAL 0 1 1 2 
Sierra Leone Ireland 
Partnership 
0 0 2 2 
Trócaire 0 2 0 2 
Christian Aid 1 0 0 1 
Oxfam 0 1 0 1 
 
 
Table 6.5  Number of Irish Times articles containing reference(s) to others 
questioning or disputing the legitimacy of specific named NGO(s) 
Name of NGO Quantity of 
articles from 
1994 – 1999 
Quantity of 
articles from 
2000 – 2004 
Quantity of 
articles from 
2005 – 2009 
Total quantity 
of articles 
from 1994-
2009 
Concern 0 2 0 2 
 
6.2.4.3 Main Hypothesis 4.3:  (a) The total quantity of articles in which others 
question or dispute the accountability of NGOs in general will be greater than 
the total quantity of articles in which others question or dispute the 
accountability of specific named NGOs; (b) the quantity of articles in which 
others question or dispute the accountability of NGOs in general will be greater 
than the quantity of articles in which others question or dispute the 
accountability of specific named NGOs in each time period in the study; (c) the 
total quantity of articles in which others question or dispute the legitimacy of 
NGOs in general will be greater than the total quantity of articles in which 
others question or dispute the legitimacy of specific named NGOs; and (d) the 
quantity of articles in which others question or dispute the legitimacy of NGOs 
in general will be greater than the quantity of articles in which others question 
the legitimacy of specific named NGOs in each time period in the study. 
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Between 1994 and 2009 there were significantly more articles containing 
references to others questioning the accountability of NGOs in general (n = 32) than 
articles containing references to others questioned the accountability of specific 
named NGOs (n = 9) [ p< 0.001).  In each separate time period (P1, P2 and P3) there 
were more articles that contained references to others questioning the accountability 
of NGOs in general than specific named NGOs, but the difference only reached 
statistical significance for P1.   
 
 
Reference(s) to others questioning the accountability of NGOs in general = one or more references by 
one or more others questioning the accountability of NGOs in general as indicated by the use of one or 
more of the generic subject search terms that appear in Annex 3 to Appendix B. 
Reference(s) to others questioning the accountability of specific named NGOs = one or more 
references by one or more others questioning the accountability of one or more specific named NGOs 
as identified in Annex 2 to Appendix B. 
Note that these figures exclude one 2000 article in which others reportedly questioned both the 
accountability of NGOs in general and that of specific named NGOs.   
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For the period 1994-2009 neither of the groups of articles referred to above 
were significantly different from each other in terms of individual article lengths (p = 
.42, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test).  It was not possible to compare article lengths 
for the period 1994-1999 as there were no articles in which others questioned the 
accountability of specific named NGOs. 
 In sum, therefore, there was a statistically significant greater number of 
articles in which the accountability of NGOs in general was reportedly questioned or 
disputed by others than articles in which the accountability of specific named NGOs 
was reportedly questioned or disputed for the periods 1994-2009 and 2005-2009.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference(s) to others questioning the legitimacy of NGOs in general = one or more references by one 
or more others questioning the legitimacy of NGOs in general as indicated by the use of one or more 
of the generic subject search terms that appear in Annex 3 to Appendix B. 
Reference(s) to others questioning the legitimacy of specific named NGOs = one or more references 
by one or more others questioning the legitimacy of one or more specific named NGOs as identified in 
Annex 2 to Appendix B. 
Note that there were no articles in which others reportedly questioned the legitimacy of both NGOs in 
general and specific named NGOs and hence no articles were excluded from this analysis. 
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Between 1994 and 2009 although there were more articles containing 
references to others questioning the legitimacy of NGOs in general (n = 8) than 
articles containing references to others questioning the legitimacy of specific named 
NGOs (n = 2), this difference was not statistically significant.  Between 2005 and 
2009 there was a significantly larger quantity of articles containing references to 
others questioning the legitimacy of NGOs in general (n = 6) than articles containing 
references to others questioning the legitimacy of specific named NGOs (n = 0)[p = 
.04].   It was not possible to compare article lengths for these categories of articles as 
there were no articles containing references to others questioning the legitimacy of 
specific named NGOs.   
No statistically significant difference was found for P2 and analysis was not 
possible in relation to P1 as there were no articles containing references to others 
questioning either the legitimacy of NGOs in general or that of specific named 
NGOs.   
In sum, therefore, there was a statistically significant greater number of 
articles in which the legitimacy of NGOs in general was reportedly questioned or 
disputed than articles in which the legitimacy of specific named NGOs was 
reportedly questioned or disputed for the period 2005-2009. 
 
6.3 Summary of Findings  
6.3.1 Research question 1: Is the quantity of coverage of NGO 
accountability greater than the quantity of coverage of NGO legitimacy? 
The findings indicate that, as hypothesized, there were significantly more 
articles that referred to NGO accountability than articles that referred to NGO 
legitimacy during the period of the study.  This trend applied both to articles in 
which NGOs reportedly referred to NGO accountability or legitimacy and articles in 
which others reportedly referred to NGO accountability or legitimacy.  Although the 
small quantity of articles involved made it impossible to analyse whether the 
quantity of articles reporting references by NGOs to NGO legitimacy and 
accountability or by others to NGO legitimacy had changed significantly over the 
course of the study, it was clear that there was no significant change in the quantity 
of articles reporting references by others to NGO accountability.  
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6.3.2 Research question 2: Is the quantity of coverage of principal-agent 
approaches to NGO accountability greater than the quantity of coverage 
of stakeholder approaches to NGO accountability? 
The findings indicate that, as hypothesized, there were significantly more 
articles in which references to NGO accountability implied a principal-agent 
approach than articles in which references to NGO accountability implied a 
stakeholder approach.  This trend was observed across the study period as a whole 
and in each of the three individual time periods considered in the study.  Although 
the quantity of articles in which reported NGO references to NGO accountability 
implied principal-agent approaches was not significantly larger than the quantity of 
articles in which reported NGO references to NGO accountability implied 
stakeholder approaches, there were significantly more articles in which reported 
references by others to NGO accountability implied principal-agent approaches than 
articles in which reported references by others to NGO accountability implied 
stakeholder approaches.  This finding was observed across the study period as a 
whole and in each of the individual time periods considered in the study. 
 
6.3.3 Research question 3: Is the quantity of coverage in which low NGO 
administration costs are presented as desirable greater than the quantity 
of coverage in which the use of low NGO administration costs as an 
indicator of NGO accountability is questioned or disputed? 
The findings indicate that, as hypothesized, there were significantly more 
articles in which low NGO administration costs were presented as desirable than 
articles in which the use of administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality were 
questioned or disputed across the study period as a whole.   There were, however, no 
significant differences between these categories of articles in any of the individual 
time periods.  The relatively small quantity of articles in which NGO administration 
costs were referred to made additional statistical analysis in relation to NGO 
administration costs problematic.  However it is possible to say that not only did 
multiple large NGOs refer to low administration costs as an apparent indicator of 
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NGO quality during the period, but also that the use of this measure went largely 
unchallenged in Irish Times coverage. 
 
6.3.4 Research question 4: How critical is Irish newspaper coverage of 
relief and development NGOs? 
Measured in terms of the number of articles in which the accountability or 
legitimacy of NGOs was questioned or disputed the findings indicate that, overall, 
newspaper coverage of NGOs during the period of the study was largely uncritical.  
Across the 16-year period there were only 42 articles in which the accountability and 
only ten articles in which the legitimacy of either one or more of the 77 NGOs 
searched for in this study or NGOs in general was questioned or disputed.  While 
there was a significant increase in reporting of NGO questioning or disputing the 
accountability of others during the study period, there was no significant change in 
reporting of questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs by others.  
Although numbers were insufficient to statistically analyse whether the extent of 
reported questioning or disputing accountability or legitimacy of others by specific 
named NGOs co-varied with the levels of reported questioning or disputing 
accountability or legitimacy of those same NGOs, there would appear to be no link.  
Finally, across the study period as a whole and in the individual time period 2005 -
2009 there was a significantly larger quantity of articles in which the accountability 
of NGOs in general was questioned or disputed compared to the quantity of articles 
in which the accountability of specific named NGOs was questioned or disputed.  
This finding was not replicated in relation to legitimacy, however, as no significant 
difference was found across the study period as a whole or in the periods 1994-1999 
or 2000-2004 between the quantity of articles in which the legitimacy of NGOs in 
general was questioned or disputed and the quantity of articles in which the 
legitimacy of specific named NGOs was questioned or disputed. 
 
6.3.5 Other Findings 
Although unrelated to a specific research question or hypothesis two 
additional findings merit mention.  Firstly, after removing irrelevant articles the Irish 
Times coverage identified contained references to only 23 of the original 77 Irish 
167 
 
NGOs searched for.  Secondly, the vast majority of this coverage did not meet the 
indicators of prominence identified in this study (e.g. appearance on the front page, 
editorial or length).  In fact, only four of the articles appeared on the front page and 
only two were editorials and, as discussed in 6.2.3.1 in only one case was there a 
significant difference in the lengths of the sets of articles being compared.  The 
significance of these findings will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the empirical findings of this research, which was 
guided by a three-pronged argument that is outlined in Chapter 1 and described in 
detail in Chapters 2-4.  For the purposes of clarity and to facilitate the use by others 
of these findings in ways not associated with the background argument of this study, 
this chapter has described the results independently of the literature review and 
associated background argument.  In the chapter that follows, however, the findings 
described in this chapter will be brought together with the literature review in a 
discussion of the study’s overall conclusions. 
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7.1: Introduction 
This thesis comprises two distinct components: a literature review presenting 
a background argument that culminates in my claim that newspaper coverage linking 
Irish relief and development NGOs, legitimacy and accountability may indicate the 
extent to which these NGOs are promoting and members of the public are exhibiting 
development literacy and global solidarity; and empirical research that investigates 
the ways in which and extent to which Irish relief and development NGOs are linked 
with the concepts of legitimacy and accountability (and the related concept of 
administration costs) in Irish Times newspaper coverage between 1994 and 2009.  
The main empirical findings of this study are summarised at the outset of this chapter 
followed by a commentary on their significance with reference to the literature 
review contained in this study.  A discussion of the main methodological and 
empirical contributions of the study then follows.  Finally, the limitations of the 
study and recommended avenues for further research are explored. 
7.2: Empirical Contribution of Research/Summary of Main 
Findings 
As outlined in Chapter 6, a first finding of note in this study is that after the 
removal of irrelevant articles only 23 of the 77 Irish NGOs that I included in my 
initial search were mentioned in any context in relation to accountability, legitimacy 
or administration costs in Irish Times newspaper coverage between 1994 and 2009.  
Not only that, but even when these NGOs, or NGOs in general, were linked to these 
concepts this occurred almost exclusively in articles that did not meet the indicators 
of prominence identified in this study. 
Secondly, this study clearly reveals that NGO accountability received far 
more coverage in the Irish Times during the period 1994-2009 than NGO legitimacy.  
While there was very little coverage of NGOs referring to either NGO accountability 
or NGO legitimacy, there was significantly more of the former.  There was also 
significantly more coverage of the public referring to NGO accountability than NGO 
legitimacy.   
 Thirdly, not only does the study reveal that NGO accountability received far 
more coverage than NGO legitimacy, but it also shows that principal-agent 
approaches to NGO accountability received far more coverage than stakeholder 
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approaches to NGO accountability.  Strikingly, not a single reference to NGO 
accountability defined in stakeholder terms was found in any article after 1998.   
 Fourthly, this study showed that there were significantly more articles in 
which low NGO administration costs were presented as desirable than articles in 
which the validity of low administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality were 
questioned or disputed during the period of the study as a whole.  The number of 
articles in which NGO administration costs were mentioned at all, however, was 
notably small at just 15 across the 16 year period.  In only one of these articles was 
the validity of administration costs as an indicator of quality questioned.   
 Finally, measured in terms of questioning of NGO legitimacy and 
accountability, this study showed a very uncritical approach to NGOs across the 
period of the study.  While there was an increase over time in coverage of NGOs 
questioning the accountability of others, there was no significant change in the extent 
of questioning of NGO accountability by the public across the study period.   
Although the sample was too small to allow for statistical analysis the research found 
no evidence to suggest a link between the extent to which NGOs question either the 
accountability or legitimacy of others and the extent to which their own 
accountability or legitimacy is questioned.  Finally, even in those instances when the 
accountability of NGOs was questioned it was more common for the accountability 
of NGOs in general to be questioned than the accountability of specific NGOs that 
were named in the articles.   
7.3 Discussion of Findings 
7.3.1 Introduction 
In this section I seek to explicitly bring together my literature review and the 
findings of my content analysis.  Firstly, I compare what my literature review found 
in relation to key issues with the findings of my study in relation to those issues. I 
will then move on to discuss my findings in the context of the argument that I 
presented in my literature review.   Given the nature of this argument I will begin by 
discussing, with reference to my literature review, what the ways in which the public 
reportedly referred to NGO legitimacy and accountability might suggest about the 
extent to which the public is exhibiting development literacy and global solidarity.  I 
then turn my attention to NGOs and consider, again with reference to my literature 
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review, what the ways in which NGOs reportedly used these concepts might suggest 
about the extent to which NGOs are promoting development literacy and global 
solidarity among the public. 
7.3.2. Bringing the Literature Review and Empirical Findings Together 
 As I summarised in Chapter 3, my literature review of NGOs, legitimacy and 
accountability raised three key points.  Firstly, existing literature has suggested that 
NGO accountability has received far more attention internationally in both theory 
and practice than NGO legitimacy.  Whereas NGO legitimacy has attracted some 
attention, this has often focused exclusively on a small number of NGO activities, in 
particular advocacy or activism (Pearce, 1997, Van Rooy, 2004).  In addition, 
accountability has often been presented as a source of legitimacy (Edwards, 2000) 
leading the practical focus towards accountability and away from legitimacy.   
 Secondly, my literature review identified a broad consensus among theorists 
and practitioners alike that principal-agent approaches to accountability are 
inappropriate for NGOs and that stakeholder perspectives are more compatible with 
NGO missions.  However, despite this rhetorical commitment to stakeholder 
approaches, existing literature has suggested that the practice of accountability seems 
dominated by traditional principal-agent approaches. 
 Thirdly, my literature review identified a broad consensus among theorists 
that NGO administration costs do not accurately reflect the quality or impact of 
NGO work.  Despite this, however, existing literature has also suggested that the 
measure retains considerable popular appeal. 
 Dealing specifically with Ireland, my literature review found that, as in the 
international context, the attention paid to NGO legitimacy in Ireland has been 
overshadowed by that paid to NGO accountability; stakeholder approaches to NGO 
accountability appear to have gained a rhetorical but not practical advantage over 
principal-agent approaches; and an emphasis on administration costs appears to 
retain popular appeal.   
 Dealing with the relative attention paid to NGO legitimacy and 
accountability, my findings concur with existing literature in showing that NGO 
accountability has received significantly more attention than NGO legitimacy.  
However, it is important to note that there was a significant increase over time in the 
number of references in Irish Times coverage to NGO legitimacy and that a similar 
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increase did not occur in relation to NGO accountability.  For example, whereas in 
the time period 1994-1999 there were 25 references to NGO accountability 
compared to only 2 to NGO legitimacy, by the time period 2005-2009 the gap had 
narrowed considerably with 16 references to NGO accountability appearing 
compared to 11 references to NGO legitimacy.     
 Dealing with the relative attention paid to principal-agent approaches to NGO 
accountability compared with stakeholder approaches to NGO accountability, again 
my findings concur with existing literature in showing that principal-agent 
approaches to NGO accountability have received significantly more attention than 
stakeholder approaches to NGO accountability throughout the study period. 
 In relation to NGO administration costs, whereas my findings concur with 
existing literature in showing that NGO administration costs continue to be used 
virtually unopposed as an apparent measure of NGO quality, the most noteworthy 
finding in this study in relation to NGO administration cost is the relative 
infrequency with which they have been referred to in Irish Times coverage across the 
period.  In total, NGO administration costs were referred to in only 15 articles across 
the entire study period.  This finding appears at odds with the existing view that an 
emphasis on NGO administration costs continues to be very common. 
7.3.3 Development Literacy and Global Solidarity and the Irish Public 
Moving on to consider my findings in relation to the argument I presented in 
my literature review, this study finds very little media coverage exhibiting either 
development literacy, as indicated by a critical approach to development initiatives; 
or global solidarity, as indicated by the prioritisation of the wishes of people in 
whose name development initiatives are advanced.  Dealing firstly with the notion of 
a critical approach to development, overall the study found very little media 
questioning of Irish NGOs, which seems surprising given both international claims 
that the Rwandan experience and other factors led to a culture of vastly increased 
scrutiny of NGOs, and the significant growth in numbers and funding of Irish NGOs 
during the period.  In total across the 16-year period there were only 42 articles in 
which the accountability and ten articles in which the legitimacy of either one or 
more of the 77 NGOs searched for in this study or NGOs in general was questioned 
or disputed.  Not only was questioning limited, but throughout the study period even 
when NGOs were questioned, it was far more common for their accountability 
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(expressed in principal-agent terms) to be questioned, which I have argued is more 
likely to represent a superficial critique of NGOs, rather than their legitimacy, which 
I have argued is more likely to represent a potentially more radical and serious 
appraisal.   Although in numerical terms there was a slight increase in questioning of 
NGO legitimacy during the period, the total number of instances involved was too 
small to assess if this represented a statistically significant trend.  Notably in eight of 
the 18 articles that contained references by the public to NGO legitimacy between 
1994 and 2009 the concept of legitimacy was not used as a means of questioning 
NGOs.  Even when the concept was used, therefore, its potential as a means of 
facilitating a profound critical approach was not exploited.  
While long criticised within academic literature and viewed here as 
fundamentally at odds with development literacy the notion of administration costs 
as an indicator of NGO quality was not challenged at all in references attributed to 
the public.  In fact, the only reference during the period to a questioning of the 
appropriateness of the measure were made by Dóchas, itself an NGO (2005).    
 While the notion of administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality 
appears at odds with development literacy, the use of this measure also appears at 
odds with global solidarity as it generally directs attention towards the wishes of 
donors and fails to ask what the priorities of clients are.  The approach to 
accountability that is evident in references to accountability attributed to the public 
also suggests a lack of global solidarity.  This study found that references to 
principal-agent accountability attributed to the public overwhelmingly outnumbered 
references to stakeholder approaches to accountability attributed to the public 
throughout the study period.  As I argued in Chapter 3, principal-agent approaches to 
accountability appear incompatible with global solidarity as they are oriented 
towards donors rather than those most likely to be most affected by the actions of 
NGOs.   
 While a critical approach to development, including NGOs, is identified in 
this study as an indicator of development literacy, it can also be seen as an indicator 
of global solidarity.  At the high point of Irish government spending on ODA in 
2008, over €153 million representing 24% of total Irish ODA was channelled 
through Irish NGOs (Irish Aid, 2008b). This money was in addition to many millions 
more secured by Irish NGOs from other institutional donors and public fundraising.   
I suggest that a genuine commitment to global solidarity among the Irish public 
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would have resulted in a high level of informed scrutiny being applied to Irish NGOs 
during this period given their high levels of funding and resultant power.   As 
already noted, the data in this study showed that questioning of NGOs did occur, but 
that this was very limited and usually focused on principal-agent accountability.  In 
addition, most questioning of NGOs identified during the period was directed at 
NGOs in general or the charity sector in general and avoided naming specific NGOs.  
Even though the number of relevant articles was too small for statistical analysis, on 
the face of it there also appears to be no reason to believe that increased coverage of 
questioning of others by NGOs was associated with increased coverage of 
questioning of those NGOs by others. 
In 2000 the Irish Times journalist, Kevin Myers (p. 15), claimed that Irish 
NGOs were “beyond criticism” and went on to say that “nobody dare publicly 
discuss their activities, never mind – God bless the mark – challenge them.  Such 
charities are autonomous, unelected and frequently unaccountable”.  Myers’s view of 
an Irish NGO sector apparently “beyond criticism” largely corresponds to the 
findings of this study and his own criticism of NGOs stands in marked contrast to the 
overall picture presented by this data.   In 2005 one NGO commentator (Jordan) 
suggested that discussions of NGO accountability implied that NGOs had “arrived” 
as accepted and important actors.  Using Jordan’s criterion Irish NGOs have not 
arrived and are not being taken seriously in Irish media coverage despite their 
apparently high levels of public support as indicated by increasing levels of funding.   
 For reasons including the mediated nature of all newspaper coverage and the 
fact that the Irish Times is only one of many newspapers available on the Irish 
market, I cannot assert that Irish Times coverage of public opinion regarding NGOs 
and legitimacy and accountability mirrors actual public opinion.  However, in 
Chapter 4 I made the more modest suggestion that such media may indicate public 
opinion on these subjects.  If one accepts both this argument and my prior argument 
as to the relevance of legitimacy and accountability for development literacy and 
global solidarity, then one can conclude that this study finds a lack of evidence for 
either development literacy or global solidarity among the Irish public.  There is 
substantial independent evidence also for a lack of development literacy among the 
Irish public and, perhaps more importantly from the point of view of the scientific 
principle of falsifiability, no clearly opposing evidence.  As discussed in Chapter 2, a 
range of studies have indicated a lack of sophisticated understanding of development 
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issues by the Irish public (McDonnell et al., 2003, Weafer, 2002, Directorate-
General Development, 2005, Connolly et al., 2008).  In addition, studies have shown 
high levels of trust in Irish NGOs (Connolly et al., 2008, Edelman, 2011), which 
may be partly responsible for the lack of questioning of Irish NGOs identified in this 
study.  This finding is in marked contrast, however, to the oft-cited notion in 
international commentary on NGOs that scrutiny has increased significantly in recent 
years (Naidoo, 2004).   While there is supporting evidence in relation to a lack of 
development literacy, there is no clearly relevant independent evidence concerning a 
lack of global solidarity on the part of the Irish public, as evidenced by a failure to 
prioritise the wishes of clients above those of donors.  The absence of research in this 
regard is itself interesting as it suggests a limited engagement by researchers with 
specific issues relating to public attitudes to development and may, in itself, suggest 
a limited development literacy. 
7.3.4. Development Literacy and Global Solidarity and Irish NGOs 
In a commentary on a 2002 survey of attitudes towards development 
cooperation in Ireland conducted among a nationally representative sample of 1,000 
adults, Gibson and Dalzell (2002, p. 41) concluded that  “the Irish public has learned 
what it has consistently been told ... through marketing by NGOs”.  Underpinned by 
the media theories of agenda-setting and priming that posit strong media effects this 
study set out to identify what newspaper coverage suggests that NGOs are, whether 
deliberately or not, telling the public in relation to legitimacy and accountability.  
The first point of note is that there is a striking correspondence between how these 
concepts were reportedly used by the public in relation to NGOs and how the 
concepts were reportedly used by NGO themselves.  If one accepts my contention 
that Irish Times coverage may serve as a reflection of NGO and public opinion, then 
the data suggest that not only do the public appear to be lacking in development 
literacy and global solidarity, but Irish NGOs also appear not to be promoting them.   
Firstly in relation to development literacy, the references attributed to Irish 
NGOs in the coverage considered would suggest that they have not encouraged a 
critical approach to development as they rarely refer to either accountability or 
legitimacy in relation to themselves or other NGOs.  Overall the coverage provides 
no evidence that NGOs feel obliged to justify their existence or activities to the 
wider public using the concepts of either accountability or legitimacy or to question 
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the accountability or legitimacy of other NGOs.  On the rare occasions when NGOs 
have reportedly referred to these concepts in relation to themselves or other NGOs 
this has more commonly been in relation to accountability, and more particularly 
principal-agent accountability, than legitimacy.  As has already been argued, this 
emphasis on accountability generally represents a superficial questioning in contrast 
to the more serious critique afforded by the notion of legitimacy.   
This study shows a significant increase over time in the extent of coverage in 
which NGOs are reported to have questioned others.  Interestingly, however, the data 
also indicate that whereas reported questioning of the accountability of others by 
NGOs significantly increased over the period of the study, reported questioning of 
the legitimacy of others by NGOs did not.  I suggest that this apparent preference by 
NGOs for a concept that generally facilitates only a superficial critique over one that 
encourages a more radical appraisal represents a missed opportunity for NGOs to set 
an example of meaningful critical engagement, which could by itself serve to 
promote meaningful critical engagement by others. 
The reported use of administration costs as an indicator of NGO quality by 
NGOs also suggests that far from promoting development literacy, NGOs are in fact 
furthering development illiteracy by promoting a largely irrelevant but conveniently 
easy to communicate indicator as a proxy for a diverse range of  more appropriate 
and nuanced assessment measures.  While the number of reported references by 
NGOs to administration costs throughout the period was low, the fact that the 
indicator was reportedly mentioned by NGOs at all, and particularly that it was 
reportedly used by the three largest Irish NGOs, should be a cause for concern 
among those interested in development literacy.  It is noteworthy, for example, that 
in one article (Cullen, 2005) in which five prominent aid agencies were asked to 
identify their administration costs for funds donated in the wake of the Asian 
tsunami, not only did none of the agencies object to the use of the measure, but three 
of the five (Oxfam, Concern and The Irish Red Cross) were reported as saying that 
100% of money donated would be used in the disaster areas and there would be zero 
administration costs.  Although this was, one assumes, technically correct, it 
conceals the reality that there are always costs to administering aid programmes and 
that in these cases these costs must have been allocated to another donor or funding 
source.  As already noted, there were very few reported references to NGO 
administration costs attributed to the public during the study period, although there 
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was also no questioning of the validity of the measure attributed to the public.  If this 
coverage is indeed reflective of public and NGO attitudes to administration costs, 
this would suggests that an emphasis on administration costs is being led by NGOs 
rather than the public.  The data also suggest that one NGO in particular, GOAL, has 
been particularly consistent in referring to the measure. 
As already suggested, the use of administration costs as an indicator of 
quality not only appears antithetical to the promotion of development literacy, but it 
also seems incompatible with the promotion of global solidarity as it directs attention 
towards the wishes of donors and away from those in whose name development 
activities are initiated.  The same is true of principal-agenda approaches to NGO 
accountability.  While the overall number of reported references by NGOs to NGO 
accountability during the study period was very small (seven references in total), it is 
noteworthy that only one of these represented a stakeholder approach (Kilcullen, 
1998).  Also noteworthy is the fact that while there were very significantly more 
references to NGO accountability attributed to members of the public, these were 
also predominantly expressed in principal-agent terms (28 references to principal-
agent approaches compared with only 1 reference to a stakeholder approach).  If one 
accepts my argument that media coverage of NGOs and legitimacy and 
accountability may reflect NGO views on legitimacy and accountability, not only 
does the data imply that NGOs did not proactively promote stakeholder approaches 
and the notion that the wishes of clients should take precedence over the wishes of 
donors during this period, therefore, but it also suggests that NGOs failed to counter 
through the Irish Times the dominant principal-agent accountability discourse 
evident in coverage attributed to the public during the period.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, NGO legitimacy has received little previous 
scholarly attention in an Irish context.  This study suggests that the apparent 
overlooking of this concept in academic circles is mirrored in the Irish Times.  In 
contrast, NGO accountability has received substantial scholarly attention in Ireland, 
an attention that is also evident in frequent references to the concept in the 
newspaper coverage in this study.  Overall, previous research has suggested a 
growing acceptance within the Irish NGO sector of the appropriateness of 
stakeholder or downward accountability (Cronin and O'Reagan, 2002, Leen, 2006, 
Trócaire, 2011).  In addition, a limited number of specific practical initiatives (e.g. 
HAP membership by Concern, Tearfund and Christian Aid) oriented towards the 
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promotion of stakeholder accountability have been undertaken.  These initiatives 
notwithstanding, several studies have pointed to stakeholder approaches being 
crowded out in practice by what broadly correspond to principal-agent approaches 
(O'Dwyer, 2006, O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, O'Dwyer, 2005).  This study finds no 
evidence of a commitment to stakeholder approaches to accountability in references 
attributed to Irish NGOs in Irish Times coverage and no signs of a move towards 
such approaches.  In fact, the single reference to NGO accountability attributed to an 
NGO that appeared to embody a stakeholder approach was in 1998.   
7.3.5 Agenda Setting and Priming 
 The references attributed to NGOs in the coverage studied imply that NGOs 
have not succeeded in influencing or creating coverage of legitimacy and 
accountability that could help promote development literacy and global solidarity 
among the Irish public.  While I acknowledge that NGO ability to influence media 
coverage is not absolute, I nonetheless propose five recommendations for NGOs 
seeking to harness the potential of media coverage towards the promotion of 
development literacy and global solidarity.  Firstly, NGOs should be careful about 
how they use the terms legitimacy and accountability themselves – e.g. when 
discussing accountability they should embrace every chance to promote stakeholder 
approaches.  Secondly, NGOs should counter uses of these terms by others that are 
incompatible with this agenda – e.g. the large number of references to principal-
agent accountability that have emerged from other sources.  Thirdly, NGOs should 
cease using concepts that undermine this agenda – e.g. administration costs.  
Fourthly, bearing in mind that agenda setting and priming posit that what is not said 
is important as well as what is said, NGOs should seek to emphasise legitimacy to a 
greater degree than previously and to a greater degree than accountability.  Finally, 
NGOs should recognise that what is being proposed here in terms of the promotion 
of both development literacy and global solidarity is not an NGO marketing strategy 
oriented towards conveying a preconceived and securely packaged message, but 
rather that NGOs genuinely commit themselves to a new way forward.  If NGOs 
themselves commit, not merely in individual departments or strategy units, but 
across their organisations as a whole to the agenda being proposed then I believe that 
they will have a greater chance of consistently promoting this agenda and being 
reported as so doing.  
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7.4: Original Methodological and Theoretical Contribution of 
Research 
7.4.1 Methodological Contribution 
The empirical research described in this thesis is based on a quantitative 
content analysis, which facilitated a longitudinal study of Irish Times coverage of 
NGOs and legitimacy and accountability and was compatible with both my research 
aims and epistemological position.  This research was original, firstly, because, as far 
as I am aware it represents the first study into media coverage of Irish relief and 
development NGOs and legitimacy and accountability.  In addition, I suggest that 
this research makes an original methodological contribution in relation to the 
problem of insufficient variation in reliability testing, which I will describe in more 
detail in this section. 
Considerations of reliability in quantitative content analysis have generated a 
voluminous literature.  Although a consensus as to the most appropriate inter-coder 
reliability index has remained elusive, Cohen’s kappa is among the most prominent 
and commonly-applied indices and, consequently, was used in this study.  A 
potential limitation of Cohen’s kappa, which has received a relatively limited degree 
of scholarly attention, is the problem of insufficient variation.  As the name suggests, 
insufficient variation refers to situations in which there is a lack of variation between 
the data being coded - i.e. when the same code applies in relation to the vast majority 
of items being coded for one or more variables.   Insufficient variation arose as a 
problem in relation to several variables in this study.  For example, variable 20 asked 
whether an NGO claimed in each article under consideration to be legitimate.  The 
two coders agreed that in 107 of 108 jointly-coded articles NGOs did not make such 
a claim.  In relation to the one remaining article they disagreed, with one coder 
coding to indicate that an NGO did make such a claim and the other coding to 
indicate that an NGO did not.   Although 107 agreements out of a possible total of 
108 would appear to be a very high level of agreement representing 99.07%, the 
kappa score in this instance was 0, which would be considered an unacceptable level 
of reliability by all commentators.  The reason for the low kappa score is that 
variation is a requirement for reliability to be demonstrated.  Without variation, 
coders could simply have agreed to code everything in the same way or could have 
habitually coded articles in the same way due to boredom or inertia.  The 
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conservative nature of kappa results in the possibility that the data sources genuinely 
exhibited very little variation being discounted.     
The methodological contribution of this study lies primarily in providing a 
detailed discussion of the problem of insufficient variation and its implications.  In 
particular, this study makes a contribution by highlighting the incongruity between 
the assumption underpinning a perfect kappa score and that underpinning a less than 
perfect kappa score.  A perfect kappa score results from instances when there is 
100% agreement between coders regardless of whether there is variation in the codes 
they allocate. In a case where there is 100% agreement and coders have coded 
everything the same way there is even more reason to suspect habitual coding than in 
instances when there is some disagreement between coders.  However, as long as 
there is total agreement a perfect kappa score results with the possibility of habitual 
coding apparently being discounted.  In contrast, in instances when there is less than 
full agreement and there is limited variation between the codes allocated by coders, 
kappa appears to assume habitual coding and low kappa scores result.    In cases of 
100% agreement with low variation the index appears too liberal therefore, while in 
cases of slightly less than 100% agreement with low variation the index appears too 
conservative.    
In this study I proposed that kappa, which has clear benefits despite its 
limitation in relation to insufficient variation, be used in conjunction with percentage 
agreement.  Although this combination has been proposed and used in other studies 
(Lombard et al., 2002, Riffe et al., 2005), its use specifically to counter the problem 
of insufficient variation is innovative. 
7.4.2 Theoretical Contribution 
 Theory features prominently in this thesis both in relation to the media 
theories of agenda-setting and priming and theorizing regarding the concepts of 
legitimacy and accountability.  The original theoretical contribution of this research 
pertains to the latter and forms two distinct arguments.  Firstly, this thesis is 
innovative in suggesting that considerations of accountability generally represent a 
superficial critique that leave underlying assumptions unchallenged and that this 
contrasts with considerations of legitimacy, which offer the possibility of a more 
fundamental questioning.  While, as I acknowledged in Chapter 3, it is not inevitable 
that a focus on legitimacy will lead to a profound critique, nor is it inevitable that a 
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focus on accountability will result in a superficial critique, I argue that 
accountability, with its focus on answering for what has already been done or said, 
almost invariable leads towards an evaluation based on the effectiveness or 
efficiency of a particular action rather than a consideration of the desirability of that 
action being undertaken by that actor.  Whereas the question as to whether an NGO 
is accountable appears to invite an automatic and usually factually correct positive 
answer – as most NGOs will be accountable in some way – it obscures issues such as 
to whom NGOs are accountable, how they prioritise the wishes of those to whom 
they are accountable and how they are accountable.  In other words, it invites a 
superficial response and hence represents a superficial critique.  To ask whether an 
NGO is legitimate, on the other hand, promotes a fundamental questioning as to 
whether an organisation has the right to do or say anything and, if so, what gives it 
that right.  Whereas a questioning of NGO legitimacy, understood as what gives an 
organisation the right to do or say something, appears to start without the assumption 
of any right on the part of NGOs, accountability appears to contain an in-built 
assumption of certain rights and focuses instead on the execution of activities. 
 The second innovative argument made in this thesis relates to legitimacy and 
accountability and NGO roles.  Whereas there is a substantial academic literature 
that suggests that the practice of NGO accountability may lead to the deflection of 
original NGO goals (Ebrahim, 2003), this thesis is innovative in suggesting that not 
only is the practice of accountability relevant for the ability of NGOs to pursue 
certain roles, but the ways in which legitimacy and accountability are talked about 
may also impact on the ability of NGOs to pursue roles based on the education and 
motivation of developed country populations.  
7.5 Limitations of Study and Proposals for Future Research 
7.5.1 Limitations of Study 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis I acknowledged that the overall conclusions of this 
study pivot on a background argument.  Notwithstanding the fact that the results may 
be useful in a variety of contexts unrelated to this argument, I acknowledge that the 
fact that there are many steps in this complex argument, all of which require 
acceptance by readers if my overall conclusions are to be deemed convincing, is a 
limitation of this study.  For example, one element of my argument is concerned 
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with justifying my exclusive focus on mediated content related to NGOs, the public 
and legitimacy and accountability.  While I believe that the media theories of agenda 
setting and priming make media reporting of NGOs, legitimacy and accountability 
deserving of attention regardless of whether or not these views correspond with the 
actual views held by NGOs or the public, I accept that use of media as a possible 
indicator of NGO and public views is potentially problematic.   
I also accept that there are limitations associated both with my choice of 
methods and my application of those methods.  As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, 
while I believe that quantitative content analysis was an appropriate method for this 
study given my research questions , quantitative content analysis has limitations.  
These range from very specific issues such as problems associated with category 
development, coder training and reliability assessments to broader issues including 
the unsuitability of the method for more in-depth analysis of individual units of 
content.   
As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, one limitation of my application of 
quantitative content analysis is my exclusive concentration on newspaper content 
and, more particularly, Irish Times content.  Although this was sufficient to provide 
a demonstration of the ways in which the concepts of legitimacy, accountability and 
administration costs were reportedly used by NGOs and in relation to NGOs, and 
including additional media sources would have considerably added to the costs and 
time required to conduct the study, a larger sample from a broader range of media 
sources would have been beneficial for two reasons.  Firstly, a larger sample would 
have allowed for more detailed exploration of specific issues relating to the overall 
topic.  For example, the coding protocol included questions that asked whether 
NGOs reportedly claimed to be accountable or legitimate and whether others 
reportedly claimed that NGOs were accountable or legitimate.  The very small 
numbers of positive results made statistical analysis of these findings impossible.  
Similarly, the small number of articles in which NGO administration costs were 
referred to made detailed analysis impossible. 
 Secondly, a larger sample sourced from a broader range of media sources 
would have been beneficial in providing a stronger indication of the ways in which 
NGOs and the public used the terms legitimacy, accountability and administration 
costs and, by implication according to my argument, the likely degree of 
development literacy and global solidarity of the Irish public and extent to which 
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NGOs appear to be promoting development literacy and global solidarity among the 
Irish public. The reliance on a single print media source with an apparently unique 
status among Irish media necessarily weakens the claims that this study can make.   
 Another potential limitation of my application of quantitative content 
analysis in this study is its failure to investigate the specific triggers that led to a 
questioning of either the accountability or legitimacy of NGOs and the exact targets 
of the scrutiny when it occurred.  Perusal of the articles would suggest that much of 
the questioning of NGOs that occurred was in the context of discussion of Irish 
charity legislation and that there was a far greater tendency to question NGOs based 
on their organisational competence and probity than the appropriateness of their 
activities.  Whereas this study investigated whether accountability was defined in 
principal-agent or stakeholder terms, it did not collect data on what aspects of an 
organisation’s accountability or legitimacy were questioned.  This data would serve 
to indicate whether the considerable emphasis on donor wishes implied by emphasis 
on principal agent approaches to accountability was matched by a heightened 
emphasis on those aspects of accountability or legitimacy most clearly visible to an 
Irish audience.   
7.5.2 Proposals for Future Research 
 Following on from the acknowledged limitations of this study I recommend 
that the content analysis described in this study be replicated based on a wider range 
of media sources and that any similar future content analyses seek to consider not 
only whether accountability is described in principal-agent or stakeholder terms, but 
also the triggers for scrutiny of NGO legitimacy and accountability and the specific 
targets of this scrutiny.   
 The finding of this study that media coverage exhibited a largely uncritical 
approach to Irish NGOs expressed in terms of questioning their legitimacy or 
accountability despite their growing budgets during the period invites further 
research.  A 2009 report into institutional child abuse in Ireland (Commission to 
Enquire into Child Abuse) identified deference shown by the Irish state toward 
religious institutions as partly responsible for the problems described.  A very 
different report into the colossal current Irish banking crisis identified “regulatory 
deference” by the Irish financial regulator towards the institutions under its remit as 
one of the primary causes for the banking collapse (Honohan, 2010).  One could 
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suggest that regulatory deference has also been displayed towards NGOs, as 
evidenced by the failure to even enact comprehensive charity legislation until 2009 
and the failure thus far to implement the key provisions of this legislation.  In 
addition one could suggest that this regulatory deference forms part of a deeply 
engrained culture of deference that also encompasses the media and society as a 
whole and that is at least partly responsible for the uncritical approach to NGOs 
found in this research.  Or this uncritical approach could be attributable to the high 
levels of trust that studies have found to be invested in Irish NGOs.  Or, along with 
an absence of global solidarity, it could simply be one result of a lack of sincere 
interest on the part of the Irish public in relation to development issues that at a 
glance appear to have little immediate relevance for the day to day lives of most Irish 
people.   These and other hypotheses all warrant scholarly attention. 
 Influenced by international thinking on NGO roles I have argued both that 
the adoption by Irish NGOs of roles based on the promotion of development literacy 
and global solidarity among the Irish public offers significant potential for the 
advancement of the long-term goals of NGOs and that Ireland now provides an ideal 
time and place for such roles to be adopted.  Given their many apparent advantages 
the question as to why Irish NGOs appear not to already be prioritising such roles 
deserves attention.   In order to further explore the feasibility of the role I have 
proposed I recommend that research be conducted among Irish NGO representatives 
on the actual roles their organisations conduct, their stated rationales for such roles 
and their views on the role I have recommended.  This research could take a variety 
of forms including interviews, focus groups and case studies both of organisations 
that already focus on roles similar to those I suggest and others that do not.   
Finally, further direct research into Irish public opinions on NGO legitimacy, 
accountability and roles, which could be conducted using a variety of quantitative or 
qualitative methods, could also greatly assist in advancing understanding of the 
environment in which Irish relief and development NGOs currently operate. 
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Appendix A. Irish Daily Newspaper Readership Statistics* 
Year Irish Times Irish 
Independent 
Irish Daily 
Star 
Irish 
Examiner 
Irish Daily 
Mirror 
Irish Sun Irish Daily 
Mail 
Evening 
Herald 
1997-1998 10% 21% 13% 7% - - - 12% 
1998-1999 11% 21% 15% 9% - - - 12% 
2000 11% 21% 15% 8% - - - 12% 
2001 10% 20% 15% 7% - - - 12% 
2001-2002 11.2% 19.2% 15.8% 6.8% - - - 11.5% 
2003 10.2% 17% 13.9% 6.8% 7% 9.1% - 11.5% 
2004 10% 19% 13.9% 6.8% 7.3% 8.6% - 10.8% 
2005 10.2% 16.9% 12.3% 7.7% 6.1% 8.2% - 8.8% 
2006 9.9% 15.7% 11.8% 7.3% 5.2% 7.4% - 8.8% 
2007 9.3% 16.4% 12.7% 7.7% 5.8% 8.9% 3.3% 9.1% 
2008 9% 14.7% 13.7% 5.7% 5.8% 8.5% 4% 9% 
2009 10.5% 16.5% 11.9% 5.9% 8.3% 6% 4% 8.2% 
 
 
 These figures are taken from successive readership surveys conducted by the Institute of Advertising Practitioners in Ireland (IAPI, 2009, 
IAPI, 2008, IAPI, 2007, IAPI, 2006, IAPI, 2005, IAPI, 2004, IAPI, 2003, IAPI, 2002, IAPI, 2000, IAPI, 1998b, IAPI, 1998a)
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Appendix B. Coding Protocol 
Introduction and Instructions for Coders 
 This research centres on a content analysis of Irish Times newspaper articles 
published between 1994 and 2009 that refer to relief and development NGOs and 
accountability and/or legitimacy and/or administration costs and/or any of their 
derivatives as outlined in Annex 1.  Newspaper content (including articles, letters, 
editorials and opinion columns) have been selected for inclusion in the study based 
on the inclusion of keyword search terms (e.g. accountability and legitimate), 
specific relief and development NGO names (e.g. Concern and Trócaire) and generic 
subject search terms (e.g. charity and aid agency).  These are listed in Annexes 1, 2 
and 3 respectively. 
 The primary purpose of this content analysis is to identify a) what others 
have reportedly said about the accountability and legitimacy of NGOs and b) what 
NGOs have reportedly said about the accountability and legitimacy of others.  It is 
vital, therefore, that each reference to one of the keyword search terms be correctly 
attributed to one or more of the following: a specific named NGO from among those 
listed in Annex 2, NGOs in general as identified by the use of one of the generic 
subject search terms in Annex 3, or another actor, which refers to anybody other than 
a specific named NGO or NGOs in general.   
 All references to accountability,  legitimacy and administration costs in this 
protocol refer to instances in which the terms “accountability” or “legitimacy” or 
“administration costs” and/or any of their derivatives are mentioned in relation to 
NGOs - i.e. references in which NGOs reportedly use these keyword search terms or 
when they are reportedly used by other actors in relation to NGOs.  Additional 
comments that may appear in some articles in which other actors reportedly refer to 
legitimacy and accountability in relation to other contexts should be ignored.  
Therefore, although each article will contain at least one relevant use of a keyword, 
there may also be additional uses of keywords that are not relevant and hence should 
not be coded.  The derivatives of accountability, legitimacy and administration costs 
that apply in this study are listed in Annex 1.  Please refer to Annex 1 in advance of 
coding each article to ensure that you are familiar with all these derivatives.  If the 
article appears to be concerned with one of the key concepts of accountability, 
legitimacy or administration costs, but the relevant keywords or their derivatives are 
not used then the articles should be treated as if they are not about accountability or 
207 
 
legitimacy or administration costs.  For example, an article that speaks of an NGO’s 
“overheads” or “the amount of money spent on administration” but does not 
specifically mention “administration cost/s” should be coded to indicate that it does 
not refer to administration costs.  Similarly, an article that speaks of how NGOs 
“account” for money spent should be coded to indicate that it does not refer to NGO 
accountability unless “accountability” or one of its derivatives as listed in Annex 1 
are also contained in the article. 
 All references to “a specific named NGO” or “specific named NGOs” in this 
coding protocol refer to the NGOs outlined in Annex 2 only.  Please refer to Annex 2 
each time either of these references appear to ensure that you correctly identify the 
specific NGOs involved.  As some of the NGOs involved may be referred to using 
incomplete names – e.g. Concern Worldwide may be referred to as simply 
“Concern”, and some of the NGOs have changed names during the period of the 
study – e.g. ChildFund used to be called Christian Children’s Fund, please ensure 
that that you check both the main names listed in Annex 2 and the abbreviated, 
alternative and previous names also listed in Annex 2.  If a specific NGO is 
identified that is not included in the list in Annex 2 (e.g. Focus Ireland) that NGO 
should be viewed as “another actor” rather than a “specific named NGO”.   In cases 
where a comment is attributed to a group of NGOs including some that are listed in 
Annex 2 and others that are not, then for the purposes of the coding the comment 
should be attributed to a “specific named NGO” and those identified in Annex 2 
should be recorded where requested in the questions. 
 All references to “NGOs in general” refer to NGOs as indicated by use of one 
or more of the generic subject search terms that appear in Annex 3.  Please refer to 
Annex 3 each time this reference appears to ensure that you are only using these 
terms to identify “NGOs in general”.  If one of the generic subject search terms is 
modified to designate a particular category of NGOs – e.g. “charities for the 
homeless” or “patient support NGOs” these should not be considered “NGOs in 
general”.  However, given the focus on relief and development NGOs in this study, 
if a generic subject search term is modified to describe this particular group of NGOs 
– e.g. “Third World charities” or “development NGOs” then these should be 
considered “NGOs in general”. 
 All references to “another actor” in this protocol refer to any actor that is not 
a “specific named NGO” as identified in Annex 2 or “NGOs in general” as identified 
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in Annex 3.  Other actors include, for example, the journalist or commentator who 
has written the article unless the article in full is identified as having been written by 
a representative of a specific named NGO as outlined in Annex 2 or a specific 
reference within the article is attributed to a “specific named NGO” or “NGOs in 
general” .  Any references to keywords that are not clearly attributed to either a 
“specific named NGO” or “NGOs in general” should be attributed in the coding to 
another actor therefore.    
 No distinction should be made in answering the questions between ideas 
expressed directly by NGOs (via  their representatives) and comments or ideas 
attributed to NGOs by reporters –e.g. if a question asks if an NGO has expressed a 
particular view this should be taken to mean if a NGO has expressed a particular 
view directly via a direct quotation or in an article written by an NGO representative 
or if a view has been indirectly attributed to an NGO by a reporter or another actor.  
Similarly, interpretations of NGO statements, reports and activities included in 
articles should be considered as accurate reflections of the statements, reports and 
activities of NGOs for the purpose of this study.  If an article written by an NGO 
representative or a statement attributed to an NGO representative refers to what 
another actor says about one of the keywords then this should be considered a 
reference attributed to another actor rather than as a reference attributed to an NGO. 
For example, if a specific named NGO states that donors seek accountability for all 
funds issued to NGOs or that they have been told by a government official that 
accountability is a key concern then these should be considered references by “other 
actors” to accountability rather than references by the specific named NGO.  For the 
purposes of this study all those identified as current NGO staff members, Board 
members or volunteers should be considered representatives of that NGO.  NGO 
supporters or donors should not be considered representatives of the NGO.  Views 
expressed in reports or documents commissioned by NGOs should be interpreted as 
references expressed by those NGOs.  Comments of former staff members should be 
considered comments from other actors unless those comments are identified as 
having been held by the person at the time that they were staff members.   
 The coding questions frequently refer to “a comment/s expressed”.  For the 
purposes of the coding a “comment” should be understood to mean any comment, 
viewpoint or idea expressed directly or indirectly.  For example, if a specific named 
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NGO states that the public want financial accountability this should be understood as 
a “comment” expressed by “another actor” (the public). 
 Coders should bear in mind that some keyword search terms may be used 
ironically – e.g. a reference to a “’legitimate’ war” in which the word “legitimate” 
appears surrounded by speech marks may indicate that the writer considers the war 
in question not to have been legitimate.  In this case in question six, for example, it is 
up to the coder to decide whether or not this might constitute questioning or 
disputing the legitimacy of the war.  In addition, references to “legitimate charities” 
or “legitimate diamond traders” even when these are not surrounded by speech 
marks imply that there are illegitimate charities and illegitimate diamond traders and 
may therefore be understood as questioning or disputing the legitimacy of charities 
and diamond traders – e.g. a recommendation by a public body that donors only give 
money to legitimate charities can be coded as questioning or disputing the legitimacy 
of NGOs in general. 
 Some of the articles being studied may include more than one reference to 
the same keyword.  Therefore questions that refer to “a reference” to something 
should be understood to mean “one or more reference”.  If more than one reference 
from the same source implies the same meaning (e.g. the same specific named NGO 
questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs in general) then these 
references should be coded as one unit.  If a single article contains more than one 
reference to a keyword that imply different meanings (e.g. one reference implies a 
claim that a specific named NGO is accountable and another implies a questioning of 
the accountability of another specific named NGO) then the differing meanings will 
be captured for that article as long as each question is answered.  Similarly, if, for 
example in question 10, two different actors refer to accountability and suggest 
different approaches then these references should each be coded using the secondary 
codes for that question. 
Before entering any codes please read each article in full and underline each 
of the keyword search terms.  Then check to see which of these references are 
attributed to specific named NGOs (i.e. in an article written by a representative of a 
specific named NGO or in a comment attributed to a specific named NGO) and/or 
generic subject search terms and underline these also.    Please note that only current 
representatives who are specifically identified as writing on behalf of the NGO 
should be viewed as representatives of that NGO.   If a single keyword that is 
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attributed to or relates to a specific named NGO or NGOs in general appears more 
than once or more than one keyword is contained in the article that is attributed to or 
relates to a specific named NGO or NGOs in general these should be numbered 
individually on the article to ensure that the coding takes account of each incidence 
in which a keyword is mentioned if these are relevant.  Disregard any references to 
keyword search terms that are neither attributed to nor relate to a specific named 
NGO or NGOs in general.  Then answer the questions in this protocol in the Excel 
coding sheet while reading the article a second time.  Please check your entries in the 
Excel coding sheet after completing the coding for each article to ensure that all the 
questions have been answered and that the answers are as you intended. 
 The possible codes for the questions in the protocol are divided into primary 
codes (which are designated by round bullet points) and secondary codes (which are 
designated by dashes).  Each question must be answered with one primary code only, 
but may in addition be coded with one or more secondary codes.  No question may 
be skipped. 
 
 
Section A: General Information about articles 
1. Year of Article: Fill in the year in which the article was published.  This is listed 
at the top of the article. 
 
2. Month of Article: Fill in the month in which the article was published.  This is 
listed at the top of the article. 
 
3. Number of words in article: Fill in the number of words in the article.  This is 
listed at the top of the article. 
 
4. Type of Article: The type of article and the page number on which it appears are 
listed at the top of the article. 
 Code 1 if the article appears on Page 1. 
 Code 2 if the article is described as a “letter”, “letters” or a “letter to the 
editor”. 
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 Code 3 if the article is described as an “opinion” or “opinion and analysis” 
piece.   
 Code 4 if the article is described as an “editorial” or “editorial comment”.  
Do not include other types of article that are described as being “on the 
editorial page”. 
 Code 5 if the article is anything else – e.g. news, features, part of a 
supplement. 
 
Section B: Accountability 
5. References to NGO accountability 
For the purposes of this study NGO accountability refers to either the 
accountability of NGOs in general or specific named NGOs as organisations or 
the accountability of any of the staff, policies, statements, actions, systems or 
expressed or attributed opinions of NGOs in general or specific named NGOs.   
For example, a reference to the accountability mechanisms of a specific named 
NGO programme constitutes, for the purposes of this research, a reference to 
the accountability of that specific named NGO.  A more complicated case could 
refer to the accountability requirements of a particular donor being explained to 
an NGO that is a funding recipient of that donor.  This too should be understood 
as a reference to the accountability of that NGO.  Please note that references by 
NGOs or other actors to the accountability of other actors are NOT RELEVANT 
to this question. 
 Code 1 if neither the accountability of NGOs in general nor that of a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) is referred to. 
 Code 2 if the accountability of NGOs in general and/or that of a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) is referred to in a comment/s attributed to NGOs in 
general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not also 
attribute a reference to NGO accountability to another actor.  Note that this 
may include a specific named NGO referring to its own accountability. 
- If Code 2 is allocated and, if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the comment/s is attributed. 
- If Code 2 is allocated and, if relevant, list the name of the specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) whose accountability is being referred to. 
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 Code 3 if the accountability of NGOs in general and/or that of a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) is referred to in a comment/s attributed to another 
actor AND the article does not also attribute a reference to NGO 
accountability to NGOs in general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 3 is allocated and, if relevant, list the name of the specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) whose accountability is being referred to. 
 Code 4 if the accountability of NGOs in general and/or that of a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) is referred to both in a comment/s attributed to 
NGOs in general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and a comment/s 
attributed to another actor. 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the comment/s is attributed. 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the name of the specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) whose accountability is being referred to by 
NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose accountability is being referred to by another actor/s. 
 
6. NGOs questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs or other actors. 
For the purposes of this research “NGOs questioning or disputing the 
accountability of NGOs or other actors” refers to NGOs in general or specific 
named NGOs  questioning the accountability of NGOs in general, specific 
named NGOs or other actors as organisations or the accountability of any of 
their staff, policies, statements, actions, systems or expressed or attributed 
opinions.  More specifically, questioning or disputing accountability includes 
any calls for accountability from NGOs or other actors, any suggestions that 
any NGOs or other actors  mentioned must be accountable or “held 
accountable”, any suggestions that specific actions are required to ensure that 
any NGOs or other  actors mentioned are made accountable or more 
accountable, any assertions that accountability or high standards of 
accountability are necessary, important or expected from NGOs or other actors, 
and any direct or indirect references to a lack of accountability or weak 
accountability on the part of the NGOs or actors mentioned.  For example, an 
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assertion by Amnesty International that a proposed Irish government system for 
accommodating asylum seekers would be weak in terms of accountability should 
be interpreted as a specific named NGO questioning or disputing the 
accountability of another actor (i.e. the Irish government).  Similarly, a 
suggestion by an NGO that a government should change its policy in the cause 
of accountability should be interpreted as that NGO questioning or disputing the 
accountability of that government. 
 Code 1 if the article does not refer to NGOs in general or a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the accountability of another actor, 
NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs).   
 Code 2 if the article refers to NGOs in general questioning or disputing either 
the accountability of NGOs in general or the accountability of a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) (not both) AND the article does not refer to NGOs in 
general questioning or disputing the accountability of another actor/s AND 
the article does not refer to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or 
disputing the accountability of another actor/s, the accountability of NGOs in 
general or the accountability of a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 2 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose accountability is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 3 if the article refers to NGOs in general questioning or disputing the 
accountability of another actor/s AND the article does not refer to NGOs in 
general questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs in general or the 
accountability of a specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not 
refer to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the 
accountability of another actor/s, the accountability of NGOs in general or 
the accountability of a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 4 if the article refers to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning 
or disputing either the accountability of NGOs in general or the 
accountability of a specific named NGO (or NGOs) (not both) AND the 
article does not refer to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or 
disputing the accountability of another actor/s AND the article does not refer 
to NGOs in general questioning or disputing the accountability of another 
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actor/s, the accountability of NGOs in general or the accountability of a 
specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) that is 
identified as questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs in 
general or the accountability of a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose accountability is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 5 if the article refers to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning 
or disputing the accountability of another actor/s AND the article does not 
refer to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the 
accountability of NGOs in general or the accountability of a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not refer to NGOs in general 
questioning or disputing the accountability of another actor/s, the 
accountability of NGOs in general or the accountability of a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 5 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) that is 
identified as questioning or disputing the accountability of another 
actor. 
 Code 6 if the article refers to NGOs in general questioning or disputing more 
than one of the following: the accountability of NGOs in general, the 
accountability of a specific named NGO (or NGOs), the accountability of 
another actor/s AND the article does not refer to a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) questioning or disputing the accountability of another actor/s, the 
accountability of NGOs in general or the accountability of a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 6 is allocated code A if the article refers to NGOs in general 
questioning or disputing the accountability of both NGOs in general 
and a specific named NGO (or NGOs); code B if the article refers to 
NGOs in general questioning or disputing the accountability of both 
NGOs in general and another actor/s; code C if the article refers to 
NGOs in general questioning or disputing the accountability of 
another actor/s and a specific named NGO (or NGOs); and code D if 
the article refers to NGOs in general questioning the accountability of 
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another actor/s, NGOs in general and a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs). 
- If Code 6 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose accountability is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 7 if the article refers to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning 
or disputing more than one of the following: the accountability of NGOs in 
general, the accountability of a specific named NGO (or NGOs), the 
accountability of another actor/s AND the article does not refer to NGOs in 
general questioning or disputing the accountability of another actor/s, the 
accountability of NGOs in general or the accountability of a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 7 is allocated code A if the article refers to a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the accountability of both 
NGOs in general and a specific named NGO (or NGOs); code B if the 
article refers to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or 
disputing the accountability of both a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) and another actor/s; code C if the article refers to a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the accountability of 
both NGOs in general and another actor/s; code D if the article refers 
to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the 
accountability of another actor/s, NGOs in general and a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs).  
- If Code 7 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) that is questioning or disputing the accountability of another 
actor/s. 
- If Code 7 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose accountability is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 8 if the article refers to both NGOs in general and a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs in 
general, a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and/or another actor. 
- If Code 8 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) that is questioning or disputing the accountability of another 
actor. 
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- If Code 8 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose accountability is being questioned or disputed by a 
specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
  Code 9 if none of the above apply. 
 
7. Other Actors Questioning or Disputing the Accountability of NGOs 
For the purposes of this research “other actors questioning or disputing the 
accountability of NGOs” refers to other actors questioning the accountability of 
NGOs in general or specific named NGOs as organisations or the 
accountability of any of their staff, policies, statements, actions, systems or 
expressed or attributed opinions.  As in the case of question 6, questioning or 
disputing accountability includes any suggestions that any of the NGOs 
mentioned must be accountable or “held accountable”, any suggestions that 
specific actions are required to ensure that the NGOs  mentioned are made 
accountable or more accountable, any assertions that accountability or high 
standards of accountability are necessary, important or expected, and any direct 
or indirect references to a lack of accountability,  weak accountability or 
difficulty complying with accountability mechanisms on the part of the NGOs 
mentioned.  For example, an assertion by a government representative that 
charity law will be or should be reformed to increase the accountability of 
charities should be interpreted as another actor questioning or disputing the 
accountability of NGOs in general.  Similarly, an assertion that a donor 
requires accountability from NGOs should be interpreted as another actor 
questioning the accountability of NGOs. 
 Code 1 if the article does not contain a reference to another actor/s 
questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs in general or the 
accountability of a specific named NGO (or NGOs).   
 Code 2 if the article refers to another actor/s questioning or disputing the 
accountability of NGOs in general AND the article does not also refer to 
another actor/s questioning or disputing the accountability of a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs).  
 Code 3 if the article refers to another actor/s questioning or disputing the 
accountability of a specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not 
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also refer to another actor/s questioning or disputing the accountability of 
NGOs in general. 
- If Code 3 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) whose 
accountability is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 4 if the article refers to another actor/s questioning both the 
accountability of NGOs in general and the accountability of a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) whose 
accountability is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 5 if none of the above apply. 
 
8. Claims of Accountability by NGOs 
For the purposes of this research “claims of accountability by NGOs” refers to 
NGOs in general or  specific named NGOs  claiming to be themselves 
accountable as organisations or claiming that any of their staff, policies, 
statements, actions, systems or expressed or attributed opinions are 
accountable. It also includes any references by NGOs in general or specific 
named NGOs to what NGOs in general or specific named NGOs do to facilitate 
or ensure their accountability. It also includes defences of NGOs’ accountability 
in relation to criticisms contained in or referred to in the same or other articles. 
 Code 1 if the article does not refer to NGOs in general or a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) claiming accountability for NGOs in general or a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 2 if the article refers to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) claiming 
accountability for NGOs in general and/or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) 
AND the article does not also refer to NGOs in general claiming 
accountability for NGOs in general and/or a specific named NGO (or NGOs).  
Note that this code includes instances where a specific named NGO is 
claiming to be itself accountable. 
- If Code 2 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) that is 
claiming accountability for itself, and/or for NGOs in general and/or 
for another specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
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- If Code 2 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) for whom accountability is being claimed. 
 Code 3 if the article refers to NGOs in general claiming accountability for 
NGOs in general and/or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article 
does not also refer to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) claiming 
accountability for NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 3 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) for whom accountability is being claimed. 
 Code 4 if the article refers both to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) 
claiming accountability for NGOs in general and/or for a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) and to NGOs in general claiming accountability for NGOs 
in general and/or for a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) that is 
claiming accountability for itself, for NGOs in general and/or for 
another specific named NGO (or NGOs) 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) for whom accountability is being claimed (either by NGOs in 
general or a specific named NGO or NGOs). 
 Code 5 if none of the above apply 
 
9. Claims of NGO accountability by other actors 
For the purposes of this research “claims of NGO accountability by other 
actors” refers to other actors claiming that NGOs in general or specific named 
NGOs  are accountable as organisations or that any of their staff, policies, 
statements, actions, systems or expressed or attributed opinions are 
accountable. It also includes any references by other actors to what NGOs in 
general or specific named NGOs do to facilitate or ensure their accountability.  
It also includes defences of NGOs’ accountability in relation to criticisms 
contained in or referred to in the same or other articles. 
 Code 1 if the article does not refer to another actor claiming accountability 
for NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
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 Code 2 if the article refers to another actor/s claiming accountability for 
NGOs in general AND the article does not also refer to another actor/s 
claiming accountability for a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 3 if the article refers to another actor/s claiming accountability for a 
specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not also refer to 
another actor/s claiming accountability for NGOs in general. 
- If Code 3 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) for 
whom accountability is claimed. 
 Code 4 if the article refers both to another actor/s claiming accountability for 
NGOs in general and for a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) for 
whom accountability is claimed. 
 Code 5 if none of the above apply. 
 
10. Definitions of Accountability Applied By NGOs and Other Actors 
A key difference in approaches to accountability concerns whether actors should be 
accountable only to those to whom they are formally obliged to account (principal-
agent accountability) or whether actors should also be accountable to others likely 
to be affected by their actions but to whom they are not formally obliged to account 
(stakeholder accountability).  This question seeks to establish when, in references to 
accountability in the newspaper articles being considered, it is either explicitly 
stated or clearly implied that actors, including NGOs, are accountable only to those 
to whom they are formally obliged to account and when they accountable to others 
to whom they are not formally obliged to account but who are likely to be affected by 
their actions. 
 
Examples of principal-agent approaches to accountability.   
NGOs are formally obliged to account to legal and regulatory authorities in their 
home countries and any other countries in which they operate.  Hence any 
references to charity law or regulation in the context of NGO accountability should 
be understood as a principal-agent approach to accountability. In addition, NGOs 
are obliged to account to financial donors.  Hence any references to accountability 
to donors (which are often described in terms of accountability for monies received) 
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should also be understood as principal-agent approaches to accountability.  Please 
note, however, that a reference to financial accountability by itself does not 
necessarily imply a principal-agent approach.  This will only be the case if it is 
explicitly stated or clearly implied that this financial accountability is owed to 
actor/s to whom NGOs or others are formally obliged to account.  Before coding any 
article to indicate that it implies a principal-agent approach to accountability please 
ask yourself: 
1) whether it is either explicitly stated or clearly implied to whom accountability is 
owed – if not, the approach to accountability must be coded ‘not discernible’; 
and 
2) whether it is either explicitly stated or clearly implied that there is a formal 
obligation on the part of one actor to account to another – if this is not the case, 
the approach to accountability should either be coded “stakeholder” or “not 
discernible”.  
 
Examples of stakeholder approaches to accountability.  
Examples of NGO stakeholders that  generally do not have formal power to hold 
NGOs accountable include NGO memberships, beneficiaries/clients, local 
communities in the areas in which NGOs operate, other NGOs, and bodies that have 
developed voluntary codes of conduct for NGOs.  A reference to accountability to 
local citizens for social and environmental impacts for an NGO aid programme is an 
example of a stakeholder approach to accountability as  local citizens are unlikely to 
have  formal power over the NGO.  Before coding any article to indicate that it 
implies a stakeholder approach to accountability please ask yourself: 
1) whether it is either explicitly stated or clearly implied to whom accountability is 
owed – if not, the approach to accountability must be coded ‘not discernible’; 
and 
2) whether it is either explicitly stated or clearly implied that there is NO formal 
obligation on the part of one actor to account to another – if this is not the case, 
the approach to accountability should either be coded “principal-agent” or “not 
discernible”.  
 
Although references to “public accountability” are common, please note that these 
do not by themselves imply a principal-agent or stakeholder approach to 
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accountability as they do not make clear if actors are formally obliged to account to 
the public or not.  Finally, when answering this question please be careful to ensure 
that whereas all references by NGOs to accountability are considered, only 
references by other actors in relation to the accountability of NGOs are considered.   
 
 Code 1 if accountability is not mentioned. 
 Code 2 if the article contains a reference to accountability that is attributed to 
NGOs in general and/or to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and that implies 
a principal-agent approach to accountability AND the article does not contain 
another reference to accountability from the same source that implies a 
different approach to accountability AND the article does not contain a 
reference to accountability (in relation to NGOs) that is attributed to another 
actor. 
- If code 2 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the reference is attributed. 
 Code 3 if the article contains a reference to accountability that is attributed to 
NGOs in general and/or to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and that implies 
a stakeholder approach to accountability AND the article does not contain 
another reference to accountability from the same source that implies a 
different approach to accountability AND the article does not contain a 
reference to accountability (in relation to NGOs) that is attributed to another 
actor. 
- If Code 3 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the reference is attributed. 
 Code 4 if the article contains a reference to accountability (in relation to 
NGOs) that is attributed to another actor/s and that implies a principal-agent 
approach to accountability AND the article does not contain another 
reference to NGO accountability from the same source that implies a 
different approach to accountability AND the article does not contain a 
reference to accountability that is attributed to NGOs in general or a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 5 if the article contains a reference to accountability (in relation to 
NGOs) that is attributed to another actor and that implies a stakeholder 
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approach to accountability AND the article does not contain another 
reference to NGO accountability from the same source that implies a 
different approach to accountability AND the article does not contain a 
reference to accountability that is attributed to NGOs in general or a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 6 if the article contains a reference to accountability that is attributed to 
NGOs in general and/or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and it is not 
possible to discern what approach to accountability is implied AND the 
article does not contain another reference to accountability from the same 
source that implies an approach to accountability that can be classified AND 
the article does not contain a reference to accountability (in relation to 
NGOs) that is attributed to another actor. 
- If Code 6 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the reference is attributed. 
 Code 7 if the article contains a reference to accountability (in relation to 
NGOs) that is attributed to another actor/s and it is not possible to discern 
what approach to accountability is implied AND the article does not contain a 
second reference to accountability (in relation to NGOs) from the same 
source that implies an approach to accountability that can be classified AND 
the article does not contain a reference to accountability that is attributed to 
NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 8 if the article attributes references to accountability (or in the case of 
other actors accountability in relation to NGOs) to more than one of the 
following: NGOs in general, a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and another 
actor. 
- If Code 8 is allocated because a reference to accountability is 
attributed to NGOs in general code A if the reference implies a 
principal-agent approach to accountability, code B if the reference 
implies a stakeholder approach to accountability and code C if it is 
not possible to discern what approach to accountability is implied. 
- If Code 8 is allocated because a reference to accountability is 
attributed to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) list the specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) to whom the reference is attributed. 
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- If Code 8 is allocated because a reference to accountability is 
attributed to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) code A if the 
reference implies a principal-agent approach to accountability, code B 
if the reference implies a stakeholder approach to accountability and 
code C if it is not possible to discern what approach to accountability 
is implied. 
- If Code 8 is allocated because a reference to accountability (in 
relation to NGOs) is attributed to a another actor code A if the 
reference implies a principal-agent approach to accountability, code B 
if the reference implies a stakeholder approach to accountability and 
code C if it is not possible to discern what approach to accountability 
is implied. 
 Code 9 if none of the above apply. 
 
11. Accountability to Whom 
A key issue in understanding approaches to accountability concerns to whom an 
actor is accountable.  This question seeks to establish when, in references to 
accountability in the newspaper articles being considered, it is either explicitly 
stated or clearly implied to whom accountability is owed.  For example, it might be 
mentioned that a relationship between a donor and an NGO has to be marked by 
NGO accountability indicating that accountability is owed to a donor by an NGO.  
Similarly, it might be stated that an NGO or other body is accountable to the public 
or publicly accountable or does something in the interests of public accountability 
indicating that the NGO or other body is accountable to the public.  References to 
democratic accountability in the context of governments or other entities also imply 
accountability to those with the power to elect those governments or other entities.  
If the context of an article appears to imply that accountability is owed to somebody 
but this is not clear, then this should be coded 5 to indicate that there is no explicit 
reference or clear indication as to whom charities should be accountable.  For 
example, a discussion of charity regulation might imply that charities should be 
accountable to a regulator, but this is not clear as a regulator might also stipulate 
that charities would be accountable to the state by means of existing taxation 
reporting requirements. 
224 
 
 
 Code 1 if accountability is not mentioned. 
 Code 2 if the article contains a reference to accountability that is attributed to 
NGOs in general and/or to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and that 
indicates to whom accountability is owed AND the article does not contain 
another reference to accountability from the same source that does not 
indicate to whom accountability is owed AND the article does not contain a 
reference to accountability (in relation to NGOs) that is attributed to another 
actor. 
- If code 2 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the reference is attributed. 
 Code 3 if the article contains a reference to accountability (in relation to 
NGOs) that is attributed to another actor/s and that indicates to whom 
accountability is owed AND the article does not contain another reference to 
NGO accountability from the same source that does not indicate to whom 
accountability is owed AND the article does not contain a reference to 
accountability that is attributed to NGOs in general or a specific named NGO 
(or NGOs). 
 Code 4 if the article attributes references to accountability (or in the case of 
other actors accountability in relation to NGOs) to more than one of the 
following: NGOs in general, a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and another 
actor. 
- If Code 4 is allocated because a reference to accountability is 
attributed to NGOs in general code A if the reference indicates to 
whom accountability is owed and code B if the reference does not 
indicate to whom accountability is owed. 
- If Code 4 is allocated because a reference to accountability is 
attributed to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) list the specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) to whom the reference is attributed. 
- If Code 4 is allocated because a reference to accountability is 
attributed to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) code A if the 
reference indicates to whom accountability is owed and code B if the 
reference does not indicate to whom accountability is owed. 
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- If Code 4 is allocated because a reference to accountability (in 
relation to NGOs) is attributed to a another actor code A if the 
reference indicates to whom accountability is owed and code B if the 
reference does not indicate to whom accountability is owed. 
 Code 5 if none of the above apply. 
 
12. Other NGO References to accountability 
“Other NGO references to accountability” refer to references by NGOs in 
general or specific named NGOs to accountability that are not concerned with 
questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs in general, specific named 
NGOs or other actors as defined in question 6 or with claiming accountability 
for NGOs in general or specific named NGOs as defined in question 8.  
Examples  of other NGO references to accountability include a statement by an 
NGO that another actor is accountable, an assertion that another actor is 
unable to hold someone accountable, and an assertion that the  actions or 
policies of an organisation do not encourage another actor to be accountable. 
 Code 1 if the article does not attribute a reference to accountability to NGOs 
in general or a specific named NGO. 
 Code 2 if the only reference/s in the article to accountability attributed to 
NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) are concerned either 
with NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or 
disputing the accountability of NGOs in general, a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) or another actor or with NGOs in general or a specific named NGO 
(or NGOs) claiming that NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) are accountable. 
 Code 3 if the article attributes another reference/s to accountability (as 
described above) to NGOs in general and/or a specific named NGO. 
- If Code 3 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the reference/s is attributed. 
 
13. Other References by Other Actors to NGOs and accountability 
“Other references by other actors to NGOs and accountability” refer to 
references by other actors to NGOs in relation to accountability that are not 
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concerned with questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs in general, 
specific named NGOs or other actors as defined in question 7, or with claiming 
accountability for NGOs in general or specific named NGOs as defined in 
question  9. An example of another reference by an actor to NGOs and 
accountability is a statement by another actor that they are not stating whether 
an NGO is accountable or not. 
 Code 1 if the article does not attribute a reference to accountability in relation 
to NGOs to another actor/s. 
 Code 2 if the only reference/s in the article to NGOs in relation to 
accountability attributed to another actor/s are concerned either with 
questioning or disputing the accountability of NGOs in general or a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) or claiming that NGOs in general or a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) are accountable. 
 Code 3 if the article attributes another reference/s to accountability in relation 
to NGOs (as described above) to another actor/s. 
 
NGO Administration Costs 
14. References to NGO Administration Costs 
Although specific definitions vary, NGO “administration costs” are broadly 
defined as how much NGOs spend on carrying out their work – this typically 
includes costs such as head office salaries and head office operating costs.  For 
the purposes of this research, only specific references to “administration cost” 
or “administration costs” are to be considered.   References to related ideas 
including “NGO overheads” or “the cost of carrying out NGO work” should 
not be interpreted as references to NGO administration costs.  Please note that 
references by NGOs or other actors to the administration costs of other actors 
are NOT RELEVANT to this question. 
 Code 1 if the administration costs of NGOs in general or a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) are not referred to. 
 Code 2 if the administration costs of NGOs in general or a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) are referred to in a comment/s attributed to NGOs in general 
or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not also attribute a 
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reference to NGO administration costs to another actor.  Note that this may 
include a specific named NGO referring to its own administration costs. 
- If Code 2 is allocated and, if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the comment/s is attributed. 
- If Code 2 is allocated and, if relevant, list the name of the specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) whose administration costs are being referred 
to. 
 Code 3 if the administration costs of NGOs in general or a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) are referred to in a comment/s expressed in the article but 
not attributed to NGOs in general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND 
the article does not also attribute a reference to NGO administration costs to 
NGOs in general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 3 is allocated and, if relevant, list the name of the specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) whose administration costs are being referred 
to. 
 Code 4 if the administration costs of NGOs in general or a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) are referred to both in a comment/s attributed to NGOs in 
general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and a comment/s attributed to 
another actor. 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the comment/s is attributed. 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the name of the specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) whose administration costs are being referred 
to by a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose administration costs are being referred to by another 
actor/s. 
 
15. References Made By NGOs to NGO Administration Costs  
This question seeks to categorise references made by NGOs in general or 
specific named NGOs to the administration costs of NGOs in general or specific 
named NGOs.  For the purposes of this research, if an NGO states that its own 
administration costs are low or implies that its own administration costs are low 
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without commenting further on administration costs this should be viewed as a 
suggestion on that NGO’s part that low NGO administration costs are 
desirable.  Suggestions that high administration costs are undesirable should be 
viewed as equivalent to suggestions that low administration costs are desirable. 
 Code 1 if the article does not attribute a reference/s to the administration 
costs of either NGOs in general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) to 
either NGOs in general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 2 if the article attributes a reference/s to administration costs to NGOs 
in general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and that reference/s implies 
that low administration costs are desirable without also suggesting that this 
only holds true in certain cases AND no other reference to NGO 
administration costs attributed to either NGOs in general or a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) in the article implies a different approach to NGO 
administration costs. 
 Code 3 if the article attributes a reference/s to administration costs to either 
NGOs in general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and that reference/s 
implies that administration costs are either not appropriate measures or are 
only appropriate if other factors are also considered AND no other reference 
to NGO administration costs attributed to either NGOs in general or a 
specific named NGO (or NGOs) in the article implies a different approach to 
NGO administration costs. 
 Code 4 if the article attributes a reference/s to NGO administration costs to 
NGOs in general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and that reference/s 
implies either a single different approach to those described in Codes 2 & 3 
above or it is not possible to discern what approach/es is implied  
 Code 5 if the article attributes more than one reference to NGO 
administration costs to either NGOs in general  or a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) and those references imply more than one of the approaches to NGO 
administration costs described in Codes 2, 3 & 4 above. 
 Code 6 if none of the above apply. 
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16. References Made by Other Actors to NGO Administration Costs 
This question seeks to categorise references made by other actors to the 
administration costs of NGOs in general or specific named NGOs.  For the 
purposes of this research if another actor states that an NGO’s administration 
costs are low or implies that its administration costs are low without 
commenting further on administration costs it is up to the coder to decide if this 
constitutes a suggestion that low administration costs are desirable or not.  As 
in question 15, suggestions that high administration costs are undesirable 
should be viewed as equivalent to suggestions that low administration costs are 
desirable. 
 Code 1 if the article does not attribute a reference/s to the administration 
costs of either NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) to 
another actor/s. 
 Code 2 if the article attributes a reference/s to NGO administration costs to 
another actor and that reference implies that low NGO administration costs 
are desirable without also suggesting that this only holds true in certain cases 
AND no other reference to NGO administration costs attributed to another 
actor in the article implies a different approach to NGO administration costs. 
 Code 3 if the article attributes a reference/s to NGO administration costs to 
another actor/s and that reference/s implies that administration costs are 
either not appropriate measures or are only appropriate if other factors are 
also considered AND no other reference to NGO administration costs 
attributed to another actor in the article implies a different approach to NGO 
administration costs. 
 Code 4 if the article attributes a reference/s to NGO administration costs to 
another actor/s   and that reference/s implies either a single different approach 
to those described in Codes 2 & 3 above or it is not possible to discern what 
approach is implied. 
 Code 5 if the article attributes more than one reference to NGO 
administration costs to other actor/s and those references imply more than 
one of the approaches to NGO administration costs described in Codes 2,3 & 
4 above. 
 Code 6 if none of the above apply. 
230 
 
 
Section C: Legitimacy 
17. References to NGO legitimacy 
For the purposes of this study NGO legitimacy refers to either the legitimacy of 
NGOs in general or specific named NGOs as organisations or the legitimacy of 
any of their staff, policies, statements, actions, systems or expressed or 
attributed opinions.  For example, a reference to the legitimacy of lobbying 
activities conducted by NGOs at world summits should be interpreted as a 
reference to the legitimacy of NGOs in general.     
 Code 1 if neither the legitimacy of NGOs in general or nor that of a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) is referred to. 
 Code 2 if the legitimacy of NGOs in general or that of a specific named NGO 
(or NGOs) is referred to in a comment/s attributed to NGOs in general  or a 
specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not also attribute a 
reference to NGO legitimacy to another actor.  Note that this may include a 
specific named NGO referring to its own legitimacy. 
- If Code 2 is allocated and, if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the comment/s is attributed. 
- If Code 2 is allocated and, if relevant, list the name of the specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) whose legitimacy is being referred to. 
 Code 3 if the legitimacy of NGOs in general and/or that of a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) is referred to in a comment/s attributed to another actor 
AND the article does not also attribute a reference to NGO legitimacy to 
NGOs in general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 3 is allocated and, if relevant, list the name of the specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) whose legitimacy is being referred to. 
 Code 4 if the legitimacy of NGOs in general and/or that of a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) is referred to both in a comment/s attributed to NGOs in 
general  or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and a comment/s attributed to 
another actor. 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the comment/s is attributed. 
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- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the name of the specific 
named NGO (or NGOs) whose legitimacy is being referred to by 
NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose legitimacy is being referred to by another actor/s. 
 
18. NGOs questioning or disputing the legitimacy of NGOs or other actors 
For the purposes of this research “NGOs questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of NGOs or other actors” refers to NGOs in general or specific 
named NGOs  questioning the legitimacy of NGOs in general, specific named 
NGOs or other actors as organisations or the legitimacy of any of their staff, 
policies, statements, actions, systems or expressed or attributed opinions.  More 
specifically, questioning or disputing legitimacy includes any suggestions that 
specific actions are required to enhance the legitimacy of the actors mentioned, 
any assertions that legitimacy is necessary or important, and any direct or 
indirect references to a lack of legitimacy or weak legitimacy on the part of the 
actors mentioned.  For example, a reference by Amnesty International to the 
illegitimacy of the war in Iraq in the context of a discussion of US foreign policy 
should be interpreted as a specific named NGO questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of another actor as the war can be viewed as an action of the US 
government.  An assertion by an NGO that a particular action or statement does 
not legitimise the activities of an actor or NGO should also be interpreted as 
that NGO disputing the legitimacy of that actor or NGO.  References to 
legitimate NGOs should be understood to imply that there are also illegitimate 
NGOs and hence should be coded to indicate that the legitimacy of NGOs has 
been questioned or disputed.  If in certain articles NGOs are found to be 
questioning or disputing the legitimacy of ideas, policies, statements, expressed 
opinions or actions that cannot be attributed to another actor then these articles 
should be coded 9 for this question.  For example, a reference by a specific 
named NGO to the illegitimacy of the idea of positive discrimination or the 
practice of female genital mutilation should be coded 9. 
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 Code 1 if the article does not refer to NGOs in general or a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the legitimacy of another actor, 
NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs).   
 Code 2 if the article refers to NGOs in general questioning or disputing either 
the legitimacy of NGOs in general or the legitimacy of a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) (not both) AND the article does not refer to NGOs in 
general questioning or disputing the legitimacy of another actor/s AND the 
article does not refer to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or 
disputing the legitimacy of another actor/s, the legitimacy of NGOs in 
general or the legitimacy of a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 2 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose legitimacy is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 3 if the article refers to NGOs in general questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of another actor/s AND the article does not refer to NGOs in 
general questioning or disputing the legitimacy of NGOs in general or the 
legitimacy of a specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not 
refer to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of another actor/s, the legitimacy of NGOs in general or the 
legitimacy of a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 4 if the article refers to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning 
or disputing either the legitimacy of NGOs in general or the legitimacy of a 
specific named NGO (or NGOs) (not both) AND the article does not refer to 
a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the legitimacy of 
another actor/s AND the article does not refer to NGOs in general 
questioning or disputing the legitimacy of another actor/s, the legitimacy of 
NGOs in general or the legitimacy of a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) that is 
identified as questioning or disputing the legitimacy of NGOs in 
general or the legitimacy of a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose legitimacy is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 5 if the article refers to a specific named NGO questioning or disputing 
the legitimacy of another actor/s AND the article does not refer to a specific 
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named NGO questioning or disputing the legitimacy of NGOs in general or 
the legitimacy of a specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not 
refer to NGOs in general questioning or disputing the legitimacy of another 
actor/s, the legitimacy of NGOs in general or the legitimacy of a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 5 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) that is 
identified as questioning or disputing the legitimacy of another actor. 
 Code 6 if the article refers to NGOs in general questioning or disputing more 
than one of the following: the legitimacy of NGOs in general, the legitimacy 
of a specific named NGO (or NGOs) or the legitimacy of another actor/s 
AND the article does not contain a reference to a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) questioning or disputing the legitimacy of another actor/s, the 
legitimacy of NGOs in general or the legitimacy of a specific named NGO 
(or NGOs). 
- If Code 6 is allocated code A if the article refers to NGOs in general 
questioning or disputing the legitimacy of both NGOs in general and 
a specific named NGO (or NGOs); code B if the article refers to 
NGOs in general questioning or disputing the legitimacy of both 
NGOs in general and another actor/s; code C if the article refers to 
NGOs in general questioning or disputing the legitimacy of another 
actor/s and a specific named NGO (or NGOs); and code D if the 
article refers to NGOs in general questioning the legitimacy of 
another actor/s, NGOs in general and a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs). 
- If Code 6 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose legitimacy is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 7 if the article refers to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning 
or disputing more than one of the following: the legitimacy of NGOs in 
general, the legitimacy of a specific named NGO (or NGOs) or the 
legitimacy of another actor/s AND the article does not refer to NGOs in 
general questioning or disputing the legitimacy of another actor/s, the 
legitimacy of NGOs in general or the legitimacy of a specific named NGO 
(or NGOs). 
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- If Code 7 is allocated code A if the article refers to a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the legitimacy of both 
NGOs in general and a specific named NGO (or NGOs); code B if the 
article refers to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or 
disputing the legitimacy of both a specific named NGO (or NGOs) 
and another actor/s; code C if the article refers to a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the legitimacy of both 
NGOs in general and another actor/s; code D if the article refers to a 
specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of another actor/s, NGOs in general and a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs).  
- If Code 7 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) that is questioning or disputing the legitimacy of another 
actor/s. 
- If Code 7 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose legitimacy is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 8 if the article refers to both NGOs in general and a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) questioning or disputing the legitimacy of NGOs in general, 
a specific named NGO (or NGOs) and/or another actor. 
- If Code 8 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) that is questioning or disputing the legitimacy of another 
actor. 
- If Code 8 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) whose legitimacy is being questioned or disputed by a 
specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 9 if none of the above apply. 
 
19. Other Actors Questioning or Disputing the Legitimacy of NGOs 
For the purposes of this research “other actors questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of NGOs” refers to other actors questioning the legitimacy of NGOs 
in general or specific named NGOs as organisations or the legitimacy of any of 
their staff, policies, statements, actions, systems or expressed or attributed 
opinions.  As in the case of question 18, questioning or disputing legitimacy 
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includes any suggestions that specific actions are required to enhance the 
legitimacy of the actors mentioned, any assertions that legitimacy is necessary 
or important,  and any direct or indirect references to a lack of legitimacy or 
weak legitimacy on the part of the NGOs mentioned.    
 Code 1 if the article does not contain a reference to another actor/s 
questioning or disputing the legitimacy of NGOs in general or the legitimacy 
of a specific named NGO (or NGOs).   
 Code 2 if the article refers to another actor/s questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of NGOs in general AND the article does not also refer to another 
actor/s questioning or disputing the legitimacy of a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs).  
 Code 3 if the article refers to another actor/s questioning or disputing the 
legitimacy of a specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not 
also refer to another actor/s questioning or disputing the legitimacy of NGOs 
in general. 
- If Code 3 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) whose 
legitimacy is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 4 if the article refers to another actor/s questioning both the legitimacy 
of NGOs in general and the legitimacy of a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) whose 
legitimacy is being questioned or disputed. 
 Code 5 if none of the above apply. 
 
20. Claims of Legitimacy by NGOs 
For the purposes of this research “claims of legitimacy by NGOs” refers to 
NGOs in general or  specific named NGOs  claiming to be themselves legitimate 
as organisations or claiming that any of their staff, policies, statements, actions, 
systems or expressed or attributed opinions are legitimate. For example, a 
reference by an NGO to lobbying being a legitimate NGO activity constitutes a 
claim of legitimacy by an NGO.  References in the codes below to “bases” for 
legitimacy refer to explanations given by NGOs as to what makes them 
legitimate – for example, their technical expertise, their role as representatives, 
their past performance or their values. 
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 Code 1 if the article does not refer to NGOs in general or a specific named 
NGO (or NGOs) claiming legitimacy for NGOs in general or for a specific 
named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 2 if the article refers to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) claiming 
legitimacy for NGOs in general and/or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) 
AND the article does not also refer to NGOs in general claiming legitimacy 
for NGOs in general and/or a specific named NGO (or NGOs).  Note that this 
code includes instances where a specific named NGO is claiming legitimacy 
for itself. 
- If Code 2 is allocated  list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) that is 
claiming legitimacy for itself, and/or for NGOs in general and/or for 
another specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 2 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) for whom legitimacy is being claimed. 
-      If Code 2 is allocated Code A if no bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited and Code B if one or more bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited. 
 Code 3 if the article refers to NGOs in general claiming legitimacy for NGOs 
in general and/or for a specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does 
not also refer to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) claiming legitimacy for 
NGOs in general and/or a specific named NGO (or NGOs).  
- If Code 3 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) for whom legitimacy is being claimed. 
- If Code 3 is allocated Code A if no bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited and Code B if one or more bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited. 
 Code 4 if the article refers both to a specific named NGO (or NGOs) 
claiming legitimacy for NGOs in general and/or for a specific named NGO 
(or NGOs) and  to NGOs in general claiming legitimacy for NGOs in general 
and/or a specific named NGO (or NGOs).  
- If Code 4 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) that is 
claiming legitimacy for itself, for NGOs in general and/or for another 
specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
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- If Code 4 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) for whom legitimacy is being claimed (either by NGOs in 
general or a specific named NGO or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated Code A if no bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited and Code B if one or more bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited. 
 Code 5 if none of the above apply. 
 
21. Claims of NGO legitimacy by other actors 
For the purposes of this research “claims of NGO legitimacy by other actors” 
refers to other actors claiming that NGOs in general or specific named NGOs  
are legitimate as organisations or that any of their staff, policies, statements, 
actions, systems or expressed or attributed opinions are legitimate. For 
example, a reference by another actor to lobbying being a legitimate NGO 
activity constitutes a claim of NGO legitimacy by another actor. References in 
the codes below to “bases” for legitimacy refer to explanations given by other 
actors as to what makes NGOs  legitimate – for example, their technical 
expertise, their role as representatives, their past performance or their values. 
 Code 1 if the article does not refer to another actor claiming legitimacy for 
NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
 Code 2 if the article refers to another actor/s claiming legitimacy for NGOs in 
general AND the article does not also refer to another actor/s claiming 
legitimacy for a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
-  If Code 2 is allocated Code A if no bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited and Code B if one or more bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited. 
 Code 3 if the article refers to another actor/s claiming legitimacy for a 
specific named NGO (or NGOs) AND the article does not also refer to 
another actor/s claiming legitimacy for NGOs in general. 
- If Code 3 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) for 
whom legitimacy is claimed. 
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- If Code 3 is allocated Code A if no bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited and Code B if one or more bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited. 
 Code 4 if the article refers both to another actor/s claiming legitimacy for 
NGOs in general and for a specific named NGO (or NGOs). 
- If Code 4 is allocated list the specific named NGO (or NGOs) for 
whom legitimacy is claimed. 
- If Code 4 is allocated Code A if no bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited and Code B if one or more bases for the claimed legitimacy 
are cited. 
 Code 5 if none of the above apply. 
 
22. Other NGO references to legitimacy 
“Other NGO references to legitimacy” refer to references by NGOs in general 
or specific named NGOs to legitimacy that are not concerned with questioning 
or disputing the legitimacy of NGOs in general, specific named NGOs or other 
actors, or with claiming legitimacy for NGOs in general or specific named 
NGOs as defined in questions 18 & 20.   Examples of other NGO reference to 
legitimacy include  a reference by an NGO to legitimate military activity, a 
reference by an NGO to a legitimate matter for debate and a reference by an 
NGO to activities that legitimise or lend legitimacy to military operations or 
corrupt governments.  
 Code 1 if the article does not attribute a reference to legitimacy to NGOs in 
general or a specific named NGO. 
 Code 2 if the only reference/s in the article to legitimacy attributed to NGOs 
in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) are concerned either with 
NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or NGOs) questioning or 
disputing the legitimacy of NGOs in general, a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) or another actor or with NGOs in general or a specific named NGO 
(or NGOs) claiming that NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) are legitimate. 
 Code 3 if the article attributes another reference/s to legitimacy (as described 
above) to NGOs in general and/or a specific named NGO. 
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- If Code 3 is allocated, and if relevant, list the specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) to whom the reference/s is attributed. 
 
23. Other References by Other Actors to NGOs and legitimacy 
“Other references by other actors to NGOs and legitimacy” refer to references 
by other actors to NGOs in relation to legitimacy  that are not concerned with 
questioning or disputing the legitimacy  of NGOs in general, specific named 
NGOs or other actors, or with claiming legitimacy for NGOs in general or 
specific named NGOs as defined in questions 19 & 21.  An example of another 
reference by another actor to NGOs and legitimacy is a statement by another 
actor that an initiative is being lent legitimacy or legitimised through the 
participation of NGOs. 
 Code 1 if the article does not attribute a reference to legitimacy in relation to 
NGOs to another actor/s. 
 Code 2 if the only reference/s in the article to NGOs in relation to legitimacy 
attributed to another actor/s are concerned either with questioning or 
disputing the legitimacy of NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) or claiming that NGOs in general or a specific named NGO (or 
NGOs) are legitimate. 
 Code 3 if the article attributes another reference/s to legitimacy in relation to 
NGOs (as described above) to another actor/s. 
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Protocol Annex 1. Keyword Search Terms  
 
Accountability 
Accountable 
Accountably 
Unaccountability 
Unaccountable 
Unaccountably 
 
 
Legitimacy 
Illegitimacy 
Illegitimate 
Legitimate 
Legitimately 
Legitimation 
Legitimisation 
Legitimise 
Legitimised 
Legitimises 
Legitimising 
 
 
Administration costs  These are considered  
Administration cost  derivatives of administration costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These are all considered  
derivatives of accountability 
These are all considered  
derivatives of legitimacy 
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Protocol Annex 2.  Specific NGO Names 
 
Full Name of NGO     Abbreviated, Alternative & 
Previous Names 
1. Action Aid Ireland  Action Aid 
2. AFRI     
3. Amnesty   
4. ChildFund    Christian Children’s Fund 
5. Christian Aid  
6. Comhlámh  
7. Concern Worldwide  Concern 
8. Debt and Development Coalition  
9. Dóchas  
10. GOAL  
11. Gorta  
12. Hope Foundation  
   
Edith Wilkins Hope Foundation, Edith 
Wilkins Street Children’s Foundation 
13. Medecins Sans Frontieres  MSF, Doctors Without Borders 
14. Oxfam Ireland   Oxfam 
15. Plan Ireland    
16. Self Help Africa  
   
Self Help, Self Help Development 
International 
17. Sierra Leone Ireland Partnership  
18. Sightsavers  
19. Trócaire  
20. Voluntary Service International  VSI 
21. Volunteer Missionary 
Movement  
VMM 
22. VSO Ireland   VSO 
23. World Vision Ireland  World Vision 
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Protocol Annex 3.  Generic Subject Search Terms 
 
NGO 
Nongovernmental organisation 
Non-governmental organisation 
Non governmental organisation 
Charity 
Charitable organisation  
Charitable agency 
Non-profit 
Nonprofit 
Aid organisation 
Aid agency 
Humanitarian organisation 
Humanitarian agency 
Relief organisation 
Relief agency 
International development organisation 
International development agency 
Third World organisation 
Third World agency 
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Appendix C.  Full List of NGOs 
NGOs with operations outside Ireland 
NGO Name Actual Name/s Used In Searching 
Action Aid Ireland Action Aid 
ADRA ADRA & Adventist Development and Relief 
Agency 
Aidlink Aidlink 
AIDS Partnership with Africa AIDS Partnership with Africa 
Aurelia Trust Aurelia Trust 
Bothar Bothar 
Burren Chernobyl Project Burren Chernobyl Project 
Camara Camara 
Chernobyl Aid Ireland Chernobyl Aid Ireland 
Chernobyl Children’s Appeal Chernobyl Children’s Appeal  
Child Aid Ireland Child Aid 
ChildFund (formerly Christian 
Children’s Fund) 
ChildFund & Christian Children’s Fund 
Christian Aid Ireland Christian Aid 
Christian Blind Mission Ireland Christian Blind Mission 
Comber Romanian Orphanage Appeal Comber Romanian Orphanage Appeal 
Concern Worldwide Concern* 
Cradle Cradle 
Friends of Londiani Friends of Londiani 
Friends of Mustard Seed 
Communities 
Friends of Mustard Seed Communities 
GOAL GOAL* 
Gorta Gorta 
Health Action Overseas Health Action Overseas 
ICROSS ICROSS 
International Service Ireland International Service Ireland 
Irish Bosnia Aid Irish Bosnia Aid 
Irish League of Credit Unions 
Development Foundation 
Irish League of Credit Unions Development 
Foundation 
Irish Foundation for Cooperative 
Development 
Irish Foundation for Cooperative Development 
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Irish Friends of Albania Irish Friends of Albania 
Lepra Ireland Lepra 
Medecins Sans Frontieres Medecins Sans Frontieres & MSF & Doctors 
Without Borders 
Nepal Leprosy Trust Nepal Leprosy Trust 
Orbis Ireland Orbis  
Outreach Moldova Outreach Moldova 
Oxfam Ireland Oxfam 
Plan Ireland Plan Ireland 
Progressio Ireland Progressio 
Realta Global AIDS Foundation Realta  
Rokpa Aid Ireland Rokpa Aid  
Romanian Children’s Appeal Romanian Children’s Appeal 
SAFE SAFE* & Support for Afghan Further Education 
Schools Across Borders Schools Across Borders 
Self Help Africa (formerly Self Help 
Development International) 
Self Help* 
SERVE SERVE 
Sightsavers Sightsavers & Sight Savers 
Skillshare International Ireland Skillshare 
Suas Suas 
Tearfund Tearfund 
The Hope Foundation (also referred to 
as the Edith Wilkins Hope Foundation 
and the Edith Wilkins Street 
Children’s Foundation) 
Hope Foundation & Edith Wilkins 
The Leprosy Mission Leprosy Mission 
To Russia with Love To Russia with Love 
Trocaire Trocaire 
Valid Nutrition Valid Nutrition 
Vita (formerly Refugee Trust) Vita & Refugee Trust 
Voluntary Service International  Voluntary Service International & VSI 
VSO Ireland VSO 
Volunteer Missionary Movement Volunteer Missionary Movement & VMM 
Waterford Kitui Partnership Waterford Kitui Partnership 
245 
 
Wingspread International Wingspread  
World Vision Ireland World Vision  
 
NGOs with operations in Ireland exclusively 
NGO Name Actual Name/s Used In Searching 
AFRI AFRI 
Africa Centre (formerly Africa 
Solidarity Centre) 
Africa Centre & Africa Solidarity Centre 
Amnesty Amnesty* 
Banulacht Banulacht 
Comhlamh Comhlamh 
Ethical Development Action Ethical Development Action 
Galway One World Centre Galway One World Centre 
Irish Sudanese Solidarity Group Irish Sudanese Solidarity Group 
Kerry Action for Development 
Education 
Kerry Action for Development Education & KADE 
Latin America Solidarity Centre Latin America Solidarity Centre & LASC 
Link Community Development Link Community Development 
Sierra Leone Ireland Partnership Sierra Leone Ireland Partnership 
Waterford One World Centre Waterford One World Centre 
West Papua Action West Papua Action 
80:20 80:20 
 
 
Associations of NGOs 
NGO Name Actual Name/s Used In Searching 
Debt and Development Coalition Debt and Development Coalition 
Dóchas Dóchas 
Irish Development Education Association Irish Development Education Association 
 
 
*The CAPS command was used in Nexis UK with these NGO names to ensure that articles 
containing the names were only identified by the search if the names contained one or more 
capital letter – e.g. Concern or GOAL. 
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Appendix D.  Procedures Used to Identify Search Terms 
 
Keyword Search Terms 
 I conducted initial newspaper searches on Nexis UK to identify  keyword 
search terms deriving from the words “legitimacy” and “accountability” by entering 
“legitim!”, “accountab!”, “illegitim!”, “unaccountab!” with a selection of NGO 
names and generic subject search terms for the full duration of the study period.  I 
then used the derivatives produced as keyword search terms.  In addition, I identified 
“administration costs” as a keyword search term of interest.  I also assessed the 
usefulness of the term “overheads”, which is sometimes used to refer to 
administration costs, as a possible additional keyword search term.  However I found 
that the articles it produced were generally either irrelevant or also contained the 
term “administration costs” and so did not include it in my final list of keyword 
search terms.   
 
Generic Subject Search Terms 
 I selected generic subject search terms selected based on my knowledge of 
the terminology most commonly used to refer to NGOs when they are not mentioned 
by name. 
 
Specific NGO names 
I identified specific NGOs for inclusion in this study using the following 
inclusion and exclusion criteria: 
 An organisation must have received funding from Irish Aid during any of the 
years under consideration for which funding records from Irish Aid were 
available at the point of the commencement of the research (1994-2008), 
and/or must have been a member of Dóchas, either in 2006 when its most 
comprehensive member survey was conducted or in 2009 when the research 
began.  I used Irish Aid Annual Reports as a source of information about 
which NGOs received funding in a given year and Dóchas’s 2006 
membership survey and 2009 membership list as a source of information on 
Dóchas members (Donnat, 2007, Dochas, 2009b). 
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 An organisation must have had a formal physical base in the Republic of 
Ireland for some or all of the period 1994 – 2009.  I excluded organisations 
that were members of Dóchas and/or received funding from Irish Aid during 
the study period but were based in other developed or developing countries. 
 An organisation must have been primarily focused on international 
humanitarian or development activities.  I excluded organisations that 
periodically engaged in activities associated with international humanitarian 
or development work, but were primarily oriented towards another goal.  
Examples of this include the organisation Pavee Point, which has conducted 
development education, but has as its primary goal “to contribute to 
improvement in the quality of life and living circumstances of Irish 
Travellers” (Pavee Point, 2009).  Similarly, the Irish Family Planning 
Association has engaged in development activities outside Ireland, but has as 
its primary focus the provision in Ireland of “sexual and reproductive health 
information, clinical services, counselling services, education, training and 
awareness raising” (Irish Family Planning Association, 2009). 
 Although human rights organisations were not a specific target of this 
research, due to the frequent overlaps between human rights and 
development and humanitarian activities, I included any human rights 
organisations that identified themselves as development or humanitarian 
organisations by choosing to become members of Dóchas. 
 I excluded religious congregations and congregational missionary 
organisations from the study primarily because I considered it likely that their 
founding beliefs and emphasis on religious mission would present particular 
legitimacy and accountability questions that differed from those of lay 
organisations. However, I included one lay missionary organisation that 
engaged in development and humanitarian activities and fulfilled the other 
criteria (Volunteer Missionary Movement).  I excluded the Irish Missionary 
Union, an umbrella body for missionary organisations, as its membership 
was predominately made up of congregational missionary organisations.   
 I excluded all UN bodies – e.g. UNHCR and UNICEF – as they are not 
considered NGOs.  
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 I excluded the Irish Red Cross as, having been established by an Act of the 
Oireachtas in 1939, it is not considered an NGO 
I applied the inclusion and exclusion criteria for NGOs as follows: 
 Step 1 – I consulted the Dóchas 2009 member list, which contained 44 
members including all those who were members when the 2006 Dóchas 
member survey took place. I excluded 4 organisations that were based in 
Northern Ireland (Centre for Global Education, Children in Crossfire, Church 
Mission Society Ireland, War on Want) leaving 40 organisations. The 
addition of Dóchas itself brought this to 41. 
 Step 2 – I deleted 4 additional organisations from the Dóchas list because 
development and/or humanitarian activity was not their primary focus (Irish 
Commission for Justice and Social Affairs, Irish Family Planning 
Association, National Youth Council of Ireland, Irish Council for 
International Students).  This left 37 organisations. 
 Step 3 – I deleted the Irish Missionary Union, a representative union for 
missionary organisations, as its membership was made up predominately of 
religious congregations involved in missionary activity – as of 2009 it had 76 
religious congregations among its membership and only 3 lay missionary 
organisations (Irish Missionary Union, 2009).  This left 36 organisations.  
 Step 4 – I deleted the Irish Red Cross as it did not meet the definition of an 
NGO.  This left 35 organisations. 
 Step 5 – I reviewed all Irish Aid annual reports from 1994 to 2008 and 
included all organisations identified as having received Irish Aid Funding 
that were not already on the Dóchas list but  met the other criteria.  I 
considered all forms of Irish Aid funding to NGOs (e.g. MAPS, co-financing, 
humanitarian aid, development education) as part of this process.  The 
amount of information provided by Irish Aid in annual reports in different 
years differed significantly – e.g. the 2008 report provided no detailed 
information on the NGO recipients of aid whereas reports from previous 
years provided significant detail.  As a result of the reviews of the annual 
reports I identified an additional 42 NGOs.   
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 In total, therefore, I identified 77 NGOs.  I then used their websites to 
categorise them into one of three categories:  
 NGOs that conducted operations outside Ireland (whether through partner 
organisations or directly and whether or not they also conducted activities in 
Ireland);  
 NGOs that were operational exclusively in Ireland and did not act as 
representative bodies for other NGOs; and  
 NGOs that acted as representative bodies for other NGOs. 
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Appendix E.  Image of Nexis UK Search Engine 
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Appendix F. Article Searching and Filtration Procedures 
General Description of Searching Procedures Followed 
As already described, I used Nexis UK to search for articles that contained a specific 
reference to one or more of 77 NGOs listed in Appendix C AND/OR one or more of 23 
generic subject search terms listed in Annex 3 to Appendix B AND contained a reference to 
one or more of the keyword search terms “accountability”, “legitimacy” or “administration 
costs” AND/OR any of the derivatives of these keyword search terms specified in Annex 1 to 
Appendix B.  
In cases where I anticipated a small volume of result, I used the “!” function in Nexis 
UK to yield all results that began with a particular combination of letters – e.g. I used 
“accountab!” to yield all articles that contained the words “accountability”, “accountable” or 
“accountably”.  This reduced the number of searches required while still ensuring that all 
relevant articles were found.  In the case of searches for which I anticipated larger numbers of 
articles, I entered each one of the keyword search terms individually with an NGO name or 
generic subject search term.  This made the results easier to manage as the volume of articles 
yielded per search was smaller. 
 I also used the “CAPS” function in Nexis UK to ensure that only NGO names with 
one or more capital letter would be included in the sample produced by the search.  This was 
particularly useful in the cases of the NGOs “GOAL”, “Concern” and “Amnesty” as their 
names are also common nouns and searches using their names would otherwise lead to large 
volumes of irrelevant results. 
 As plurals are automatically detected by Nexis UK I used the keyword search term 
“administration cost” to find articles containing both the term “administration cost” and 
“administration costs”. 
 In order to ensure that all relevant articles containing references to the 77 identified 
NGOs were found, I also took the following steps: 
 I reviewed the website of each NGO to see if any had changed their names during the 
study period.  In cases where the website reviews revealed that an NGO had changed 
its name during the study period I used both names for the purpose of article 
searching. 
 I used acronyms as search terms when these were commonly used to refer to the 
organisation – e.g.  I used both “VMM” and “Volunteer Missionary Movement” to 
search for articles concerning this organisation.   
252 
 
 I used “Medecins Sans Frontieres”, “MSF” and the English language version, 
“Doctors Without Borders” as search terms for this organisation.    
 Apart from the case of “Plan Ireland”, in cases where the NGO’s name was followed 
by “Ireland” to designate the Irish branch of an international NGO, I excluded 
“Ireland” in the searching process in case the NGO might also have been referred to 
without “Ireland” being mentioned – e.g. I searched for “Oxfam Ireland” and “World 
Vision Ireland” using “Oxfam” and “Word Vision”.  In some cases this produced 
articles that appeared to be related to the international organisation in general, rather 
than the Irish branch of the organisation.  I nonetheless retained these articles as I felt 
that they could be associated by the readership with the Irish branch of the 
organisation given that they appeared in an Irish newspaper. I did not follow this 
strategy for “Plan Ireland” and instead searched for it using its full name, “Plan 
Ireland”, as conducting a search based on “Plan” alone would have yielded thousands 
of irrelevant articles.  
Initial Article Identification Process and Results 
 As each article was produced by Nexis UK I briefly checked it to confirm that it: 
A) Contained a reference to one or more of 77 NGOs listed in Appendix C AND/OR one 
or more of 23 generic subject search terms listed in Annex 3 to Appendix B - e.g. I 
excluded articles in which “Concern” or “GOAL” were being used as nouns rather 
than to refer to the organisations “Concern” and “GOAL” and articles in which 
“charity” was used to describe an apparent virtue rather than an organisation; and 
B) Contained one or more of the references described in (A) above in the body of the 
article itself.  This check was necessary as Nexis UK uses an internal categorisation or 
tagging system to categorise articles by themes.  This led to many articles being 
produced by the searches that contained the subject or keyword search terms in the 
categorisation system that appeared after the article, rather than in the article itself.  
This occurred particularly in relation to the terms “nongovernmental organisations”, 
“relief agencies” and “charities”.  I decided to only include articles that contained 
both the subject and keyword search terms within the articles themselves, both 
because the categorisation system appeared to produce large volumes of irrelevant 
articles and because the general readership of the newspaper (who would not have 
seen Nexis UK’s categorisation system) may not have recognised any link between 
the categorisation applied by Nexis UK and an individual article itself.   Previous 
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research on Lexis-Nexis (which included the current Nexis UK) also validates this 
approach as it found that conducting full-text searches with keywords produced better 
results than relying on using descriptors tagged to articles (Neuzil, 1994). 
 
The result of the article searching and initial checks as described was a set of 969 articles, 
the names and years of which I recorded in an Excel database. 
Filtration of Articles 
 I reviewed all 969 articles and removed those I  deemed irrelevant based on the 
criteria identified below.  These filtration criteria differed for articles containing the keyword 
search term “administration cost” and for articles containing any of the other keywords 
search terms. 
 In sum, I retained all articles from the original set of 969 that contained the keyword 
search term “administration cost” unless they did not include commentary on the 
administration costs of NGOs (as indicated either by reference to one or more of the 77 
specific NGO names identified in Appendix C or one more of the generic subject search 
terms identified in Annex 3 to Appendix B) either by NGOs themselves or by other actors.  
For example, I excluded articles containing the keyword “administration cost” when: 
 NGOs (as indicated either by reference to one or more of the 77 specific NGO names 
identified in Appendix C or one more of the generic subject search terms identified in 
Annex 3 to Appendix B were mentioned peripherally to a discussion of administration 
costs in another context; 
 they referred to the administration costs of organisations that were not NGOs (e.g. 
Hennessey, 2007). 
 
I retained all articles containing any other keyword search terms from the initial set 
unless they did not include commentary on the legitimacy or accountability of NGOs (as 
indicated either by reference to one or more of the 77 specific NGO names identified in 
Appendix C or one more of the generic subject search terms identified in Annex 3 to 
Appendix B)  either by NGOs themselves or other actors or they did not include other 
commentary by NGOs in relation to accountability or legitimacy.  For example, I excluded 
articles when: 
 The accountability or legitimacy of a particular NGO that was not one of the 77 
specific named NGOs identified in Appendix C was being referred to or discussed 
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without additional reference being made to NGOs in general (as indicated by the use 
of one or more of the generic subject search terms in Annex 3 to Appendix B), relief 
and development NGOs in general, or one of the 77 specific named NGOs listed in 
Appendix C; 
 The accountability or legitimacy of a particular type of NGO other than relief and 
development NGOs was being discussed without additional reference being made to 
NGOs in general (as indicated by the use of one or more of the generic subject search 
terms in Annex 3 to Appendix B), relief and development NGOs in general, or one of 
the 77 specific named NGOs listed in Appendix C  - e.g. NGOs that provide services 
to homeless people or people with disabilities in Ireland (e.g. O'Brien, 2009); 
 References to a specific named NGO or NGOs in general were contained in the article 
but were peripheral to any discussion of accountability or legitimacy – e.g. if it was 
mentioned that a named person used to work for one of the 77 NGOs identified in 
Appendix C in the course of an article concerned with the a discussion of 
accountability or legitimacy in another context (e.g. Hughes, 1997); 
 Accountability or legitimacy were mentioned as having been considered at a 
conference or talk attended or organised by NGOs in general (as indicated by the use 
of one or more of the generic subject search terms in Annex 3 to Appendix B), relief 
and development NGOs in general, or one of the 77 specific named NGOs listed in 
Appendix C, and the article contained no other relevant commentary on accountability 
or legitimacy. 
 
I also excluded articles because of the way that Nexis UK presents multiple letters in 
response to a particular article or earlier letter as a single item.  In many cases, a 
keyword search term was found in one of these letters and an NGO name or generic 
subject search term in another letter.  Although both may have been combined by 
Nexis UK into a single unit, they were in fact separate items and I excluded them as a 
result. 
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Appendix G. List of Articles Included  
No. Article Name Year 
1 Charities and accountability (October 25) 1994 
2 Criticism dogs the World Bank and IMF as they redefine global role 1994 
3 Criticisms of World Bank policies start to hit home 1994 
4 Helping Rwanda 1994 
5 Aid programme principles are criticised 1995 
6 Civil rights bodies criticised for neglecting victims of violence 1995 
7 Code of ethics for charity adverts urged 1995 
8 Images of Africa 1995 
9 Nations agree on final UN document 1995 
10 Reforming the UN 1995 
11 Smiley emerges smiling 1995 
12 Supporting the UN 1995 
13 The world and Bosnia 1995 
14 Tribunal told Gorta spent over 50% on administration 1995 
15 UN withdrawal from Somalia 1995 
16 Amnesty claims state forces use summary executions 1996 
17 Burton sets up group to help frame charity law 1996 
18 Charity regulator is launched by Burton 1996 
19 Dignity and freedom are focus of new aid charter 1996 
20 Failure to address specific charges of killings alleged 1996 
21 Senator says Red Cross committee head 'out of touch' on poverty 1996 
22 Aid agencies warned about future support 1997 
23 Aid budget and accountability 1997 
24 Aid to Rwanda 1997 
25 Department suspends GOAL funds 1997 
26 Ecological destruction goes with Asian denial of rights 1997 
27 EU office wants GOAL funds suspended over accounts 1997 
28 GOAL withdraws allegations against Department and agrees to audit 1997 
29 Irish overseas aid 1997 
30 O'Donnell urges regulatory body for agencies 1997 
31 Own GOAL 1997 
32 Simmering dispute culminates in suspension of GOAL 1997 
33 Suspension of GOAL funding 1997 
34 Aid agency calls for world court to police rights 1998 
35 Bill on Third World debt withdrawn  1998 
36 Rights violators 'must be punished' 1998 
37 The Reality of Aid 1998 
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38 Trócaire and political action 1998 
39 Agencies deplore Korean obstruction 1999 
40 Arrest will reverberate throughout charity sector 1999 
41 Banks lacking Third World ethical policy 1999 
42 Charitable tax status 1999 
43 Charities and tax 1999 
44 Competition is fierce among charities for donor pounds 1999 
45 Global trade talks should give special attention to the wretched of earth 1999 
46 Government should build on legacy of neutrality 1999 
47 ISPCC review after fraud inquiry arrest 1999 
48 Making a charity case 1999 
49 O'Donnell will propose greater refugee intake by Ireland 1999 
50 People donate less money and time to charity, survey finds 1999 
51 SDLP warns against Patten retreat 1999 
52 Third World Debt 1999 
53 Third World Debt Cancellation 1999 
54 UNCHR effort in Balkans attracts strong criticism from Oxfam 1999 
55 Watchdog's company requested but mixed welcome is expected 1999 
56 Aid to developing countries 2000 
57 An Irishman's Diary (July 8 2000) 2000 
58 Delayed report on IMF 2000 
59 Giving money to corrupt Third World leaders not the answer 2000 
60 
Irish NGOs offering vital aid to the world's dispossessed as well as advocating 
their cause 2000 
61 New report shows torture used in over 150 countries 2000 
62 Prague gets ready for trouble at finance summit 2000 
63 SDLP warns it will not sit on policing board 2000 
64 Third World corruption 2000 
65 World Bank and IMF 2000 
66 Afghan peace hinges on human rights 2001 
67 AG says charity law needs to be reformed to avoid donation abuses 2001 
68 Call for military exports controls 2001 
69 Genoa protestors signal coming of age of global politics 2001 
70 Government and overseas aid 2001 
71 Human rights record 2001 
72 Inquiry on claim charity gave mailing list names to finance firm 2001 
73 Irish Aid tackles roots of Ethiopian poverty 2001 
74 Language of development co-opted for war purposes 2001 
75 Militarism and not enlargement is what this treaty is really about 2001 
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76 O'Donnell criticises charity regulation 2001 
77 Patent laws and AIDS crisis 2001 
78 Public funding of GOAL 2001 
79 State criticised on human rights record 2001 
80 The business of giving 2001 
81 The events at Mazar-E-Sharif 2001 
82 A growing Concern for those in need 2002 
83 A time bomb for charities 2002 
84 Amnesty critical of refusal to access Irish prisons 2002 
85 Amnesty lists children killed in intifada 2002 
86 Amnesty report finds Israeli army committed war crimes 2002 
87 Argentina's debt crisis 2002 
88 Charitable controversies 2002 
89 Complaint against Concern over the disclosure of donor details 2002 
90 Female genital mutilation 2002 
91 IFA sets emergency meeting on CAP reform proposals 2002 
92 Israel's policy of military segregation must be challenged 2002 
93 Lack of commitment to eradicating poverty 2002 
94 One African girl is saved, amid abject human misery 2002 
95 Putting the money where it counts 2002 
96 Reform of legal system to be widely welcomed 2002 
97 Trade policies condemn millions to hunger 2002 
98 Ugandans are told of Irish concerns over executions 2002 
99 Aftermath of Iraq invasion 2003 
100 Amnesty opposes EU plan for transit camps 2003 
101 Amnesty raises concern on Garda actions 2003 
102 Big business should impose code of practice, say NGOs 2003 
103 Cowen urged to raise rights in Russia 2003 
104 Crisis in the Congo 2003 
105 Development aid to Africa 2003 
106 Farmers' organisations and NGOs must meet 2003 
107 Iraq and Irish neutrality 2003 
108 Little debate at development conference 2003 
109 Palestinians find themselves with nowhere left to go 2003 
110 Trócaire calls on oil firms to act 2003 
111 US war plans against Iraq 2003 
112 Victims regret Amin never faced justice 2003 
113 We have to build competitiveness and jobs in the agriculture sector 2003 
114 Amnesty's concern at EU Agenda 2004 
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115 Banker says charitable groups need to be more accountable 2004 
116 Foreign aid and corruption (14 Dec 2004) 2004 
117 Ireland asked to confront Israel over destroyed homes 2004 
118 Managing to be a volunteer 2004 
119 Need for UN action on Darfur 2004 
120 New aid row over Lenihan remark on spending 2004 
121 Oxfam dismayed by IFA's reaction 2004 
122 Positive ageing 2004 
123 Relations with Burma 2004 
124 Tanáiste pledges law to control domestic arms trade 2004 
125 Taoiseach links aid funds to agencies' capacity 2004 
126 The advocates 2004 
127 US anti-terror policies 'bereft of principle' 2004 
128 All that glitters is not ethical  2005 
129 Charity needs controls, seminar hears 2005 
130 Flawed: diamonds lose their sparkle 2005 
131 Garda, department must address human rights issues 2005 
132 Guantanamo prisoners 2005 
133 Hold on tight to your (EUR115) million dreams 2005 
134 Holding charities to account 2005 
135 Iraqi insurgents guilty of crimes against humanity, says Amnesty 2005 
136 King rules with iron fist as deaths and human rights abuses spiral 2005 
137 Living in hope 2005 
138 Making sure aid is effective is not so simple 2005 
139 Properly reformed UN is the way forward 2005 
140 Response to tsunami disaster 2005 
141 Scams, profiteers wash up in disaster's wake 2005 
142 Set aside the blame game and feed the people in Niger 2005 
143 Shootings at Lusk post office 2005 
144 State accused on rights obligations 2005 
145 The hand that feeds 2005 
146 Tracking the aid: where the charities say your donations go 2005 
147 Tsunami response puts focus on charities sector 2005 
148 Unregulated charities 2005 
149 What's it like to work for ... GOAL? 2005 
150 Aid agency chiefs step down in row over policy and spending 2006 
151 Aid and corruption in Africa (Jan 5 2006) 2006 
152 Aid and corruption in Uganda 2006 
153 Amnesty report accuses Israel of breaching international law 2006 
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154 Charities regulator included in new bill 2006 
155 Charities warn of 'bogus' collectors 2006 
156 EU proposes voluntary registration for lobbyists 2006 
157 Focus on arms trade must include legal weapons 2006 
158 Government attitude to child abuse victims criticised 2006 
159 Human rights in Russia 2006 
160 My working day 2006 
161 Society failing to teach children about justice 2006 
162 Testing charities on your doorstep 2006 
163 Usurping Government's role unacceptable 2006 
164 Aid and corruption in Africa (Dec 14 2007) 2007 
165 Aid and corruption in Africa (June 15 2007) 2007 
166 Aid and corruption in Africa (June 21 2007) 2007 
167 Aid and corruption in Africa (June 26 2007) 2007 
168 Aid and corruption in Africa (March 10 2007) 2007 
169 Amnesty calls for rights minister 2007 
170 Charities face new regulatory regime 2007 
171 Cowen should stop world bank contributions 2007 
172 Doing it for the kids 2007 
173 G8 summit, aid and development 2007 
174 Ireland should lead fight against hunger 2007 
175 Major reform of charities legislation announced 2007 
176 Marking the charity card 2007 
177 Media must scrutinise Irish Aid 2007 
178 Modern Moment 2007 
179 Poor states crippled by illegitimate debt 2007 
180 Reactions to Budget 2008 2007 
181 Rights group exploit China Olympics spotlight 2007 
182 Smart thinking 2007 
183 Turning away from politics of fear 2007 
184 Wolfowitz and the World Bank 2007 
185 Women activists 'repressed' in Zimbabwe 2007 
186 180 killed, thousands tortured in Zimbabwe - Amnesty 2008 
187 Amnesty calls for 'renditions' inquiry 2008 
188 Amnesty chief critical of Government plans to merge human rights agencies 2008 
189 Amnesty report criticises Ireland for gaps in human rights protection 2008 
190 Challenge is to clear up corporate culture 2008 
191 China's policy in Africa 2008 
192 Could Kenya be the next Rwanda? 2008 
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193 Don't lose your head when you donate from the heart 2008 
194 Group of 8 and world poverty 2008 
195 How the poor pay the price of tax breaks for big business 2008 
196 Insurgency, warfare and food crisis bring Somalia to brink of collapse 2008 
197 Is aid channelled through African governments a waste of money? 2008 
198 New best practice code for aid groups 2008 
199 Private sector involvement in Irish overseas aid 2008 
200 Quartet has failed to help Palestinians, say NGOs 2008 
201 We cannot 'deliver' development from outside 2008 
202 We must bypass toxic regimes in Africa when it comes to aid 2008 
203 We must ratify UN corruption convention 2008 
204 Wealthy nations must act in the interest of majority 2008 
205 Amnesty says Israel's Gaza action breached laws of war 2009 
206 Concern welcomes signing into law of charity regulation Act 2009 
207 Human rights forced to take back seat due to global recession, says Amnesty 2009 
208 Ideas aplenty at innovation showcase 2009 
209 Impact of cutting back on aid 2009 
210 Over one billion go hungry every day, summit told 2009 
211 Serbia jails four for 1999 killings 2009 
212 Sharing the pain of economic crisis 2009 
213 Shining light of aid workers must inspire us to protect them 2009 
214 State urged to lead on debt cancellation 2009 
215 The business of charity businesses 2009 
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Appendix H.  Image of Excel Coding Sheet for Variables 1-5. 
Article 
ID 
Article Name Q. 1 
Year 
of 
article 
Q. 2 
Month 
of 
article 
Q. 3 
Number 
of 
words 
in 
article 
Q. 4 
Type 
of 
Article 
Q. 5 
References to 
NGO 
accountability 
If Code 2 is 
allocated 
for Q. 5, & 
if relevant, 
list the 
name of 
the 
NGO/NGOs 
to whom 
the 
comment 
is 
attributed 
If Code 2 is 
allocated for 
Q. 5, & if 
relevant, list 
the name of 
the 
NGO/NGOs 
whose 
accountability 
is being 
referred to. 
If Code 3 is 
allocated for 
Q. 5, & if 
relevant, list 
the name of 
the 
NGO/NGOs 
whose 
accountability 
is being 
referred to. 
If Code 4 is 
allocated 
for Q. 5, & 
if relevant, 
list the 
name of 
the 
NGO/NGOs 
to whom 
the 
comment 
is 
attributed. 
If Code 4 is 
allocated for 
Q. 5, & if 
relevant, list 
the name of 
the 
NGO/NGOs 
whose 
accountability 
is being 
referred to by 
NGOs in 
general or a 
specific 
named 
NGO/NGOs 
If Code 4 is 
allocated for 
Q. 5, & if 
relevant, list 
the name of 
the 
NGO/NGOs 
whose 
accountability 
is being 
referred to by 
another actor. 
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Appendix I. Kappa Calculation Matrixes for Variables With Low Coding Variations. 
 
These calculations were made using graphpad - see 
http://www.graphpad.com/quickcalcs/kappa1.cfm 
 
Variable 8. Claims of accountability by NGOs 
 A B C D E Total    
A 105  3  0  0  0  108 
B 0  0  0  0  0  0 
C 0  0  0  0  0  0 
D 0  0  0  0  0  0 
E 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total 105 3 0 0 0 108 
Number of observed agreements: 105 ( 97.22% of the observations) 
Number of agreements expected by chance: 105.0 ( 97.22% of the observations)  
Kappa= 0.000  
 
Variable 16. References made by other actors to NGO administration costs 
 
 A B C D E F Total 
A 106  1  0  0  0  0  107 
B 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
C 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
D 0  1  0  0  0  0  1 
E 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
F 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total 106 2 0 0 0 0 108 
Number of observed agreements: 106 ( 98.15% of the observations) 
Number of agreements expected by chance: 105.0 ( 97.24% of the observations)  
Kappa= 0.329  
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Variable 18. NGOs questioning or disputing the legitimacy of NGOs or other actors 
 
 A B C D E F G H I Total 
A 92  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  93 
B 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
C 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
D 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
E 8  0  0  0  6  0  0  0  0  14 
F 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
G 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
H 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
I 0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1 
Total 100 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 108 
Number of observed agreements: 98 ( 90.74% of the observations) 
Number of agreements expected by chance: 87.0 ( 80.57% of the observations)  
Kappa= 0.523  
 
Variable 19. Other actors questioning or disputing the  legitimacy of NGOs 
 A B C D E Total 
A 102  2  0  0  0  104 
B 1  3  0  0  0  4 
C 0  0  0  0  0  0 
D 0  0  0  0  0  0 
E 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total 103 5 0 0 0 108 
Number of observed agreements: 105 ( 97.22% of the observations) 
Number of agreements expected by chance: 99.4 ( 92.01% of the observations)  
Kappa= 0.652  
 
 
 
 
 
264 
 
Variable 20. Claims of legitimacy by NGOs 
 A B C D E Total 
A 107  0  0  0  0  107 
B 1  0  0  0  0  1 
C 0  0  0  0  0  0 
D 0  0  0  0  0  0 
E 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total 108 0 0 0 0 108 
Number of observed agreements: 107 ( 99.07% of the observations) 
Number of agreements expected by chance: 107.0 ( 99.07% of the observations)  
Kappa= 0.000  
 
 
Variable 21. Claims of NGO legitimacy by other actors 
 A B C D E Total 
A 103  0  0  0  0  103 
B 2  2  0  0  0  4 
C 0  1  0  0  0  1 
D 0  0  0  0  0  0 
E 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total 105 3 0 0 0 108 
Number of observed agreements: 105 ( 97.22% of the observations) 
Number of agreements expected by chance: 100.3 ( 92.82% of the observations)  
Kappa= 0.613  
 
 
 
 
 
 
